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Abstract
This thesis assesses UK banking liquidity regulation and supervision and the Basel liquidity
requirements, and models banks’ liquidity risk. The study reveals that the FSA’s risk-
assessment framework before 2008 was too general without specifically considering banks’
liquidity risk (as well as its failures on Northern Rock). The study also lists the limitations
of the FSA’s banking liquidity regimes before 2008. The thesis reviews whether the FSA’s
new liquidity regimes after 2008 would have coped with UK banks’ liquidity risks if they
have been applied properly. The fundamental changes in the FSA’s liquidity supervision
reflect three considerations. First, it introduces a systemic control requirement by measuring
individual firm’s liquidity risk with a market-wide stress or combination of idiosyncratic and
market-wide stresses. Second, it emphasizes the monitoring of business model risks and the
capability of senior managers. Third, it allows both internal and external managers to access
more information by increasing the liquidity reporting frequencies.
The thesis also comments on the Basel Liquidity Principles of 2008 and the two Liquidity
Standards. The Principles of 2008 represents a substantial revision of the Principles of 2000
and reflect the lessons of the financial market turmoil since 2007. The study argues that the
implementation of the sound principles by banks and supervisors should be flexible, but also
need to be consistent to make sure they understand banks’ liquidity positions quite well. The
study also explains the composition of the Basel liquidity ratios as well as the side effects of
Basel liquidity standards; for example, it will reshape interbank deposit markets and bond
markets as a result of the increase in demand for ‘liquid assets’ and ‘stable funding’.
This thesis uses quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis, based upon modified ver-
sions of the BCBS (2010b) and Moody’s (2001) models, to estimate eight UK banks’ short
and long-term liquidity positions from 2005 to 2010 respectively. The study shows that only
Barclays Bank remained liquid on a short-term basis throughout the sample period (2005-
2010); while the HSBC Bank also proved liquid on a short-term basis, although not in 2008
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and 2010. On a long-term basis, RBS has remained liquid since 2008 after receiving gov-
ernment support; while Santander UK also proved liquid, except in 2009. The other banks,
especially Natwest, are shown to have faced challenging conditions, on both a short-term
and long-term basis, over the sample period.
This thesis also uses the Exposure-Based Cash-Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) model to forecast
UK banks’ liquidity risk. Based on annual data over the period 1997 to 2010, the study pre-
dicts that by the end of 2011, the (102) UK banks’ average CFaR at the 95% confidence level
will be -£5.76 billion, Barclays Bank’s (Barclays’) CFaR will be -£0.34 billion, the Royal
Bank of Scotland’s (RBS’s) CFaR will be -£40.29 billion, HSBC Bank’s (HSBC’s) CFaR will
be £0.67 billion, Lloyds TSB Bank’s (Lloyds TSB’s) CFaR will be -£4.90 billion, National
Westminister Bank’s (Natwest’s) CFaR will be -£10.38 billion, and Nationwide Building
Society’s (Nationwide’s) CFaR will be -£0.72 billion. Moreover, it is clear that Lloyds TSB
and Natwest are associated with the largest risk, according to the biggest percentage differ-
ence between downside cash flow and expected cash flow (3600% and 816% respectively).
Since I summarize a bank’s liquidity risk exposure in a single number (CFaR), which is the
maximum shortfall given the targeted probability level, it can be directly compared to the
bank’s risk tolerance and used to guide corporate risk management decisions.
Finally, this thesis estimates the long-term United Kingdom economic impact of the
Basel III capital and liquidity requirements. Using quarterly data over the period 1997:q1
to 2010:q2, the study employs a non-linear-in-factor probit model to show increases in bank
capital and liquidity would reduce the probability of a bank crisis significantly. The study
estimates the long-run cost of the Basel III requirements with a Vector Error Correction
Model (VECM), which shows holding higher capital and liquidity would reduce output by
a small amount but increase bank profitability in the long run. The maximum temporary
net benefit and permanent net benefit is shown to be 1.284% and 35.484% of pre-crisis
GDP respectively when the tangible common equity ratio stays at 10%. Assuming all UK
banks also meet the Basel III long-term liquidity requirements, the temporary net benefit
and permanent net benefit will be 0.347% and 14.318% of pre-crisis GDP respectively.
Therefore, the results suggest that, in terms of the impact on output, there is considerable
room to further tighten capital and liquidity requirements, while still providing positive
effects for the United Kingdom economy.
JEL Classifications: C15; C22; C32; C53; C81; G01; G21; G28; G32; G38
Thesis Supervisors: Maximilian J.B. Hall and Paul M Turner.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 The motivation of the research
The global financial crisis starting from the summer of 2007 is considered by many economists
to be the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930s. It resulted in the
threat of total collapse of large financial institutions, the bailout of banks by national gov-
ernments, and downturns in stock markets around the world. The crisis played a significant
role in the failure of key businesses, declines in consumer wealth estimated in trillions of
US dollars, and a downturn in economic activity leading to the 2008-2012 global recession
and contributing to the European sovereign-debt crisis. The International Monetary Fund
estimated that large U.S. and European banks lost more than $1 trillion on toxic assets and
from bad loans from January 2007 to September 2009. These losses are expected to top $2.8
trillion from 2007-10.U.S. banks’ losses were forecast to hit $1 trillion and European bank
losses will reach $1.6 trillion. The IMF estimated that U.S.banks are about 60% through
their losses, but British and eurozone banks only 40%.
The active phase of the crisis, which manifested as a liquidity crisis, can be dated from
August 7, 2007 when BNP Paribas terminated withdrawals from three hedge funds citing ‘a
complete evaporation of liquidity’. The financial crisis was triggered by a complex interplay
of government policies that encouraged home ownership, providing easier access to loans for
subprime borrowers, and by an over-valuation of bundled sub-prime mortgages based on the
theory that housing prices would continue to escalate. Questions regarding bank solvency,
declines in credit availability and damaged investor confidence had an impact on global
stock markets, where securities suffered large losses during 2008 and early 2009. Economies
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worldwide slowed during this period, as credit tightened and international trade declined.
Given this experience, many economists have offered theories about how financial crises
develop and how they could be prevented. Since this global financial crisis was largely about
a drying-up liquidity, this research would like to focus on measuring the real liquidity risk
positions of banks and how to monitor and prevent such problem occurring again. According
to the study of the FSA(2008a), it is clear to see liquidity crises are not as rare as people may
imagine. As the FSA (2009d) mentioned, firms do not have large enough incentives to build
sufficient resilience into their liquidity stresses and hold appropriate levels of liquidity. It is
thus justified for regulators to force banks to adopt higher liquidity management standards
and advanced liquidity risk measurements.
1.2 The objectives and contributions of the study
Although liquidity stresses are usually considered as low probability events, liquidity crises
are not as rare as people imagine since a bank’s liquidity position is sensitive to the market
failures. However, liquidity regulation has not received adequate attention since the end of
the 1990s, either in the UK or internationally. Many scholars and officials have now realized
that measuring and managing bank liquidity risk are as important as capital or solvency
risk management. With respect to liquidity management, the BIS published a consultative
paper in June 2008 entitled ‘Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision’ (BCBS,
2008). The FSA also introduced a new liquidity regime in October 2009 (FSA, 2009d).
With respect to the liquidity risk measurement, the IMF reviewed its stress test experience
in 2008 (Stoiz et al., 2008). The Bank of England has focused on the management of
funding liquidity risk in global markets since the end of 2008 (Aikman et al., 2009). And
the European Central Bank provided a new measurement of funding liquidity risk in 2009
(Nikolaou and Drehmann, 2009).
This thesis studies liquidity regulation and supervision of the UK banking industry. My
objectives in this thesis are as follows:
First, I study the theory on the economic rationale of financial regulation by answering
the following questions. What is the development history of financial regulation? What
can we learn from the global financial crisis of 2007-2009? Is it necessary to have financial
regulation? What are the main purposes of financial regulation? How can supervisors
improve modern financial regulation frameworks to prevent serious financial crisis and boost
the real economy?
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Second, I emphasize the economic rationale of liquidity regulation by replying the fol-
lowing questions. What is the definition of liquidity risk? Is central banks’ liquidity support
enough to address systemic liquidity problems? What is the relationship between liquidity
regulation and central bank liquidity provision?
Third, I examine the Basel Committee’s liquidity regulation and supervision. Are there
any areas missed in the Committee’s focus on liquidity risk in its Liquidity Principles of 2008?
What are the academic and industry views on Basel’s liquidity regulation and supervision?
What are the compositions of the Basel Liquidity Ratios? And what are the peoples’ views
on the Basel Liquidity Ratios?
Fourth, I assess the UK banks’ liquidity regulation and supervision by its single regulator,
the Financial Services Authority. Specially, I answer the following questions. Did UK banks
take more risky businesses and become ‘casino banks’ in the last decade? Is the FSA’s
previous risk assessment framework sufficient in terms of monitoring and controlling risks?
How did the FSA fail to supervise high impact banks, such as the Northern Rock? What
were the limitations of the FSA’s banking liquidity regimes before 2008? How can the new
regimes after 2008 cope with UK banks’ liquidity risks?
Fifth, I apply a quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis to measure short-term and
long-term liquidity risk positions for UK banks. Besides answering the question ‘How liquid
are UK banks?’, I also explain why the Basel Liquidity Ratios cannot accurately present a
bank’s real liquidity risk position and why my analysis is superior to other ratio analyses. I
also explain the limitations of the quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis.
Sixth, I develop a dynamic model to forecast UK banks’ liquidity positions. The model
measures UK banks’ individual and systemic liquidity risks by calculating downside risk,
known as Cash-Flow-at-Risk. I try to answer the question ‘What are the differences between
the Cash-Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) model and the Value-at-Risk (VaR) model?’ Other questions
addressed include: ‘Why cannot the classic VaR model measure a bank’s liquidity risk?’;
‘Does the UK banking industry suffer liquidity pressure?’; and ‘Can my exposure-based
CFaR model help senior managers to develop a proper strategy to manage liquidity risk?’
Seventh, I provide a cost-benefit analysis of Basel III’s tighter capital and liquidity re-
quirements on the UK economy. Specially, I calculate the average capital and liquidity revel
of the UK banking industry. The questions addressed include: ‘What is the relationship
between capital or liquidity ratio and changes in the probability of a banking crisis occur-
ring?’; ‘What are the temporary expected benefits or permanent expected benefits of the
new requirements?’; ‘What are the long-term economic costs of the new requirements?’; and
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‘Do the new requirements have net positive or negative effects on the UK economy?’
The contributions of this research are listed below:
1. I set out the necessity for financial regulation by briefly reviewing the huge impact of
the global financial crisis of 2007-2009.
2. I explain liquidity provision operation of central banks would not be enough to address
liquidity crises, but increase moral hazard problems in the banking sector.
3. I examine the Basel Liquidity Principles and Liquidity Ratios of 2008 in great detail.
4. I provide a good and concise introduction to the FSA’s risk-assessment framework and
liquidity regime adopted since 1998.
5. I analyze the political economy of liquidity regulation.
6. I give a special focus on developing advanced models to measure liquidity risk for the
banking industry.
7. I apply a quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis to measure the short-term and
long-term liquidity risk positions for UK banks. The first contribution of this analysis
is to take a comprehensive look at the banks’ consolidated balance sheet informa-
tion. The second contribution of this framework is to measure a bank’s short-term
or long-term liquidity position using a single number (‘liquidity coverage’ or ‘net cash
capital’, respectively). The third contribution of this approach is to explain why the
previous intra-day or one week liquidity focus no longer ensures a bank can survive
an unexpected, serious systemic bank crisis.
8. I measure banks’ liquidity risk by calculating downside risk, known as Cash-Flow-at-
Risk (or CFaR), which can be directly compared to the banks’ risk tolerance and used
to guide corporate risk management decisions. Furthermore, I estimate exposure-based
CFaRs for UK banks, which involves the estimation of the set of exposure coefficients
that provide information about how various macroeconomic and market variables are
expected to affect the banks’ cash flow, and that also attempt to take account of inter-
dependencies and correlations among such effects. For these reasons, they can also be
used to predict how a hedging contract or change in financial structure will affect a
bank’s risk profile.
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9. I provide Cost-Benefit analysis of the Basel III requirements. I quantify the long-term
economic impact of the new requirements for the UK economy in one of the first stand-
alone country analyses of the combined impact of the recently-agreed changes to the
international standards for banks’ capital and liquidity. I also calculate the capital and
liquidity ratios based on the Basel III definitions, rather than the more commonly used
Tier 1 capital ratio and the Loans-to-Deposits liquidity ratio. Third, I use the non-
linear probit model to estimate the relationship between the probability of a banking
crisis and banking capital and liquidity by considering the imperfect substitutability
between UK banks’ capital and liquidity. And fourth, I estimate the long-run cost of
the requirements with a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), which shows holding
higher capital and liquidity would reduce output by a small amount but increase bank
profitability in the long run.
10. Finally, I use a comprehensive and recent dataset to provide updated evidence.
1.3 The structure of the thesis
The thesis is organized in eight chapters, as follows:
Chapter 2: The Economic Rational of Financial Regulation
This chapter outlines the economic rationale of financial regulation by summarising the
lessons of the global financial crisis of 2007-2009. The economic rationale for financial regula-
tions is in part to deal with the existence of negative externalities, which suggest the collapse
of illiquid banks might contaminate other solvent banks and generate economic distress. As
Hall (1991) points out, informational asymmetries are very common in the banking sector.
The rationale of regulation in this area does not only need to protect consumers from inter-
mediaries with information advantages, but also to make sure that regulators can prevent
banks’ hazardous behaviour by requiring enough relevant information disclosure. The third
economic rationale for financial regulation relates to the need for continuous monitoring of
the fiduciary role of financial institutions. It is sub-optimal or even impossible for indi-
vidual consumers to monitor such complex financial products, for example Collateralized
Debt Obligations (CDOs) backed by subprime mortgages. The fourth economic rationale
for regulation relates to consumer confidence. The main purpose of governments’ largest
liquidity injections in the last four years is to restore market confidence and limit taxpayers’
risk. The last economic rationale for regulation relates to potential ‘Grid Lock’ problems,
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which describe a phenomenon where a huge systemic paralysis is caused by herd behaviour
which may even result from rational firms pursuing maximum personal benefits. After 2003,
both commercial and investment banks increased leverage to pursue high-profit scuritization
businesses. An important lesson we learn from the recent crisis is that financial deregulation
or ‘non-regulation’ would not help to build up a healthy financial system and boost the real
economy in the long term. Without restraining risky actions and protecting consumers,
the unsafe and unsound practices adopted by ‘casino banks’ would eventually destroy the
financial markets as a whole and shrink social welfare. The chapter also liquidity regulation
is essential to prevent systemic liquidity crisis by requiring banks maintain enough liquidity
all the time and improve internal liquidity risk management frameworks.
Chapter 3:An Assessment of the changes of Liquidity Regulations in the
Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and UK Financial Services Authority
This chapter firstly compare the Basel Liquidity Principles of 2008 and the Principles
of 2000. The Principles of 2008 represents a substantial revision of the Principles of 2000
and reflect the lessons of the financial market turmoil since 2007. It adds that the work is
drawn from recent and ongoing work on liquidity risk by the public and private sectors and is
intended to strengthen banks’ liquidity risk framework to withstand a range of stress events,
including those that affect secured and unsecured funding. I also examine the comments on
the Principles of 2008 by 30 interested parties. All commentators welcomed the updated
Liquidity Principles. I argue that it would be better for financial institutions to measure
their own liquidity risk tolerance with an explicit example given by the Basel Committee.
Since banks can deal with their own liquidity costs in a variety of ways, there is a chance that
banks mislead customers by increasing prices of commercial loans and decrease the prices
of other investment products. The assumptions of the stress tests should accommodate the
nature of the bank’s business and complexity of the bank’s activities. The stress test analysis
should be reviewed by senior management on a regular basis to make sure that the bank can
fully operate even in the worst scenarios. In order to avoid excessively-detailed regulation
and to effectively protect customers’ interests, banks should provide material quantitative
information as well as qualitative information on time. I explain the compositions of the
Basel Committee’s short-term Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) and long-term Net Stable
Funding Ratio (NSFR). I argue that a one-size-fits-all assumption for the LCR and the
NSFR cannot be adapted to different economic structures. It will reshape interbank deposit
markets and bond markets as a result of the increase in demand for ‘liquid assets’ and ‘stable
funding’. However, this balance-sheet ratio analysis is still an advanced and very important
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approach to measure banks’ liquidity risk positions.
This chapter secondly retrospects the financial risk outlook for the UK banking industry
in the last decade. I find out that banks began to take on more risky businesses after
2005. Then I review the FSA’ general risk management framework and list the ‘failures’
in the FSA’s role as banking supervisor for high impact banks, like Northern Rock. These
failures included the frequently changing supervisory responsibility, inadequate ARROW
panel meetings to review risk positions, non-availability of regular management information
to identify emerging risks and re-assess business risks, and little emphasis on liquidity risk
and the use of market intelligence. I also assess the FSA’s previous liquidity regime which
operated from 1998 to 2008. However, the liquidity regime is no longer appropriate to reflect
banks’ real liquidity risk positions after 2005. This chapter analyzes the FSA’s new liquidity
regime in great detail. The new standards fully implement the Basel Committee’s ‘Principles
for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision’ (BCBS, 2008). The fundamental
changes in the FSA’s liquidity supervision reflect three considerations. First, it introduces
a systemic control requirement by measuring individual firms’ liquidity risk with a market-
wide stress or combination of idiosyncratic and market-wide stresses. Second, it emphasizes
the monitoring of business model risks and the capability of senior managers. Third, it
allows both internal and external managers to access more information by increasing the
liquidity reporting frequencies.
Finally, this chapter discusses the reasonable framework of the two policy tools (i.e.
liquidity regulation and central bank liquidity provision operation) to deal with liquidity
based financial crises. The introduction of liquidity regulation should reduce dependence
on the central bank as a lender of last resort. With the implements of liquidity regulation
and central banking, central banks should support the regulatory effort to reduce reliance of
banks on the central banks and ensure that banks price the liquidity risks of their activities.
Chapter 4: How Liquid Are UK Banks?
This chapter uses quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis, based upon modified
versions of the BCBS (2010b) and Moody’s (2001) models, to estimate UK banks’ short and
long-term liquidity positions respectively. The study also presents fundamental financial
information to facilitate analysis of banks’ business models and funding strategies. Using
data for the period 2005-2010, I provide evidence that there have been variable liquidity
strains across the UK banks in our sample. The estimated results show that Barclays Bank
was the only bank to maintain a healthy short-term liquidity position throughout the sample
period; while HSBC remained liquid in the short term, in both normal and stress conditions,
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except in 2008 and 2010. RBS, meanwhile, maintained healthy long-term liquidity positions
from 2008 after receiving government injections of capital. And Santander UK was also able
to post healthy long-term liquidity positions, except in 2009. However, the other four banks,
the Bank of Scotland, Lloyds TSB, Natwest, and Standard Chartered, proved illiquid, on
both a short-term and long-term basis, throughout the six-year period, with Natwest being
by far the worst performer.
Chapter 5: Estimating Liquidity Risk Using the Exposure-Based Cash-Flow-
at-Risk Approach: An Application to the UK Banking Sector
This chapter uses a relatively-new quantitative model for estimating UK banks’ liquidity
risk. The model is called the Exposure-Based Cash-Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) model, which not
only measures a bank’s liquidity risk tolerance, but also helps to improve liquidity risk
management through the provision of additional risk exposure information. Using data for
the period 1997-2010, I provide evidence that there is variable funding pressure across the
UK banking industry, which was forecasted to be slightly illiquid with a small amount of
expected cash outflow (i.e. £0.06 billion) in 2011. In my sample of the six biggest UK banks,
only the HSBC maintains positive CFaR with 95% confidence, which means that there was
only a 5% chance that HSBC’s cash flow would drop below £0.67 billion by the end of 2011.
RBS was expected to face the largest liquidity risk with a 5% chance that the bank would
face a cash outflow that year in excess of £40.29 billion. My estimates also suggest Lloyds
TSB’s cash flow is the most volatile of the six biggest UK banks, because it has the biggest
deviation between its downside cash flow (i.e. CFaR) and expected cash flow.
Chapter 6: Cost Benefit Analysis Of Basel III: Some Evidence from the UK
This chapter provides a long-term cost-benefit analysis for the United Kingdom of the
Basel III capital and liquidity requirements proposed by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS, 2010c). I provide evidence that the Basel III reforms will have a
significant net positive long-term effect on the United Kingdom economy. The estimated
optimal tangible common equity capital ratio is 10% of risk-weighted assets, which is larger
than the Basel III target of 7%. I also estimate the maximum net benefit when banks meet
the Basel III long-term liquidity requirements. My estimated permanent net benefit is larger
than the average estimates of the BCBS. This significant marginal benefit suggests that UK
banks need to increase their reliance on common equity in their capital base beyond the
level required by Basel III as well as boosting customer deposits as a funding source.
Chapter 7: Conclusions
Finally, Chapter 7 ends the thesis by setting out the main findings and contributions of
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my study. Opportunities for further research are also discussed.
26
Chapter 2
The Economic Rationale of
Financial Regulation
2.1 Introduction
Financial regulation is a legislative ‘product’ to establish standard rules of behavior for
each participant (Llewellyn, 1999). Features of financial regulation before the 1930s can be
described as spontaneity, initial imperfection, and monotony (Mitchener, 2004). The long
time depression of the whole economy was a consequence of massive bank and stock market
failures. It is evident from Hall (1999) that modern financial regulation and supervision
was made after a serious crisis. The main purpose is to prevent a recurrence of crisis.
The period 1930 to 1970 was an era of strict supervision with comprehensive restrictions
involving, inter alia, the segregation of financial business services, the control of interest
rates, and limitations on trading in international money markets. Between 1970 and 1990,
financial deregulation was used to increase competition. For example, under the Glass-
Steagall Act, American depository institutions lost market shares to securities firms that
were not so strictly regulated (Hall, 1993). The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 was a
significant moment for financial deregulation in the U.S which allowed the mixed operation
of commercial and investment banking businesses. Through post-mortems on a series of
banking crises in the 1990s, economists realized that outdated regulation is a major reason
for bank runs. An advanced and global regulatory framework was urgently demanded after
2007 to prevent systemic risk which is brought about by complex and sometimes toxic
financial innovations.
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In order to illustrate the necessity for financial regulation, Section 2.2 outlines the eco-
nomic rationale of financial regulation by summarizing the lessons of the global financial
crisis of 2007-2009. Section 2.3 explains the economic rationale of liquidity regulation. And
Section 2.4 summarises and concludes.
2.2 The Economic Rationale of Financial Regulation
Over a decade of financial deregulation and outdated supervisory systems are two of the
main causes of the recent financial crisis (United States Senate, 2011). Before judging the
failures of regulators and supervisors and recommending to build up of advanced supervisory
frameworks, it is essential to emphasize the necessity of financial regulation (Llewellyn, 1999)
by reviewing the problems we have faced since 2007.
2.2.1 Existence of Negative Externalities
Banks are susceptible to the domino model of contagion1 (Brunnermeier et al., 2009). There-
fore, the economic rationale for financial regulation is in part to deal with the existence of
negative externalities, which might:
1. Contaminate solvent banks.
G7 finance minister forecast global sub-prime-related losses could reach $400 billion
(David et al., 2008) All the financial institutions in the world which participate in sub-
prime loan or subprime securities, have suffered huge losses. Table 2.1 lists the asset
writedowns and credit losses for the major institutions. Citigroup, Merrill Lynch, and
UBS took the biggest losses because of their worldwide subprime-related business.
Because of losses on financial derivatives plus collapses in the housing and whole-
sale funding markets, highly-leveraged hedge funds faced serious liquidity problems.
Bear Sterns’ two hedge funds, High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund and
High Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leverage Fund were forced into
bankrupt in July 2007. In August 2007, BNP announced a rescue of its two hedge
funds. And, in March 2008, Carlyle Capital, belonging to the Carlyle Group, was
forced to liquidate because it defaulted on about $16.6bn of debt.
1Suppose that bank A has borrowed from bank B, and bank B has borrowed from bank C. If A fails to
pay back, then B will suffer a loss. If the loss is large enough to make B default, C then will take the loss.
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Table 2.1: Writedowns & Losses from sub-prime-related business
Name $bn
Citigroup 55.1
Merrill Lynch 51.8
UBS 44.2
HSBC 27.4
Wachovia 22.5
Bank of America 21.2
IKB Deutsche 15.3
Royal Bank of Scotland 14.9
Washington Mutual 14.8
Morgan Stanley 14.4
JP Morgan Chase 14.3
Deutsch Bank 10.8
Credit Suisse 10.5
Wells Fargo 10
Barclays 9.1
Lehman Brothers 8.2
Source: Onaran (2008).
The collapse of an illiquid bank might be eventually followed by a large number of
other liquid banks because depositors or creditors are unable to discriminate between
liquid and illiquid banks. It is obvious that a liquid bank cannot meet demand from
depositors who withdraw all their money at the same time unless it sells assets or
borrows the funds with high transaction costs. It became even harder in 2008 because
of the drying up of the market for both securitized credit assets and wholesale funding.
Liquidity crises at individual firms can lead to systemic instability. This, in fact
proved to be the case during the recent financial crisis. Between 2007 and 2009,
Lehman Brothers and Washington Mutual collapsed; Bear Stern, Merrill Lynch and
HBOS were sold to JP Morgan, Bank of America, and Lloyds TSB respectively; and
AIG, Fannie Mac, Freddie Mac, Citigroup, Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley
were nationalized. By the end of 2009, almost 100 banks also had gone bust in the
United States since the beginning of the Sub-prime crisis(FDIC, 2009). The FDIC
also revealed 171 bank failures in the third quarter of 2008.
2. Generate economic distress due to bank failures.
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The difficulties in the financial system had already brought a marked global economic
decline in the middle of 2008. US house prices year-on-year fell by 18.2% in November
2008 following an 18% fall a month earlier (according to the Case-Shiller index), pre-
saging further sub-prime-related losses for investors (Hall, 2009). UK house prices also
showd their biggest annual fall since the Nationwide began its housing survey in 1991,
a decline of 8.1% in 2008. Average oil prices shrunk from 140 dollars to 40 dollars per
barrel between July 2008 and March 2009, indicating a sharp decline in demand for
goods and services. The WTO (2009) also made a gloomy forecast on 24th of March
2009 that global trade would decline in 2009 by 9%.
In April 2009, the International Monetary Fund (2009) reported that global GDP is
estimated to contract by 6.25% in the fourth quarter of 2008, and global economic
output to fall in 2009 by 0.5% to 1%, the worst performance since World War II. The
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development expected, in September
2009, the GDP growth rate of rich countries in 2009 to fall by 4.1%, and the output
in the UK to contract by 4.3% , as opposed to the previous predictions of 3.7%. The
(Elmeskov, 2009) . IMF expected global growth in 2009 to be 2.2%. The World Bank’s
Global Economic Prospects forcasted: global GDP of 3.3% in 2010 and 3.3% in 2011.
According to the Bureau of Economic Analysis, the US economy contracted by 5%
at an annualisd rate in the third quarter of 2009, the worst performance since 1987.
The Office for National Statistics reported that the UK economy contracted by 6.1%
at an annualised rate in the second quarter of 2009, the worst performance recorded
for 30 years. Its GDP growth rate quarter on quarter slowed to zero in the second
quarter of 2008, ending a 16-year run of positive growth for the UK economy. The
Janpanese Cabinet Office revealed that the Japanese economy contracted by 9.4% at
an annualised rate in the second quarter of 2009. And the Germany Federal Statistical
Office announced that its economy contracted by 6.8% at an annualised rate in the
third quarter of 2009. Growth in China also slowed significantly in 2012 because of such
a fragile external environment. As regards the labour market, Japan’s unemployment
rate rose to 5.6% in August 2009, the highest level recorded for five years. In November
2009, the US unemployment rate rose to 10%, the highest level since 1983. And, in
Janurary 2012, the UK suffered its highest unemployment rate, of, 8.5% since 1992 2.
3. Increase the cost of deposit insurance.
2Data are available on the Trading Economics website http://www.tradingeconomics.com.
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Deposit insurance is a measure implemented by governments to protect bank deposi-
tors against losses caused by a bank’s inability to pay its debts when due. The need
for deposit insurance arises mainly from the fact that banks are in the business of
lending money from depositors’ accounts. The danger lies in the fact that if a bank’s
customers sense that their bank is having some kind of financial problems, perhaps
due to borrowers defaulting on loans, their incentive is to get their money out while
they still can. When a bank’s depositors all do this at once, it is said that there is
a run on the bank. Because a bank only holds a fraction of its customers’ money on
reserve as cash at any given time, not everyone will be able to get their money out
immediately. Those who can get it, do so, and without any cash left on hand, the
bank usually has no choice but to go out of business.
Deposit insurance systems are one of the financial system safety nets that are meant
to promote financial stability; however, it always faces problems. On the one hand,
deposit insurance agencies cannot efficiently control costs because it is difficult to
calculate risk premiums for risk-loving bankers. On the other hand, since deposits are
held by almost everyone in a country, it has become impossible for governments to
refuse to bail out insolvent banks (Benston and Kaufman, 1996) . As from October
2008, many EU countries, starting with the United Kingdom, were in the process of
increasing the amounts covered by their deposit insurance schemes. On October 7,
2008, the EU’s ministers of finance agreed to increase the minimum amount to 50,000
euro, and, after one year, to 100,000 euro; and the UK raised coverage from 35,000
pounds to 50,000 pounds and ended ‘co-insurance’. Two years later, the UK raised
the amount of deposit insurance coverage to 85,000 pounds (on January 1, 2011).
2.2.2 Potential problems associated with Asymmetric Information
Hall (1991) points out that informational asymmetries are very common in the banking
sector. The rationale of regulation in this area does not only need to protect consumers
from intermediaries with informational advantages, but also to make sure that regulators
can prevent banks’ hazardous behaviour by requiring enough information disclosure.
1. The asymmetric information between the suppliers of financial services and consumers.
Mortgage loan agents are incentivised to encourage customers to buy expensive houses
to gain more Origination Fees from mortgage loans. Since agents’ Origination Fees
are only related to the volume of loans, some of them ignored borrowers’ payment
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abilities, and encouraged borrowers to refinance by pledging current mortgage loans.
Some of these brokers also taught borrowers how to ‘cheat’ on loan application forms
and enhance their credit records without any increase in income. By 2006, half of
US subprime mortgage loans were made for unwaged borrowers. Investment banks
then sold those packaged sub-prime mortgages based on rating agency reports. It is a
common sense in the securities investment theory that high risk offers the prospect of
high return, while low risk provides low returns. However, the US subprime securities
were considered as low risk by credit rating agencies, even though its returns were
higher than yields on government bonds or company debts. This misrepresenting of
the risk attracted across of investors into sub-prime securities investment so many
investors to purchase.
In early April 2009, Citigroup and the Bank of America reported accounting but not
real profits, which came from a fall in debt prices (i.e. of some structured trading
instruments) rather than from prudent investment. This game, which banks were
playing to redeem their debts from investors, is a typical case of asymmetric informa-
tion. The rapid discounting of the price of banks’ debts is due to countless worried
investors who sold securities unsure whether the banks would redeem them at par. But
banks know that rather better, since the decision largely rests with these ‘animals’.
2. The asymmetric information between the suppliers of financial services and the finan-
cial regulators.
Regulated firms with information advantages can escape supervision even though they
submit ‘proper’ information to regulators. Even worse, they could provide inadequate
information and fictitious financial reports to mislead regulators. For example, there
was no explanation of backed assets of 95% investment CDO, nor any risk warning
anyalsis. Some AAA-rated of CDOs were even constructed using junk securities or
sub-prime mortgage loans.
Moreover, banking monopolies and cartels are a significant threat in developed coun-
tries. These influential companies, with high profits and good social connections, are
able to cheat on regulators. Citigroup used an ‘ advantage accounting approach ’ to
help Greece to become an European Union member in 2001, by ‘ writing off ’ over ¿1
billion debt to meet the requirement that each European Union country should hold
its deficit below 3% of GDP. The huge Greek government debt created an even more
serious and unavoidable European sovereign-debt crisis 10 years later.
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3. Existence of fraud.
Economic fraud not only destroys costumers’ wealth, but could also disturb financial
markets or cause a severe financial crisis. In recent years, financial regulators across the
world worked hard to tackle economic crimes. One of the famous cases is the arresting
of Bernard Madoff, a non-executive chairman of the NASDAQ stock exchange. He had
been operating a classic Ponzi Scheme3 to cheat thousands of clients out of around
$65 billion since the early 1990s. In order to maintain the high investment return
promised to his clients, he had committed numerous counts of fraud, including money
laundering and perjury in the New York Federal court.
In October 2007, a New York law firm mentioned that First American Corporation, a
real estate raging agency, colluded with Washington Mutual Inc to increase real house
prices.
In April 2010, the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filed charges against
Goldman Sachs of securities fraud. And Goldman Sachs subsequently agreed to pay
$550 million to the SEC to settle the charges of securities fraud linked to mortgage
investments and acknowledging a ’mistake‘ in failing to reveal to clients certain infor-
mation.
On 27 June 2012, Barclays Bank was fined $200 million by the Commodity Futures
Trading Commission, $160 million by the United States Department of Justice and
£59.5 million by the Financial Services Authority for the attempted manipulation of
the Libor and Euribor rates. Barclays manipulated rates for at least two reasons.
Routinely, from at least as early as 2005, traders sought particular rate submissions
to benefit their financial positions. And, later, during the 2007C2012 global financial
crisis, they artificially lowered rate submissions to make their bank seem healthy.
2.2.3 A need for Continuous Monitoring of the fiduciary role of financial
institutions
The third economic rationale for financial regulation relates to the need for continuous
monitoring of the fiduciary role of financial institutions. According to Llewellyn (1999),
there are several features of financial products which require a continuous check, for the
sake of avoiding hazardous behaviour:
3 A fraudulent investment operation that pays returns to investors from their own money or money paid
by subsequent new investors rather than from any actual profit earned.
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1. The nature of long-term contracts usually associated with principal-agent problems.
Banks and insurers, eager to shift risk by extending sub-prime mortgage-related busi-
ness, never looked into the eyes of borrowers to take account of their creditors’ interests.
2. The difficult of testing the quality of financial products at the point of sale. In the
stock market, some stock brokers make purchasing decisions which ultimately benefit
their own interests.
3. The impossibility to value an investment product because of the uncertain behaviour
of the suppliers after the point of purchase, especially when managers are motivated
by a short-term bonus system. As a result, the future welfare of consumers would be
very vulnerable.
For example, CDOs comprising financial derivatives of subprime mortgages, played a key
role in triggering the 2007 sub-prime securities crisis which eventually impacted on equity
and credit markets, and the global economy. CDOs are structured according to different
default risks. The first and riskiest tranche is usually taken by issuers, and other investors
choose different tranches based on their risk and return appetite. Therefore, CDO mar-
ket participants involve both individual and institutional investors across the world. The
purpose of a CDO is to diversify risk by allowing the investor to hold unrelated assets;
however, because of the unprecedented prosperity of the US housing market, issuers pack-
aged vast amount of similar mortgage assets into CDOs to pursue higher return but ignored
their risk. In addition, imperfectly-understood valuation models force investors to depend
on professional rating agencies to measure the value of CDOs 4. Meanwhile, rating agen-
cies elaborately enhanced the credibility of risky CDOs making those derivatives favorated
investment products. For example, since rating agencies use a ‘AAA’ rating as the same
standard to signify the lowest risk level for both government securities and CDOs, it is easy
to mislead investors in treating these types of CDO as equal to government securities, but
with a higher return. In the 1990s, the annual issuing of CDO was less than $250 billion but,
in 2006, the total issuing volume arried at $2750 billion, with sub-prime mortgaged-backed
CDOs amounting to $1000 billion.
It is sub-optimal or even impossible to individual consumers monitor such complex
business. Firstly, unprofessional monitors without effective power may not prevent risky
4Between 2005 and 2007, Standard & Poor‘s rated 85% of mortgage-backed CDOs as ‘AAA’, but some
of these CDOs were not worth anything by the end of 2007
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actions being performed by influential financial institutions. Secondly, if all consumers
spend time monitoring the issuing firms, the substantial costs of duplicated supervision
may ultimately erode consumer benefits. Therefore, delegating to a specialist regulator
with enforcement power would be a superior option.
2.2.4 The need to Maintain Confidence
The fifth economic rationale for regulation relates to consumer confidence. Under stressed
circumstances, without regulation and government support, the reduction in demand for
services and contracts may have damaging economic consequences. On 5th March 2009, Wen
Jiabao, the Premier of the P.R. China, called for market confidence and said that ‘confidence
is much more valuable than gold’. The Financial Times editorial on 19th February 2009
put it this way: ‘if everyone did the right thing by saving during a recession, the economy
would slide further, possibly touching off a deflationary spiral’. The purpose of regulation
is to clear the market ‘lemons’ 5 and to rebuild consumers’ confidence (Llewellyn, 1999).
The main purpose of governments’ largest liquidity injections in history is to restore
market confidence and limit taxpayers’ risk. The US,the UK, and Eurozone countries have
used ‘quantitative easing’ to reduce market funding stress by increasing the money supply.
Many other countries, including China, announced their stimulus packages to help boost
the economy as well as consumer confidence6.
2.2.5 The ‘Grid Lock’ problems
The fifth economic rationale for regulation relates to potential ‘Grid Lock’ problems. Economists
apply the term ‘grid lock’ to describe a phenomenon where a huge systemic paralysis is
caused by herd behaviour which may even result from rational firms pursuing maximum
personal benefits. Llewellyn (1999) argues that the emergence of grid lock problems may
induce herd-like behaviour of banks in line with other banks and lead to excessive system
risk.
Under grid lock, associated with adverse selection and moral hazard, it is difficult to tell
the difference between ‘good’ firms and ‘bad’ firms. The threat from adverse selection is
that ‘good’ firms are unable to differentiate themselves from others. The problem of moral
5This is a clear cost as consumer welfare falls if mis-priced inappropriate products are purchased. Like-
wise, it is also costly to reject appropriate products.
6For more information see (Guille´n, 2012).
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hazard is that ‘good’ firms are inclined to adopt hazardous conduct because of the pressures
from competition. Hardin (1968) used the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ to vividly illustrate
such disaster without efficient regulation.
Pursuing higher remuneration, managers of financial intermediaries have never done
everything according to their financial capacities over the last twenty years. After 2003, both
commercial and investment banks increased leverage to pursue high profit securitization
businesses. Average investment banks’ leverage reached more than 40 in 2006 compared
with 25 years ago. Northern Rock, which used to be a star bank in the UK, only held £1.5
billion liquidity insurance against its 75% wholesale funding source.
The other rationale for regulations relates to imperfect competition. It is not covered in
this chapter, because of limited relevenc to the current financial crisis.
2.3 The Economic Rationale of Liquidity Regulation
2.3.1 The Meaning of Liquidity Risk
The term ‘liquidity’ is anything but well defined. Back in the nineteenth century, Knies
(1876) stressed the necessity for a cash buffer to bridge negative gaps between payment in-
flows and outflows in the cases where their timing cannot be completely regulated (requiring
secured payments is the classical view especially concerning short-term liquidity). In the
last century the issue was also taken up and intensely discussed, as for example initiated
by Stu¨tzel (1959). The further discussions primarily centered on basic considerations such
as the relationship between liquidity and level of solvency (Stu¨tzel, 1983) or the distinction
between the level of liquidity reserves and its structure (Witte, 1964). Around the mid-
1990s, a new wave started to focus on specific issues of liquidity management, but only
touches policy issues related to liquidity. For example, requiring permanent trad-ability of
capital market products without undue price concessions. The long intervals certainly have
not helped to clarify the term. More importantly, however, getting funds has been of little
concern in banks, because collecting points of money for the various groups within society
is one of their basic functions.
As present, capacity to borrow sufficient long-term funds at appropriate spreads to
support asset growth is very much the focus of many banks. Meanwhile, supervision and
central banks act to main market liquidity to provide the base for borrowing in money and
capital market. Under the fractional reserve system, a bank retains funds equal to only a
36
portion of the amount of its customers’ deposits as readily available reserves (currency on
hand at the bank plus deposit accounts for that bank at the central bank) from which to
satisfy demands for payment. The remainder of customer-deposited funds is used to fund
investments or loans so that the bank makes profit from creating credit, or bank money,
through lending. If they lend too many loans, they may not have money to meet withdrawal
demands. Because there is no telling how many customers would want to withdraw their
money from their bank accounts on any given day, banks have to maintain their liquidity
position in a strong way. In this sense, liquidity indeed represents a qualitative element of
the financial strength of a bank.
This thesis takes the basic and most narrow definition of liquidity which represents the
capacity to fulfill all payment obligations as and when they fall due. Liquidity thus is neither
an amount nor a ratio. It rather expresses the degree to which a bank is capable of fulfilling
its respective obligations. Since it is done in cash, liquidity relates to flows of cash only.
Not being able to perform leads to a condition of illiquidity.
2.3.2 Lender of Last Resort is Not Enough
As the financial crisis made painfully clear, the business of liquidity provision inevitably
exposes financial intermediaries to various forms of run risk. Their fragile funding struc-
tures, together with the binding liquidity commitments they have made, can result in rapid
outflows, especially in adverse events. The absence of central bank intervention would also
lead banks to fire-sell illiquid assets or even to fail altogether in a more severe case. And fire
sales and bank failures–and the accompanying contractions in credit availability–can have
spillover effects to other financial institutions and to the economy as a whole. Thus, while
banks will naturally hold buffer stocks of liquid assets to handle unanticipated outflows,
they may not hold enough because, although they bear all the costs of this buffer stocking,
they do not capture all of the social benefits, in terms of enhanced financial stability and
lower costs to taxpayers in the event of failure. For example, BNP Paribas was the first
major bank to acknowledge the risk of exposure to sub-prime mortgage markets7. After the
sub-prime turmoil hit the US financial system, doubts about the ability of individual banks
to refinance their short term funding, and increasing concerns about bank solvency, meant
that many banks could no longer borrow unsecured in the money markets, even overnight.
7BNP Paribas froze three of their funds on 9 August 2007, indicating that they had no way of valuing
the complex assets inside them known as Collateralised Debt Obligations (CDOs), or packages of sub-prime
loans.
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As a result, these banks were forced to turn to central banks to replace their lost short term
deposit funding. This was a systemic run of the entire global banking system. And it is this
externality that creates a role for policy.
There are two broad types of policy tools available to deal with this sort of liquidity-
based market failure. The first is after-the-fact intervention, either by a deposit insurer
guaranteeing some of a bank’s liabilities or by a central bank acting as an ‘Lender of Last
Resort’ (LOLR); the second type is liquidity regulation, which requires banks to maintain
adequate liquidity resources at all times. As an example of the former, when the economy
is in a bad state, assuming that a particular bank is not insolvent, the central bank can lend
against illiquid assets that would otherwise be fire-sold, thereby damping or eliminating the
run dynamics and helping reduce the incidence of bank failure. Liquidity regulation, as
an example of the latter, needs to have in place a charge per unit of short term wholesale
funding set at a level that properly reflects the external liquidity costs of short term funding
to avoid a similar crisis in future (Milne, 2009a).
The central bank certainly has a responsibility to provide market liquidity during a
financial crisis. This was recognized in the doctrine of ‘ lender of last resort’, as conceived
by Thornton and Espoused by Bagehot (1873), who suggested that, faced with a liquidity
crisis, central banks should stand prepared to lend, at will, to solvent banks, at a penalty
rate of interest and against ‘good’ collateral, until the crisis subsides8. The actions taken
by the US Federal Reserve (the ‘Fed’)and the European Central Bank (ECB) in the second
week of August in 2007 satisfy these requirements apart from their failure to impose a
penalty rate of interest on borrowers. 9
However, these views can be contrasted with those of Mervyn King, the Governor of
the Bank of England, who had been concerned that overgenerous provision of liquidity can
create a problem of moral hazard and encourage banks to adopt an excessive exposure to
liquidity risk. Despite the intensifying liquidity crisis in the summer of 2007, the Bank of
England (the Bank) initially refused to offer additional liquidity to the market other than
8To be clear, this work assumes that the bank in question is fundamentally solvent, meaning that while
its assets may not be liquid on short notice, the long-run value of these assets is known with certainty to
exceed the value of the bank’s liabilities. One way to interpret the message of this research is that capital
regulation is important to ensure solvency, but once a reliable regime of capital regulation is in place, liquidity
problems can be dealt with after the fact, via some combination of deposit insurance and use of the LOLR.
9The ECB injected e94.8 bn into the money markets on 9th August 2007 to shore up confidence in the
financial system. About 49 banks availed themselves of the funding. The Fed announced a new emergency
credit facility on 17 August 2007. Citigroup, JP Morgan, Chase, Bank of America and Wachovia each
borrowed $500 million.
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through the ‘standing facility’ under which banks can borrow (against eligible collateral),
without limit, beyond their ‘target reserve balance’ at a penalty of 100 basis points above the
official Bank Rate, under the modifications to official money market operations introduced
in 2006 (Hall, 2009). On 12 September 2007, the Governor of the Bank explained, in a letter
to the House of Commons’ Treasury Select Committee, the reasons why the Bank, unlike its
counterpart in the USA, the Fed, and the ECB was resisting pressure to provide liquidity
against a wider range of collateral (i.e. other than government securities) and for longer
periods of time (i.e. other than overnight) 10. Whilst emphasizing the Bank’s difficulty in
balancing the needs of (short run) financial stability against the fear that a wider provision
of liquidity would ‘undermine the efficient pricing of risk’ and hence long run stability, the
Governor went on assert that proper management of ‘the current turmoil, which has at its
heart the earlier under-pricing of risk, should not threaten our long-run economic stability.’
Hence the reason for the Bank’s relatively sanguine approach. Additionally, the Governor
argued that to go further would only increase moral hazard and raise the likelihood and
intensity of a future financial crisis. As he put it:
‘The provision of large liquidity facilities penalizes those financial institutions that sat
out the dance, increases herd behaviour and increases the intensity of future crises.’ And,
‘The provision of greater short-term liquidity, would undermine the efficient pricing of risk
by providing ex-post insurance for risky behaviour, encourages excessive risk-taking and sows
the seeds of a future financial crisis.’
Whilst in agreement with the action as ‘Lender of Last Resort’, I cannot agree that the
LOLR is enough. From the experience of the past several years, it is clear that liquidity
provision from central banks is uncertain and socially costly. Because of the worry of cash
outflow into non-Euro markets, Euro-zone banks are hoarding reserves instead of providing
them to the interbank market, even after taking a massive amount of cheap money from
the ECB of e800bn. Eonia, the rate to measure European Interbank Liquidity, declined to
0.2% in April 2013 from 4.5% in July 2007. To my mind, liquidity regulation, that requires
banks to maintain adequate liquidity resources at all times, is even more meaningful than
10But, unfortunately for the Bank, it retracted from this principles only two days after publication of the
Governor’s letter to the Treasury Select Committee. For, on the 14 September, following assurances given
by the FSA that Northern Rock remained solvent, the Bank provided emergency funding to Northern Rock.
Subsequent to this, on 19 September, the Bank announced that it would, after all, lend to banks for periods
of up to three months and against a wider range of collateral than hitherto (to include, as in the Northern
Rock case, mortgages for example) under a new emergency facility.
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providing central banks’ liquidity support in terms of financial stability11. And I favor the
introduction of preventative liquidity regulation, such as the ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio’ and
‘Net Stable Funding Ration’ on top of capital regulation. It is true that the central banks
have shielded commercial banks from the consequence of the systemic liquidity problems.
But the central banks could have made clear to individual banks that they would be allowed
to fail in the event of a systemic run, such as the Northern Atlantic Liquidity Squeeze in
Autumn 2007, and this would have given them much stronger incentives to hold more liquid
assets and have more long term funding.
2.4 Summary and Conclusions
The main jobs of financial regulators across the world are to to sustain systemic stability,
to maintain the safety of financial institutions, and to protect the consumer from market
failures by dealing with the problems outlined above. An important lesson we learn from the
recent crisis is that financial deregulation or ‘non-regulation’ would not help to build up a
healthy financial system and boost the real economy in the long term. Without restraining
risky actions and protecting consumers, the unsafe and unsound practices adopted by ‘casino
banks’ would eventually destroy the financial markets as a whole and shrink social welfare.
The recent collapse of several giant financial institutions clearly demonstrated the critical
nature of liquidity. As many economists concluded, the key cause of the global financial crisis
was a drying up of liquidity. How to develop proper internal liquidity risk measurement and
management for banks and build up sound liquidity regulation and supervision for regulators
are very hot issues following these stressed years. The next chapter analyzes the changes of
Liquidity Regulation by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision and the UK Financial
Services Authority.
11Baldan et al. (2012) also demonstrate that the action of modifying a bank’s liquidity profile, in order
to comply with the incoming constraints imposed by the Basel III framework, not only reduces liquidity risk
but also lowers its interest rate risk, this enables banks to reduce the amount of capital absorbed by interest
rate risk, giving rise to a globally positive effect.
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Chapter 3
An Assessment of the changes in
Liquidity Regulations used by the
Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision and the UK’s
Financial Services Authority
3.1 Introduction
In banking, liquidity is the ability to meet obligations when they fall due without incurring
unacceptable losses. Managing liquidity is a daily process requiring bankers to monitor
and project cash flows to ensure adequate liquidity is maintained. Maintaining a balance
between assets and liabilities is critical since depositors may demand their funds when the
bank is unable to generate adequate cash; in severe cases, this may result in a bank run.
In advance of the market turmoil that began in mid-2007, asset markets were buoyant
and funding was readily available at low cost. The reversal in market conditions illustrated
how quickly liquidity can evaporate and that illiquidity can last for an extended period of
time. The turmoil, again, re-emphasized the importance of liquidity to the functioning of
financial markets and the banking sectors. As a result, there was a need to update liquidity
risk measurement and management for the financial system as a whole.
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In October 2008 Lord Turner, Chairman of the UK Financial Services Authority1, was
asked by the Chancellor Alistair Darling, to make a regulatory response to the global bank-
ing crisis. In the Turner review paper, he made it clear that the liquidity regulation was
insufficient:
‘Measuring and managing bank liquidity risk is as important as capital/solvency
risk management, but in the years running up to the crisis did not receive ade-
quate attention, either in the UK or internationally, where debates about bank
regulation were dominated by the design of the Basel II capital adequacy stan-
dard. It is essential now to restore liquidity regulation and supervision to a
position of central importance’.
Recognizing the limited attention paid to banks’ liquidity risk management and super-
vision and aware of the global systemic banking losses after 2007, the Basel Committee on
Banking Supervisory (BCBS, 2008) updated its Liquidity Principles and published Liquid-
ity Ratios in record time following heavy political pressure. And the FSA also proposed a
new liquidity regime right after the announcement of the Basel Liquidity Principle of 2008
and the Basel Liquidity Ratios.
This chapter firstly assesses the Basel Committee’s Liquidity Principles and Liquidity
Ratios in Section 3.2. Section 3.3 describes the FSA’s Liquidity Regime after 1998. Section
3.4 comments on the revision to liquidity regulation by the BCBS and the FSA. Section 3.5
explains the interactions between liquidity regulation and central bank liquidity provision.
And Section 3.6 summarises and concludes.
1 At the end of 1998, the Financial Services Authority, as a single regulator for the whole of the UK
financial services sector, was turned from ‘a concept into a reality’. The FSA took the responsibility for
Banking and Wholesale Markets supervision from the Bank of England, Building Society supervision from
the Building Societies and Friendly Societies Commissions, and Insurance supervision from HM Treasury. On
the first of April 2013, however, it was disbanded with micro-prudential supervision of most major financial
firms returning to the Bank of England and conduct of business regulation being transferred to a new agency
called the Financial Conduct Authority.
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3.2 An Assessment of the Basel Committee on Banking Su-
pervision’s Liquidity Requirements
3.2.1 The Basel Committee’s Liquidity Principles
Comparison of the Principles of 2008 with the Principles of 2000
In September 1992, the Basel Committee published its first requirements for liquidity risk
management, within a document entitled ‘A framework for managing and measuring liquid-
ity risk’(BCBS, 1992). This work was updated in February 2000, in a paper entitled ‘ Sound
Practices for Managing Liquidity in Banking Organizations’(BCBS, 2000). The Principles
of 2000 focused on developing a greater understanding of the way in which international
banks manage their liquidity on a global basis, on the premise that supervision of liquidity
is particularly effective if based on a dialogue between bank and supervisor. In order to
account for financial market developments as well as the lessons learned from the turmoil
of 2007/09, the Basel Committee updated its guidance on liquidity risk supervision and
management in September 2008, within a document entitled ‘ Sound Liquidity Risk Man-
agement and Supervision’(BCBS, 2008). This work has five areas of focus and seventeen
principles in total which are presented in Table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Management and Supervision
1 Fundamental principle for the management and supervision of liquidity risk: prin-
ciple 1
2 Governance of liquidity risk management: principles 2,3, and 4
3 Measurement and management of liquidity risk: principles 5,6,7,8,9,10,11 and 12
4 Public disclosure: principle 13
5 The Role of Supervisors: principles 14, 15,16 and 17
Comparing with the Principles in 2000, the Principles of 2008 had been significantly
expended into several key factors. Firstly, the Principle of 2008 start by asking a bank to
maintain sufficient liquidity by holding enough cushions of unencumbered and high quality
liquid assets (Principle 1). Moreover, they also require supervisors to take prompt action if a
bank is in trouble in either area in order to protect depositors and to limit potential damage
to the whole financial system (Principle 1). These requirements for a bank to maintain
sufficient liquidity had not been considered in the previous Principles guidance.
Secondly, the Principles of 2008 significantly expanded in a new required area whereby
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a bank should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance that is appropriate for its business
strategy and its role in the financial system. According to its own liquidity risk tolerance,
a bank should ensure that it is able to withstand a prolonged period of stress (Principle
2). This was the first occasion on which the definition of liquidity risk tolerance had been
introduced by the Basel Committee.
Thirdly, the Principles of 2008 highlight the necessity of allocating liquidity costs, ben-
efits and risks to all significant on- and off- balance sheet business activities to limit the
risk-taking incentive of individual business lines created by the bank as a whole (Principle
4). Moreover, liquidity risk costs, benefits and risks should be addressed explicitly in the
new product approval process.
Fourthly, in order to set up a reliable process for identifying, measuring, monitoring
and controlling liquidity risk, the Principles of 2008 firstly suggest a bank build a robust
framework for comprehensively projecting cash flows arising from assets, liabilities and off-
balance sheet items over an appropriate set of time horizons (Principle 5). The requirements
of defining of liquidity risk and building up a robust framework to project cash flows on
different time horizons are essential for a bank’s internal measurement and management
of liquidity risk. However, these requirements had only been paid attention to after the
mid-2007 systemic financial crisis.
Fifthly, the Principles of 2008 require a bank to limit its liquidity risk exposures and
manage its funding needs within and across legal entities, business lines and currencies,
taking into account legal, regulatory and operational limitations to the transferability of
liquidity (Principle 6).
Sixthly, the management of intraday liquidity risk and collateral is one of the significant
new areas considered by the Principles of 2008. In terms of the management of intraday
liquidity risk, it requires a bank to monitor its intraday liquidity positions and risks to
meet payment and settlement obligations on a timely basis under both normal and stressed
conditions and thus contribute to the smooth functioning of payment and settlement systems
(Principle 8). As regards the management of collateral positions, it suggests a bank should
monitor the legal entity and physical location where collateral is held and how it may be
mobilized in a timely manner (Principle 9).
Seventhly, the design and use of severe stress test scenarios is a new area emphasized
in the Principles of 2008. It requires a bank to conduct stress tests on a regular basis
for a variety of institution-specific and market-wide stress scenarios (individually and in
combination) to identify sources of potential liquidity strain and to ensure that current
44
exposures remain in accordance with a bank’s established liquidity risk tolerance. A bank
should use stress test outcomes to adjust its liquidity risk management strategies, policies,
and position and to develop effective contingency plans (Principle 10). Moreover, a bank
should hold high quality liquid assets as insurance against a range of liquidity stress scenarios
(Principle 12).
Eightly, adopting the same requirements on public disclosure as the Principles of 2000,
the Principles of 2008 require a bank to disclose information on a regular basis (Principle
13).
Finally, the Principles of 2008 suggest supervisors should not only carry out an indepen-
dent and timely review of a bank’s overall risk management framework (Principles 14 and
15), but also intervene to require a bank’s effective and timely remedial action to address
deficiencies in its liquidity risk management processes or liquidity position (Principle 16);
as well as to communicate with other supervisors and public authorities, such as central
banks, both within and across national borders, to facilitate effective cooperation regarding
the supervision and oversight of liquidity risk management (Principle 17). This is the first
time the committee had considered about the role of supervisors to communicate with other
national supervisors to monitor banks’ liquidity risk, which can create a systemic financial
stress.
Examining the Comments on the Principles of 2008
Two days after publishing the consultative document on the Principles for Sound Liquidity
Risk Management and Supervision, the Bank for International Settlement released 30 in-
terested parties’ written comments on the new Principles on its website. The objective of
this section is to carry out an analysis of these comments.
The 30 commentators cover both industry and academic concerns. As shown in Table 3.2,
sixteen belonged to the financial services industry associations’ group, three commentators
were from supervisors’ group, five commentators were financial institutions, and the six
remaining were placed into the Others’ group. Table 3.3 displays the frequency of discussion
of the Principles by outside commentators. And the detailed commentators’ opinions on
each Principle can be found in Appendix A.
The first principle’s area of focus, the ‘Fundamental Principle for the Management and
Supervision of Liquidity Risk’, was discussed by all commentators. ‘Public Disclosure’ was
the second most discussed area of focus with twenty-five commentators. Eighteen commen-
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tators on average discussed the ‘Measurement and Management of Liquidity Risk’ areas of
focus. The ‘Role of Supervisors’ area of focus was discussed by fourteen commentators on
average. While only twelve commentators on average discussed the principles involved with
the ‘Governance of Liquidity Risk Management’.
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Table 3.2: Commentators (30)-Listed by Affinity Groups
Financial Service Industry Associations (16)
Canadian Bankers Association (CBA)
European Association of Co-operative Banks (EACB)
European Association of Public Banks (EAPB)
European Savings Banks Group-World Savings Banks Institute (ESBG-WSBI)
Febelfin
French Banking Federation (FBF)
International BK.Fed. (IBFed)
Institutional Money market Funds Association (IMMFA)
Institute of International Finance (IIF)
Associazione Bancaria Italiana (ABI)
Japanese Bankers Association (JBA)
Mortgage Insurance Companies of America (MICA)
Nederlandse Vereniging Banken (NVB)
UK Joint Trade Association (BBA,ISDA, and LIBA)
World Council of Credit Unions (WOCCU)
Zentraler Kreditausschuss
Supervisors (3)
Banco Central Do Brasil (BCDB)
International Organization of Securities Commission (IOSCO)
Reserve Bank of New Zealand (RBNZ)
Financial institutions (5)
Credit Suisse
Dexia
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS)
UniCredit Group
US Bankcorp.
Others (6)
The Cleaning House
Fielder and Maltz
Independent Audit Limited
Institute of Chartered Accountants of England and Wales (ICAEW)
Thomson Reuters
Jean Desrochers and Jacques Pre´fontaine-University of Sherbrooke
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Table 3.3: Identification of the Principles Discussed by Commentators-Listed by Affinity Group
Principle
(Numbers)
Principle
(Area of
Focus)
Financial Services
Industry Associa-
tions (16)
Supervisors
(3)
Financial
Institutions
(5)
Others (6) Total (30)
1 FP 16* 3* 5* 6* 30*
2 GLRM 4 1 2 3* 10
3 3 1 4* 5* 13
4 8* 0 2 4* 14
5 MMLR 11* 1 4* 2 18*
6 7 1 4* 2 14
7 7* 1 4* 1 13
8 11* 0 4* 2 17*
9 5 1 4* 1 11
10 10* 1 4* 5* 20*
11 8* 2* 3* 4* 17*
12 9* 1 3* 5* 18*
13 PD 12* 3* 5* 5* 25*
14 ROS 6 2* 2 4* 14
15 5 2* 1 2 10
16 6 1 1 3* 11
17 11* 2* 3* 5* 21*
FP Fundamental Principle (30/30)
GLRM: Governance of Liquidity Risk Management (12.3/30)
MMLR: Measurement and Management of Liquidity Risk (18/30)
PD: Public Disclosure (25/30)
ROS: Role of Supervisors (14/30)
Note: * Discussed by at least 50% of the subsample, or of the total sample (30)(Pre´fontaine et al., 2010).
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Divergent Opinions on Areas of Focus and Principles
All commentators agreed that a principles-based approach was well adapted to the man-
agement and supervision of liquidity risk. However, they expressed a strong preference for
more flexibility in the application of the 17 principles. Their arguments reflected a strong
bias in favor of proportionality and materiality arguments (Pre´fontaine et al., 2010).
In the ‘Fundamental Principle’ area of focus, financial services industry associations
suggest the integration of liquidity risk management should not be excessively deep (Zen-
traler Kreditausschuss, 2008), while supervisors believe the implementation of the liquidity
management framework should be consistent with the supervisory objectives. Financial in-
stitutions focus their discussion on the definition of liquid assets (RBS, 2008), while others
consider increase in the power of supervisors (Pre´fontaine et al., 2010).
In the ‘Governance of Liquidity Risk Management’ area of focus, all commentators
agreed with principle 2 that a bank should articulate a liquidity risk tolerance; however, it
need not necessarily be disclosed publicly. Financial services industry associations suggest
in principle 3 that the operational functions of Boards of Directors and senior management
should select the size and structure of the banking group (Febelfin, 2008). As for principle
4, financial services industry associations do not think it rational to present only quantita-
tive approaches as guidance in product pricing for the regulatory authorities (JBA, 2008).
Financial institutions suggest to educate customers regarding product pricing according to
liquidity risk (RBS, 2008). Others focus on the consequences of increased liquidity cost for
products and transaction levels (Carrel, 2008).
In the focus area of ‘Measurement and Management of Liquidity Risk’, each group of
commentators suggest how to measure liquidity risk and monitor cash flow for principle 5.
As for principles 6 and 7, all commentators argued that a bank should centrally manage
liquidity risk exposure and funding needs at the group level, but should not be over-reliant
on a single funding plan. In principles 8 and 9, they all think that intraday cash and
collateral management goes beyond liquidity risk management. Furthermore, they point
out that monitoring the physical location where collateral is held is not always possible. As
for principle 10, they agree that a bank should carry out stress tests, but that the results
should not be publicly disclosed. Financial institutions and other groups agreed to principle
11 on the formulation of a contingency funding plan that did not lead to the building-up of
an excessive liquidity cushion. This cushion, described in principle 12, would be formed of
unencumbered and high quality assets. Again, these commentators believed that the size
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and exact composition of this liquidity cushion should not be publicly disclosed.
In the ‘Public Disclosure’ area of focus (principle 13), most individual financial institu-
tions and other groups agreed with the BCBS’s view that a bank should publicly disclose
information on a regular basis to enable market participants to make informed judgments
about the soundness of its liquidity risk management framework and liquidity positions.
However, some of them believed that the present level and extent of qualitative and quan-
titative publicly disclosed information was satisfactory (USbank, 2008). Nevertheless, more
complete and perhaps staggered information could be disclosed to supervisors and credit
rating agencies.
Finally, in the focus area covering the ‘Role of Supervisors’, commentators again pre-
sented very diverging views. In principle 14, financial institutions and their trade associa-
tions requested that supervisors more clearly define their role in firm-only extreme liquidity
events and also in market-wide extreme liquidity events (IBFed, 2008). The supervisors
group suggested that supervisors should perform a comprehensive assessment on an ongo-
ing basis (not just be periodic) of a bank’s overall liquidity risk management framework
and liquidity position to determine whether they deliver an adequate level of resilience to
liquidity stress and, if found to be inadequate, advise the bank to, among other tings, con-
sider seeking longer term financing and/ or reduce its illiquid positions (IOSCO, 2008). In
principle 15, following the comply-or-explain doctrine, financial institutions and their trade
associations expressed the view that supervisors make more intense use of banks’ internal
liquidity risk management reports as opposed to one format-only prudential reports (Zen-
traler Kreditausschuss, 2008). In principle 16, the BCBS argued that supervisors should
intervene to require effective and timely remedial action (usually in the form of higher capi-
tal adequacy requirements). While financial institutions and their trade associations argued
that capital is a poor substitute for inadequate liquidity; however, they did not suggest any
satisfactory alternative (EAPB, 2008). In closing, all commentators agreed with the essence
of Principle 17 saying that supervisors, both home and host country, should more closely
communicate and cooperate within and across national borders. In addition, they favor
designating a lead supervisor, the mutual recognition of home-host country supervisors and
other measures designed to facilitate the role of a college of supervisors.
I argue that it will harm the development of financial institutions as well as the real
economy if we set up financial regulation in great detail. Implementation of the sound
principles by banks and supervisors should be flexible, but also needs to be consistent to
make sure they understand banks’ liquidity positions quite well. I welcome the definition
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of liquidity risk tolerance, but it would be better for financial institutions to measure their
own liquidity risk tolerance with an explicit example given by the Basel Committee. Since
banks can deal with their own liquidity costs in a variety of ways, there is a chance that
banks mislead customers by increasing prices of commercial loans and decrease the prices
of other investment products. Furthermore, I think the assumptions of the stress test
should reflect the nature of the bank’s business and complexity of the bank’s activities.
Meanwhile, the stress test analysis should be reviewed by senior management on a regular
basis to make sure that the bank can fully operate even in the worst scenarios. Finally, I
do not believe the current disclosure of quantitative information is enough. It is essential to
help investors understand banks’ liquidity risk positions by providing relevant information.
To avoid excessively-detailed regulation and effectively protect customers’ interests, banks
should provide material quantitative information as well as qualitative information on time.
Meanwhile, supervisors should be empowered to obtain more quantitative information from
individual firms by operating a ‘traffic light system’ when risks rise, say for example from
green to orange and from orange to red (Milne, 2009b).
3.2.2 The Basel Committee’s Liquidity Ratios
The Committee has developed two standards (BCBS, 2009) for supervisors to use in liq-
uidity risk supervision. The first objective is to promote the short-term resilience of the
liquidity risk profile of banks by ensuring that they have sufficient high-quality liquid assets
to survive a significant stress scenario lasting 30 calendar days. The Committee developed
the Liquidity Coverage Ratio (LCR) to achieve this objective. The second objective is to
promote resilience over a longer time horizon by creating additional incentives for banks
to fund their activities with more stable sources of funding on an ongoing basis. The Net
Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR) has a time horizon of one year and has been developed to
capture structural issues to provide a sustainable maturity structure of assets and liabilities.
BCBS (2010b) states that the LCR will be introduced as a binding constraint on January
1, 2015, and the NSFR will become a minimum standard by January 1, 2018. However,
the Committee has since- on 7 January 2013- issued the full text of a revised Liquidity
Coverage Ratio on 7 January 2013(BCBS, 2013)2. The revisions to the NSFR will be made
by mid-2016, and the NSFR will be introduced as a requirement on January 1, 2018(BCBS,
2The Liquidity Coverage Ratio was first published in December 2009 (BCBS, 2009). But it faced pressure
from the banking industry and politicians to ‘water-down’ its original plans.
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2010d).
The section below explains and assesses the two standards.
The Liquidity Coverage Ratio
This standard aims to ensure that a bank maintains an adequate level of unencumbered,
high-quality liquid assets that can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a
30 calendar day time horizon under a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario specified
by supervisors. At a minimum, the stock of liquid assets should enable the bank to survive
until Day 30 of the stress scenario, by which time it is assumed that appropriate corrective
actions can be taken by management and/or supervisors, and/or the bank can be resolved
in an orderly way.
The Basel ‘Liquidity Coverage Ratio’ (LCR) builds on traditional ‘liquidity coverage
ratio’ methodologies used internally by banks to assess exposure to contingent liquidity
events. As defined,
LCR =
Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
≥ 100%.
According to BCBS (2010b), there are two categories of assets comprising the stock
of high-quality liquidity assets (i.e. ‘Level 1’ assets and ‘Level 2’ assets). Level 1 assets
include: marketable securities guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks,the BIS,or the IFS
and assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel II standardized approach for credit risk, and
traded in large, deep and active repo markets; 0% risk-weighted sovereign or central bank
debt securities issued in domestic currencies; and 0% risk-weighted sovereign or central bank
debt securities issued in foreign currencies. And Level 2 assets include: marketable securities
guaranteed by sovereigns and central banks and assigned a 20% risk-weight under the Basel
II standardized approach for credit risk; corporate bonds and covered bonds issued by a
financial institution or any of its affiliated entities; corporate bonds and covered bonds not
issued by a bank itself or any of its affiliated entities rated at least AA-.
Assets to be included in each category are those that the bank is holding for a month.
Level 1 assets can comprise an unlimited share of the pool and are not subject to any discount
under the LCR. Level 2 assets can be included in the stock of liquid assets, subject to the
requirement that they comprise no more than 40% of the overall stock after an assumed
weight (85%) has been applied.
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Cash outflows come from retail deposits, unsecured wholesale funding provided by small
business customers, unsecured wholesale funding with operational relationships, unsecured
wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public
sector entities, unsecured wholesale funding provided by other legal entity customers, and
secured funding.
In the revisions to the LCR (BCBS, 2013), the BCBS has been mindful not only of
the potential impact of the standard on the financial markets, the extension of credit and
economic growth, but also of the timing of its introduction as significant financial strains
persist in some banking systems. There are four major areas of change:
1. Expansion of the range of assets eligible for inclusion in the stock of high-quality liquid
assets (HQLA), through the addition of a new category of ‘Level 2B assets’ which
national supervisors may choose to recognise as HQLA in their local LCR regulations.
Supervisors exercising such discretion are expected to ensure that the Level 2B assets
included as HQLA meet all relevant qualifying criteria and that the banks holding
these assets have appropriate systems to monitor and control the associated risks;
2. Recalibration of the stress assumptions for some cash-flow items (including in respect
of retail and non-financial corporate deposits and undrawn committed facilities), tak-
ing into account industry feedback and actual experience in times of stress. Such
assumptions will affect the calculation of the Total net cash outflows denominator of
the LCR;
3. Affirmation of the usability of the stock of HQLA by banks in times of stress, notwith-
standing that this may cause the LCR to fall below the minimum requirement. Su-
pervisors are expected to establish guidance to specify the circumstances for usage of
the HQLA, and to ensure appropriate supervisory action in response to such circum-
stances; and
4. Adoption of a phase-in arrangement that introduces the LCR as planned on 1 January
2015, but with the minimum requirement set at 60%. This will then rise by 10 per-
centage points per annum to reach 100% on 1 January 2019. This graduated approach
is to ensure that the standard can be implemented without material disruption to the
ongoing strengthening of banking systems and financing of economic activity.
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The Net Stable Funding Ratio
To promote more medium and long-term funding of the assets and activities of banking
organizations, the Committee has developed the Net Stable Funding Ratio (NSFR). The
NSFR builds on traditional ‘net liquid asset’ and ‘cash capital’ methodologies used widely by
internationally-active banking organizations, bank analysts and rating agencies. As defined,
NSFR =
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
≥ 100%.
This metric establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the
liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one year horizon.
Therefore, it can measure the amount of available longer-term stable sources of funding over
the required amount under a 1 year stress scenario (includes off-balance-sheet exposures).
This standard is designed to act as a minimum enforcement mechanism to complement
the LCR and reinforce other supervisory efforts by promoting structural changes in the
liquidity risk profiles of institutions away from short-term funding mismatches and toward
more stable, longer-term funding of assets and business activities. In particular, the NSFR
standard is structured to ensure that long term assets are funded with at least a minimum
amount of stable liabilities in relation to their liquidity risk profiles. The NSFR aims to limit
over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of buoyant market liquidity and
encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and off-balance sheet items. In
addition, the NSFR approach offsets incentives for institutions to fund their stock of liquid
assets with short-term funds that mature just outside the 30-day horizon for that standard.
The available amount of stable funding includes Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital, preferred stock
due in 1 year, debt securities due in more than 1 year, liabilities due in more than 1 year,
stable deposits due in 1 year, less stable deposits due in 1 year, and unsecured wholesale
funding or terms deposits due in 1 year. The required amount of stable funding comes from
Government debt securities, unencumbered corporate bonds rated over AA-, unencumbered
corporate bonds due in 1 year, unencumbered residential mortgages, retail loans due in 1
year, and ‘other assets’ due in more than 1 year3.
These ratios need to be reported to supervisors starting January 2012. The LCR will
be calculated and reported at least monthly, with the operational capacity to increase the
frequency to weekly or even daily in stressed situations at the discretion of the supervisor.
3Preferred stock excludes Tier 2 capital, and ‘other assets’ exclude cash and interbank loans.
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The NSFR will be calculated and reported at least quarterly. The BCBS sets a two-week
limit for the time between the end of the reporting period and when the data should be
available.
Comments on the Basel Committee’s Liquidity Ratios
Both the LCR and NSFR measures clearly address the fragility identified by the crisis and
strive to increase the resilience of banks to liquidity shocks by establishing minimum levels
of buffers and by structurally matching more closely the term structure of both sides of the
balance sheet. The ratios look at liquidity gaps in defined time horizons; no information
is provided about liquidity exposures in other periods. Moreover, the observation period is
not flexible but standardized. For a bank involved in correspondent banking and clearing
and settlement activities, 30 days could be a long term horizon.
Besides, even though BCBS (2010b) imposes weights for each category of assets as well as
liabilities, it failed to consider and clarify the real contractual maturities. This shortcoming
has been explained in great detail in chapter 4, in which I build up proper frameworks to
measure a bank’s short-term liquidity risk and long-term liquidity risk, respectively.
The ratios are calculated with pre-defined standard aggregations and stress assumptions
(a one-size-fits-all approach) yet, assumptions can differ across banks with different sized
and business models and operating in different countries. One-size-fits-all assumption sets
for the LCR and the NSFR cannot convey the differences in funding processes of different
economies. Moreover, one-size-fits-all assumption sets for the LCR and the NSFR cannot
be adapted to different economic structures, because:
1. banks are intermediaries in the credit process of the economy;
2. the funding requirements may not be consistent with what funding providers (ie:
households at the end of the day) can deliver in balances or terms, or with the required
rates to attract those funds compared to the acceptable rates for funding needs (ie:
households, corporates, governments), the impacts may be detrimental to the economy
as a whole;
3. within the Euro zone, households’ savings are different in amounts and structures, no-
tably due to tax incentives. For example, the Netherlands and France allow relatively
unrestricted tax deductions for mortgage interest, but Italy allows mortgage interest
deductions for first-time homeowners only. The Netherlands allows tax deductions
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for consumer borrowings, while France and Italy taxpayers are not allowed (Poterba,
2001).;
4. as the European economy is more bank-intermediated than the US economy, the effects
on the European economy would be more significant4;
Both the NSFR and LCR requirements assume that no maturing interbank liabilities will
be rolled over and no new interbank funding will be available. This means banks can rely on
outstanding interbank funding only to the extent that they have contractually formalized
rights to avoid repayment for more than 30 days (LCR) or for more than 1 year (NSFR). It
will reshape interbank deposit markets in the long-run.
In order to meet the LCR, banks will shift demand towards assets eligible for inclusion in
the liquid buffer. This will distort bond markets, especially the price of government bonds.
In the LCR, capital is taken account of only to the extent it is invested into eligible liquid
assets. In the NSFR, capital is eligible as a stable funding source. The idea of the committee
is that banks first raise new capital, and then invest it to build up the liquid asset buffer.
This may have an adverse impact on the real economy.
Trading securitization-transforming illiquid assets to liquid instruments will be discour-
aged. And banks might need to raise medium funding to comply with the NSFR, since:
1. from the perspective of a bank willing to invest in asset-backed securities, ABS are not
eligible as liquid assets to any extent. All holdings of ABS with a maturity exceeding
one year are 100% accounted for in the determination of required stable funding and
must be matched with medium/long-term funding. And
2. from the perspective of a bank willing to grant medium/long-term credit to its cus-
tomers in the form of mortgages, credit card loans, personal loans etc, the NSFR states
that loans with maturity exceeding one year must be funded with medium/long-term
finance up to percentages that depend on the loan credit quality and are completely
independent of the possibility of being securitized. As a result, lending banks cannot
draw any benefits in terms of liquidity from securitizations.
4This is notably due to the operation of the US agencies (Fannie Mae, Freddy Mac)and the Federal Home
Loan Banks (FHLB), all of which are de-facto state guaranteed. The US agencies supply huge amounts of
mortgages, this saves US banks from a lot of funding needs, leverage and credit risk. While the Federal
Home Loan Banks provide secured funding to US banks. The FHLB replied to the BCBS’s Consultative
Paper to affirm its role of funding provider in case of a crisis.
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3.3 An Assessment of the UK Financial Services Authority’s
Liquidity Regulation and Supervision
3.3.1 The financial risk outlook for the UK banking sector since 1998
Apart from Japan, the major developed economies experienced positive growth without
significant inflationary pressures from 1998 to 2007. The major UK banks’ 5 growth rate
of assets was close to the growth of nominal GDP in 1999. Some banks improved their
competitive advantage by purchasing other financial parties in 2000 (e.g. Barclays acquired
the Woolwich; HSBC acquired the Credit Commercial de France).
Although the financial system was fragile and uncertain throughout 2001, especially
against the background of the 11th September terrorist attack, the collapse of Enron and Ar-
gentina’s default, UK banks’ capitalization and profitability was supported by the relative-
healthy domestic economy (see Figure 3.1).
Figure 3.1: Major UK banks’ profitability and capitalization
Source: FSA (2007a, pg.36) , Bank of England and Company accounts.
But, after 2004, the slight rise in interest rates and the decline in lending margins caused
a rise in credit risks from mortgages for banks and building societies, especially for those
which had expanded lending activities by relying heavily on self-certificated ‘Buy-to-Let’
5Major UK banks at that time refers to Abbey National, Alliance and Leicester, Barclays, Bradford and
Bingley, HBOS, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Northern Rock and the Royal Bank of Scotland.
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investors6. UK retail banks and building societies were likely to face a more challenging
operating environment after 20057. However, the decline in interest margins (caused by
competitive pressures and a flattening yield curve) had been offset by a growth in non-
interest income. For the larger banks, slower growth in retail lending was offset by stronger
growth in leveraged lending8 and other financial market activities. Building societies moved
towards higher-risk lending and attempted to earn non-interest income. The structure of
funds had also changed. Banks preferred international financial markets to fill the funding
gap between sluggish deposits and fast-growing loans as a result of the steady decline in
UK households’ saving rates. However, increasing reliance on short-term external funding
proved to be a key vulnerability for the banking sector in the Sub-Prime crisis of 2007.
Before 2000, securitised credit had played a small role in the UK mortgage market but,
by 2007, 18% of UK mortgage credit was funded through securitization (see Figure 3.2).
But the UK also saw the rapid growth of on-balance-sheet mortgage lending, with UK banks
expanding their loan books more rapidly than deposit bases, placing increasing reliance on
wholesale funding (see Figure 3.3). At the aggregate level, this implied a significant increase
in overseas bank financing of the UK current account deficit.
Because of high credit default rates on mortgage-related products, banks and other
financial participants, in order to maintain their own liquidity, would refuse to lend to
each other. Between August 2007 and April 2008, the indicator of lending markets’ overall
risk, the Treasury Eurodollar Spread (TED)9, rose sharply from 50 basis points to 200 basis
points. Besides, funding for short-term loans were costly, especially in 2008 through 3-month
LIBOR-OIS spreads10. (see Figure 3.4).
6Those investors buy properties (e.g. through mortgage) to let for profits.
7Net interest income of UK building societies fell to 1.06% in the first half of 2006, down from 1.45% in
2000.
8Leveraged lending is a type of corporate finance used for mergers and acquisitions, business recapital-
ization and refinancing, equity buyouts, and business or product line build-outs and expansions. It is used
to increase shareholder returns and to monetize perceived ‘enterprise value’ or other intangibles. In this type
of transaction, debt is commonly used as an alternative to equity when financing business expansions and
acquisitions.
9The TED spread is the difference between the three-month Treasury Bill interest rate and the three-
month Eurodollar interest rate (or LIBOR interest rate). The TED spread measures the degree of riskiness
of the bank lending market. Increases or decreases in this spread are viewed by market participants as
indicating the degree of problems in the banking system. (http://understandingthemarket.com/?p=51)
10The LIBOR-OIS spread is the difference between the London Interbank Offered Rate (LIBOR) and
the overnight index swap (OIS) rate, and is commensurate with the amount of perceived credit risk in the
interbank lending market. The LIBOR is a daily reference rate based on the interest rates at which banks
borrow unsecured funds from other banks in the London wholesale money market (or interbank market).
The OIS rate relates to interest rate swaps based on a specific currency that exchanges fixed rate interest
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Figure 3.2: Estimated share of securitised loans in UK mortgage lending (includes covered
bonds)
Source: Bank of England, ONS, FSA (2009e, pg.34)
A crucial feature of the UK system in the run-up to the crisis was, therefore, the rapid
growth of a number of specific banks-Northern Rock, Bradford &Bingley, Alliance and
Leicester and HBOS-which were increasingly reliant on the permanent availability of a
large-scale interbank funding and/or on their continuous ability to securitise and sell down
rapidly accumulating credit assets, particularly in the mortgage market. Banks have been
considerably weakened by adverse economic and financial market conditions since Northern
Rock was nationalized on 22rd February 2008; Bradford & Bingley was partly nationalized
on 29th September 2008, and its deposits and branches were sold to Santander; Alliance
and Leicester was acquired by the Spanish firm Banco Santander in October 2008; HBOS
was merged into Lloyds Banking Group on 19th January 2009; Dunfermline’s deposits,
residential mortgages and branches were taken over by Nationwide on 30th March 2009;
and the Royal Bank of Scotland, announcing the largest losses in UK corporate history at
£24bn, was part nationalized by the UK Government-with on equity share of almost 84.4%
early in November 2009.
Turner summarises some specific factors in the UK crisis:
payments for floating rate payments dependent on a notional swap principal at regular intervals over the life
of the swap contract.
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Figure 3.3: Major UK banks’ customer funding gap, household saving ratio and foreign
interbank deposits
Source: Bank of England; Dealogic; ONS; FSA (2009e, pg.34).
1. The failure of Northern Rock11 was not caused by immediately evident solvency/credit
quality problems, but by the drying up of the market for both securitised credit assets
and wholesale funding availability (i.e. low probability but high impact events 12).
Such funding issues were also critical to the problems at Bradford & Bingley and
HBOS in September/ October 2008.
2. The emergence of major trading book losses on the balance sheets of those UK banks
which had been extensively involved in the ‘ acquire and arbitrage ’ model of securitised
credit intermediation.
3. The subsequent emergence of a wider set of credit problems-in mortgages and in
corporate lending and, in particular, in commercial real estate-as the financial crisis
itself generated credit capacity constraints and economic slowdown. This slowdown
11For more information about FSA responses on Northern Rock’s failures, please see Appendix B
12Appendix C explains the FSA’s risk assessment on firm-specific risks is on probability of the problem
occurring and impact of the problem if it occurs. Despite admitting that low probability but high impact
episodes are very harmful, the FSA has claimed that such circumstances would not be prioritized because
they are very difficult to measure. However, both Pearson and Clair (1998) and Mitroff (2005) emphasize the
meanings of crisis management is the active prevention and mitigation of low probability but high impact
events.
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Figure 3.4: 3-month LIBOR-OIS spreads in sterling, US dollar and Euro
Source: Bloomberg; FSA (2009a).
in turn exposed the risky nature of some credit extension in the boom years and
is now generating credit quality deterioration, even among previously creditworthy
customers.
Learning from recent events, investors have realized that banks’ values should be based
on long-term survival prospects-dependent on quality and quantity of capital and liquidity-
rather than on short-term leveraged profit potential. In order to survive and keep a strong
relationship with investors, therefore, banking regulators need to adjust supervision frame-
works for requiring banks to improve their quantitative risk management as well as build a
sustainable business model supported by ample liquidity and robust capitalization. Above
all else, both banking regulators and banks need to restore trust with their customers.
3.3.2 The FSA’s liquidity regulation 1998-2008
Regulatory agencies can be viewed as supplying regulatory rules, monitoring (overseeing
whether the rules are obeyed) and providing guidance services (general conduct of the
financial firms) to stake-holders (Llewellyn, 1999).
Before 2008, the three liquidity regimes (see Appendix D) in the UK had not been
changed since the end of the 1990s. The Sterling Stock regime-see Equation (D.1)- applied
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to large UK retail banks and required banks to hold ‘eligible assets’, such as cash, UK
Treasury bills and gilts (Hall, 1999) to cover their five-day wholesale net outflow and 5% of
retail deposits withdrawable over the same period. However, this regime had a number of
limitations:
1. even though the Sterling Stock requirement can deal with a ‘short-duration’ liquidity
stress, it has less relevance for longer duration liquidity stresses, as were apparent
during the recent crisis;
2. this calculation, first introduced in 1996, was no longer appropriate, since several
liabilities are excluded, such as non-sterling liabilities and off-balance sheet contingent
liabilities;
3. in a stressed scenario, there may be few certificates of deposits available because of a
lack of confidence in the banking system; and
4. in the case of Northern Rock, a loss of 5% of sterling retail deposits cannot reflect the
possible retail behaviour over five working days13 .
The Maturity Mismatch regime -see Appendix D, Table (D.1) applied to all other banks
to assess whether they had enough marketable assets-including, inter alia, regularly-traded
assets with regularly quoted prices-to meet their liabilities through limiting the ‘ cumulative
net mismatch position’ between a bank’s inflows (assets) and outflows (liabilities) in different
time-bands within a maturity ladder (e.g. next day, one week, one month, three months,
etc). The marketable assets are subject to varying discounts. The regime also required a
firm to analyze the changes in cash flows which may not match their contractual maturity
based on relevant factors, such as economic conditions. However, recent events have shown
that some regularly-traded assets may no longer be as marketable as previously thought.
The Building Society regime was derived from policy work by the predecessor regulator,
the Building Societies Commission, in 1997. The regime reflects a simpler business model-
residential mortgage lending primarily funded out of retail savings. However, recent events
have shown that societies have adopted more complex business models and concentrated
on wholesale funding. Under this regime, building societies must hold appropriate amounts
of both total and short-term liquidity. The range for total liquidity is between 15% and
13Between 14th September and 16th September 2007, worried customers had taken out an estimated £1.5
bn in deposits against £30.1 bn of total customer deposits- believed to be the biggest unplanned withdrawal
from a British bank operation in history.
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25% of banking liabilities, while the minimum for short-term liquidity is 3.5% of banking
liabilities (FSA, 2007b). However, there is no methodology linking the liquidity calibration
to an individual society’s risk features- such as its wholesale funding gaps, or the volatility
of its retail deposit base.
3.3.3 The FSA’s liquidity regulation after 2008
In order to avoid these drawbacks of existing regimes, the FSA proposed a new liquidity
regime between 2008 and 2009 (see CP 08/22, 09/13, 09/14, and PS09/16). All Banks,
Building Societies and Investment (BIPRU) firms and EEA banks should follow two high-
level principles. Firstly, they must maintain adequate liquidity resources at all times. Sec-
ondly, they must not depend on other parts of their group to satisfy the overall liquidity
adequacy rule14. To make sure all BIPRU firms and EEA banks can smoothly comply with
the new requirements, the FSA also arranged a training conference for them in November
2009. This new regime set out four main components, as follows:
1. Systems and Controls Requirements;
2. Individual Liquidity Adequacy Standards (ILAS);
3. Group-wide management of liquidity; and
4. The composition of liquid assets buffers and liquidity reporting.
The main requirements proposed under each heading will now be addressed in turn.
Systems & controls requirements
A systemic approach to liquidity management can capture the contagious feature of liquidity
risk. In 2009, Turner stated that ‘liquidity risk has inherently systemic characteristics, with
the reaction of one bank to liquidity strains capable of creating major liquidity strains for
others’. The systems and control requirements consist of liquidity risk management, stress
testing, and contingency funding plans (CFPs), as set out in the FSA Handbook (chapter
on Prudential Sourcebooks for Banks, Building Societies, and Investment Firms,or BIPRU
12.3,12.4).
14The FSA clarified that a self-sufficient branch would only be allowed to count liquidity resources that are
under the day-to-day control of the branch’s senior management, held in account with one or more custodians
in the sole name of the UK branch,unencumbered,or attributed to the balance sheet of the branch.
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Firms will take one of three options to comply with the new provisions. For standard
ILAS firms, their Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment (ILAA) should include an
assessment of their compliance with BIPRU 12.3 and 12.4. Simplified ILAS firms need to
carry out an Individual Liquidity Systems Assessment (ILSA) assessing their compliance
with BIPRU 12.3 and 12.4. And Non-ILAS firms must undertake annual completion of
systems and controls questionnaires to demonstrate their compliance with BIPRU 12.3 and
12.4 (PD 09/16, pp. 24-25).
1. Liquidity risk management
Under the new regime, liquidity risk management should cover: the overarching sys-
tems and control requirements (e.g. through sound, effective and complete processes,
strategies and systems that enable a firm to identify, measure, monitor and control liq-
uidity risk, including early warning indicators to identify immediately the emergence
of increased liquidity risk or vulnerabilities); pricing liquidity cost (e.g.by considering
significant business activities both in normal financial conditions and stressed circum-
stances); intra-day management of liquidity (such as monitoring a firm’s intra-day
liquidity position, identifying gross liquidity inflows and outflows, acquiring sufficient
intra-day funding); the management of collateral risk (e.g. calculating all collateral
positions of a firm, and monitoring changes in the collateral usage); managing liquid-
ity across legal entities, business lines and currencies (e.g. by measuring net funding
positions); and funding diversification and market access.
2. Stress testing (for full details, see CP 08/22, pp.26-27)
Stress testing is a means to identify sources of potential liquidity strain. ILAS firms
need to report their stress testing results to the FSA in their ILAA. The stress-test
results should be reviewed by senior management and reported to the governing body.
They should also be used to develop the firm’s CFPs.
In conducting stress testing, a firm should consider the impact of its chosen stresses
on the appropriateness of its assumptions relating to: correlations between funding
markets; the effectiveness of diversification across its chosen sources of funding; addi-
tional margin calls and collateral requirements; contingent claims; liquidity absorbed
by off-balance-sheet vehicles and activities; the transferability of liquidity resources;
the ability to access central bank facilities; the future balance sheet growth; the contin-
ued availability of market liquidity in several currencies; the ability to access secured
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and unsecured funding; and the currency convertibility and access to payment or
settlement systems on which the firm relies.
3. Contingency funding plans
The aim of contingency funding plans for a firm should ensure that, in each stress, it
should still have sufficient liquidity resources. However, the CFPs of many firms failed
to rescue them by ensuring sufficient liquidity resources during the recent crisis.
In order to design a useful CFP, a firm should consider the amount of funding, the
impact of market disruptions on the funding sources, the impact of business and
reputation consequences on its ability to raise funding and the terms and conditions
of any central bank facilities.
Individual Liquidity Adequacy Standards (ILAS)
The Individual Liquidity Adequacy Standards framework, based on three stress tests, com-
prises an Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment (ILAA), a Supervisory Liquidity Re-
view Process (SLRP) and the Issuance of Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG). The FSA
sets out its final risk appetite for firms in terms of the liquidity stresses in 2009 with an
expectation that firms are able to survive without reliance on support from the public
authorities (e.g. central bank Emergency Liquidity Assistance). The reason why its risk
appetite for liquidity cannot be expressed statistically, using a probabilistic method as in
the minimum risk asset ratio for capital adequacy requirement, is because liquidity stresses
are typically low-frequency, high-impact events. Therefore, any statistical model applying
historical data to estimate future liquidity needs at a given level of confidence is unreliable.
These three separate stresses are an idiosyncratic liquidity stress, a market-wide liquidity
stress and a combination of the two. The appropriate events under those stress scenarios
are outlined in Appendix D, Table D.2.
1. Individual Liquidity Adequacy Assessment (ILAA)
A firm should conduct ILAA according to its own business model to identify the
following sources of liquidity risk which could cause a stress event:
(a) Wholesale secured and unsecured funding risk;
(b) Retail funding risk;
(c) Intra-day liquidity risk;
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(d) Intra-group liquidity risk;
(e) Cross-currency liquidity risk;
(f) Off-balance-sheet liquidity risk;
(g) Franchise viability risk;
(h) Marketable assets risk;
(i) Non-marketable assets risk; and
(j) Funding concentration risk.
A firm is required to carry out its ILAA at least annually or more frequently if changes
in the business, strategy, nature or scale of its activities or the operational environment
suggest that its level of liquidity resources or stress assumptions may no longer be
adequate.
2. Supervisory Liquidity Review Process (SLRP) A SLRP is conducted by the FSA at
a frequency depending on the risk profile of a firm. The aim of a SLRP is to provide
an Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) to the firm. In addition to a firm’s ARROW
assessment and other issues arising from day-to-day supervision, including its capital
adequacy and market perception of the firm, the FSA will review the firm’s:
(a) Most recent ILAA (see BIPRU 12.5);
(b) Systems and controls for liquidity risk (see BIPRU 12.3); and
(c) Internal stress testing and contingency funding plan (CFP) (see BIPRU 12.4).
3. Individual Liquidity Guidance (ILG) The ILG contains guidance about:
(a) the quantity of a firm’s liquid assets buffer; and
(b) the firm’s funding profile.
A firm must monitor its conformity with its ILG on a daily basis, while the FSA would
regularly monitor its liquidity risk profile.
4. Quantitative standards for simpler firms: There are several regulatory challenges with
ILAS for simpler firms. Firstly, due to their smaller management teams relative to
large firms’, it is an expensive process for simpler firms. Secondly, the resources
required by the FSA to implement ILAS is significant for simpler firms relative to
their risk-profiles and to the risk to the statutory objectives of the FSA.
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Comparing with large and more complex firms, the FSA has removed the requirement
for simpler firms to conduct ILAAs and have designed the following standardized buffer ratio
for simpler firms. Appendix D, Tables D.3 and D.4 also contain the definition of simpler
firms as well as their standardized buffer ratios.
Group-wide management of liquidity
A whole-firm liquidity modification will replace the current Global Liquidity Concessions
(GLC) to the requirement for European Economic Area (EEA) and non-EEA branches to
be self-sufficient.
Under the GLC regime, day-to-day liquidity supervision is transferred to the home state
regulator from the host regulator. Under the whole-firm liquidity modification, a branch
can rely on other parts of its group to satisfy the FSA’s systems and controls liquidity
requirement, and it will no longer be subject to the ILAS regime. However, the branch will
be required to provide liquidity reports with more clarity on the frequency on a monthly or
quarterly basis depending on the level of market impact of the branch.
An intra-group liquidity modification is the other process for granting and maintaining
modifications of the self-sufficiency requirement for UK solo entities. Firms that have been
granted an intra-group liquidity modification will also have the option of relying on other
parts of its group to satisfy the liquidity requirement. Only after determining how much
liquidity such firms should hold and how much liquidity support they should receive from
the intra-group would the FSA likely grant a firm an intra-group liquidity modification. In
addition, the ILAS group will still be subject to normal reporting requirements.
The composition of the liquid assets buffers and liquidity reporting
In relation to the liquidity assets buffer, the FSA requires all ILAS BIPRU firms to maintain
sufficient liquid assets, such as a stock of high quality government bonds, central bank
reserves and bonds issued by multi-lateral development banks. However, assets used as
collateral should not be used as liquid assets. A firm may only include in its liquid assets
buffer the following items (see BIPRU 12.7):
1. High quality government debt securities:
 issued by the central government of an EEA State; or
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 issued by the central governments of the United States of America, Canada,
Japan, Switzerland and Australia.
2. Securities issued by those international institutions listed in Appendix VI to the Bank
of England’s ‘Operations under the Sterling Monetary Framework: Operating Proce-
dures’, as periodically updated; and
3. Sight deposits and tradeable securities issued by a central bank of:
 an EEA State; or
 the United States of America, Canada, Japan and Switzerland.
4. For simpler firms’ liquid assets, investments in qualifying money market funds will
also be included, subject to meeting the following criteria:
 the funds must offer same-day liquidity to any notification given before 3pm; and
 the investment of the fund should be restricted so that it is only permitted to
invest in assets themselves eligible for the liquidity buffer and sight deposits with
credit institutions that are fully secured at all times by assets themselves eligible
for the liquidity buffer.
With respect to the composition of liquidity reporting, the FSA proposed reforms in terms of
frequency of liquidity data collection and a standardized reporting format providing a view
on liquidity risk from firm-specific, sector-and market-wide events. The main requirements
will now be addressed in turn.
1. Data items and frequency
Appendix D Tables D.5 and D.6 summarizes the data items, reporting frequency and
submission deadlines. The FSA’s strengthening of liquidity standards policy in BIPRU
12 was applied on 1st December 2009. However, there was a transitional period after
then; firms were required to continue to submit current liquidity regulatory reports
until the transition was completed.
2. Consolidation levels of reporting
There are three consolidation levels of reporting for each individual ILAS firms:
(a) Solo basis;
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(b) Defined Liquidity Group (DLG) by modification: the DLG includes each entity
which can receive liquidity support from other parts to meet the overall liquidity
adequacy rules;
i. -UK DLG: A DLG whose members are all ILAS firms
ii. -Non- UK DLG: any other type of DLG as it relates to the firm or the UK
DLG created by the modification; and
(c) DLG by default: the DLG includes each entity which is a member of the firm’s
group and provides or is committed to providing material support to the firm
against liquidity risk; the firm provides or is committed to provide material sup-
port to that entity against liquidity risk; or that entity has reasonable grounds
to believe that the firm would supply such support, and vice versa.
Firms or DLGs that are below the £50m threshold for total assets minus called up
share capital, minority interests and reserves are excluded from the new quantitative
reporting requirements and only have to complete a systems and controls questionnaire
(FSA 055).
Two factors demonstrate which consolidation levels a firm should apply:
(a) Whether it has been granted a modification;
(b) Whether the FSA is the lead regulator.
A firm which is under UK-lead regulation and does not have a UK DLG modification
will report on a Solo and DLG by default basis. A firm which is under UK-lead
regulation and has a UK DLG modification will report on a Solo, UK DLG and DLG
by default basis. A firm which neither follows the UK-lead regulation nor has a UK
DLG modification will only report at the Solo level. Finally, a firm which is not under
UK-lead regulation but has a UK DLG modification will report on a Solo and DLG
levels (see Figures D.1 and D.2 in Appendix D ).
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3.4 Comments on the Revision to Liquidity Regulations by
the BCBS and the FSA
After years of lobbying by banks, politicians and even some financial regulators15, the revi-
sions to the LCR are largely good news for bank profits because institutions will be allowed
to count more, higher-yielding assets in their liquidity buffers. In addition, the Basel group
made clear that national regulators would be able to relax the rules in a crisis so institutions
will not be expected to hold ‘buffers on top of buffers’.
Fitch (2013) discusses that the latest Basel III changes are good for banks, giving them
more time and scope to adapt to banking regulations targeted to prevent a repeat of the
global financial crisis of 2007-09. Sir Mervyn King, speaking in his capacity as head of
the Global Heads of Supervision college within BCBS, has said the agreement is ‘a very
significant achievement [and] a clear commitment to ensure that banks hold sufficient liquid
assets to prevent central banks from becoming lenders of first resort’ (Masters, 2013). And
Stefan Ingves, the Swedish central banker who chairs the Basel Committee itself, said the
changes would effectively increase the average LCR for the world’s 200 largest banks from
105 to 125 per cent. But he noted that liquidity stocks are not evenly spread, and some
institutions remain well below the required levels. That is why the banks will only have to
meet 60 per cent of the requirement in 2015, and fully by 2019 (Masters, 2013).
In order to head off a severe double-dip recession and benefit banks and their customers
by not choking off the flow of credit to the real economy, the Financial Services Authority,
on 9 June 2012, informed banks that they will not be required to hold any extra capital
against new UK loans. And they also relaxed liquidity rules to include a broader variety of
assets in the buffers that banks must hold in case of a run by depositors or other market
crises. This move, again, put Britain at the forefront of a global experiment to use bank
regulation to moderate the economic cycle (Masters, 2012).
However, Valladares (2013) criticizes regulators who pretend to supervise while banks
pretend to be liquid. The bankers had argued that the stricter requirements of the originally
proposed LCR would have constrained credit availability. But there is no guarantee that
a weaker LCR will embolden banks to lend more. Given the amount of liquidity that
monetary authorities in the U.K., Europe, and the U.S., have injected, banks have had
plenty of opportunity to lend to the real economy.
15The detailed discussion of banking industry objections to Basel III can be found in several newspaper
articles: e.g. Jenkins (2010), Watt (2011), Insight (2013), and Masters (2013)
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The calculation methods have also been changed in ways that will significantly increase
the stock of high quality liquid assets and reduce the total size of the net cash outflow. The
main winners under this new rule are those, mainly European, banks struggling to meet
the original requirements by the deadline of 2015 as well as universal banks with big retail
deposit bases and large corporate lending relationships. ‘This is quite a lot more favorable
to the industry than I and the market were expecting. The changes to the asset definitions
and the outflow calculations in particular look like a fairly massive softening of approach,’
said Daniel Davies, banking analyst for Exane BNP (Masters, 2013).
Even before the LCR was softened, a problem with the LCR was that even if a sovereign
security was not in the upper echelon of ratings, it could still be considered a Level I asset
as long as it was denominated in the sovereign’s own currency. Given the current fiscal
condition of a number of European countries, it was already questionable how liquid these
securities really are. Level 2 assets comprising sovereign, corporate, and covered bonds that
were rated AA-minus could also be part of the numerator with a 15% haircut. Under the
revised LCR announced on 7 January 2013, the numerator can also now include: corporate
bonds rated BBB-minus to A-plus; unencumbered equities; and residential mortgage-backed
securities. At least these assets have what some would consider a significant haircut (25%
for the mortgage bonds, 50% for the others). But it is important to remember how volatile
and illiquid even highly-rated sovereign securities can become, not to mention the above
assets. Also, yet again, the market will be relying on public ratings that are paid for by the
issuer, a conflict of interest that led to dicey securities receiving high grades during the boom
years. The Basel Committee also eased its recommended stress scenarios in many instances.
For instance, it reduced the outflow stress levels on certain fully-insured retail deposits,
non-financial corporate deposits, and committed liquidity facilities to non-financials.
Instead of needing a 100% LCR by 2015, banks now are expected to have just a 60% ratio
by then. The remainder would increase incrementally until 2019, when banks would have
to be fully compliant. It is important to remember, however, that the Basel Committee has
no legislative or enforcement powers anywhere. Hence, it is quite likely that any jurisdiction
could water down the LCR or delay it further depending on its views and needs, as follows:
1. Fears that the introduction of the original agreement would serve to depress bank lend-
ing amid clear evidence of a continuing ‘credit crunch’, thereby aborting the nascent
global economic recovery;
2. Doubts about the size of the pool of ‘ high quality liquid assets’ available to the global
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banking industry under the original agreement;
3. Recognition that sovereign debt need not necessarily represent the most liquid of
assets;
4. A desire to loosen the ties between banks and sovereigns; and
5. A desire to ‘kick start’ the securitization markets.
3.5 The Interaction Between The Liquidity Regulation and
the Liquidity Provision Operations of Central Banks
The key assumption underlying the new liquidity regulation is that the firm should rely on
its own capacity to raise funding in the financial markets in the first instance and not rely
on central bank funding. On the basis of this assumption the regulation seeks to require
banks to internalize or price their liquidity risk and build-up liquidity buffers independently
of central banks. And this assumption necessitates a clear qualification-the dependence of
banks on the central bank is exogenous to the decisions of banks. Under the proposition of
non-provision of central bank liquidity, Schmieder et al. (2012) build up liquidity stress tests
to simulate how liquidity support provided by parent banks and central banks would alter the
worse scenario outcomes. Any estimated liquidity shortfall of a subsidiary should indicate
the possible needed amount of additional parent funding support. Meanwhile, central banks
could use this tool to assess whether its regular and emergency liquidity support is sufficient
and to determine how much additional liquidity might be needed to be earmarked for worst
case situations.
Central banks’ liquidity provision is not enough, not only because it is socially costly
(Stein, 2013), but also because it distorts banks’ liquidity choices, given they may have
incentives to undertake more risky activities due to the explicit or implicit commitment of
the lender of last resort. However, there are those central banks who continue to argue
(e.g. the Fed and the Bank of Japan, although they both have vested interests!) that
continuing central bank involvement in banking supervision is essential, not least because
it provides direct access to important market information that can prove invaluable in
crisis situations. Hall (2009) suggests that the involvement of the central banks in banking
supervision, especially in the event of a financial crisis, may be necessary because of their
continuing lender of last resort function and their responsibility for ‘maintaining overall
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financial stability’, whilst the main regulatory authorities are responsible for the first port
of call for any financial firm which gets into difficulties. But, as the Northern Rock episode
demonstrated, this would open the Bank up to a further possible loss of credibility additional
to that deriving from the operation of its residual role of lender of last resort.
It may be easier, therefore, if the respective frameworks of the regulation and the central
bank have to remain separate so as to recognize their respective purposes and not reduce
the effectiveness of their functions. Bindseil and Lamoot (2011) propose that central banks
should support the regulatory effort to reduce the reliance of banks on the central banks and
ensure that banks price the liquidity risks of their activities. And central banks must ensure
that the less liquid collateral they accept is thoroughly valued and assessed. Otherwise, an
excessive reliance of banks on central bank funding with the least liquid collateral will be
the result. Rochet (2008) suggests that a simple and uniform liquidity ratio required by the
Banking Supervisors could be considered as a microprudential regulatory tool. As for macro-
prudential purposes, it is probably necessary to go further, and either to require additional
liquidity, or secure a credit line by the Central Bank. But Banking Supervisors should
always firstly identify macro shocks (possibly using stress tests and worst case scenarios)
and carefully apply some form of cost-benefit analysis of liquidity provision by the Central
Bank.
3.6 Summary and Conclusions
The Bank for International Settlements (BIS) is one of the first regulatory bodies to adopt
this new and more comprehensive liquidity risk regime to strengthen banks and restore
public confidence. The Basel Liquidity Principles of 2008 represent a substantial revision
of the Principles of 2000 and reflect the lessons learnt from the financial market turmoil
since 2007. I argue that it will harm the development of financial institutions as well as the
real economy if we set up financial regulation in great detail. Implementation of the sound
principles by banks and supervisors should be flexible, but also needs to be consistent to
make sure they understand banks’ liquidity positions quite well. I welcome the definition
of liquidity risk tolerance, but it would be better for financial institutions to measure their
own liquidity risk tolerance with an explicit example given by the Basel Committee.
I suspect that the one-size-fits-all assumptions of the LCR and the NSFR cannot be
adapted to different economic structures. It will reshape interbank deposit markets and
bond markets as a result of the increased demand for ‘liquid assets’ and ‘stable funding’.
73
However, this balance-sheet-ratio analysis is still an advanced and very important approach
to measuring banks’ liquidity risk positions.
This chapter examines the FSA’ previous liquidity regime which cannot reflect banks’
risk exposures and then explains the FSA’s new liquidity regime in great detail. The new
standards fully implement the Basel Committee’s ‘Principles for Sound Liquidity Risk Man-
agement and Supervision’ (BCBS, 2008). The fundamental changes in the FSA’s liquidity
supervision reflect three considerations. First, it introduces a systemic control requirement
by measuring individual firms’ liquidity risk with a market-wide stress or combination of
idiosyncratic and market-wide stresses. Second, it emphasizes the monitoring of business
model risks and the capability of senior managers. Third, it allows both internal and exter-
nal managers to access more information by increasing the liquidity reporting frequencies.
Further, this chapter refers to some contrasted views on the revisions to Basel III’s LCR
and the FSA’s liquidity buffer. Some universal banks or even financial regulators welcome
the eased requirement as giving them more time to adapt the new liquidity regulation.
While others criticized these changes for having a ‘watering-down’ effect on Basel III by
powerful lobbies.
Finally, this chapter discusses that the liquidity regulation is desirable as an important
safeguard against moral hazard. The introduction of liquidity regulation after the crisis
can be thought of as reflecting a desire to reduce dependence on the central bank as a
lender of last resort, based on the lessons learned over the previous several years. With the
implementation of liquidity regulation, central banks should support the regulatory effort to
reduce the reliance of banks on the central banks and ensure that banks price the liquidity
risks of their activities. Meanwhile, banking supervisors should evaluate the benefit and
cost of an external credit line before requiring additional liquidity provision by the central
banks.
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Chapter 4
How Liquid Are UK Banks?
4.1 Introduction
As I discussed in chapter 2.3.1, the definition of liquidity in this thesis represents the capacity
to fulfill all payment obligations as and when they fall due. Therefore, liquidity risk can
arise on both sides of the balance sheet, if either the liquidity generated from selling assets
or the liquidity available from various funding sources is insufficient to meet obligations as
they fall due. In most cases, a trigger event exposes the existing vulnerability in a bank’s
balance sheet and causes an adverse liquidity outcome. The most common sources of bank
vulnerability lie in maturity mismatches between assets and liabilities, with assets typically
being less liquid than liabilities, and significant short options of the bank with respect to
counterparties and customers, such as the right of holders of sight deposits to withdraw
them at any time, or the right of providers of short-term money market financing not to
roll over that funding at the end of the contract.
Even though Basel II (BCBS, 2003) required regulators and banks to adopt an improved
framework for dealing with liquidity risk, the measurement and management of bank liq-
uidity risk did not receive adequate attention. Before the latest banking crisis, the liquidity
regimes in the UK had not been fundamentally changed since the early 1980s. According
to the Sterling Stock regime applied to large UK retail banks1, these banks were encour-
aged to just focus on controlling intra-day or weekly liquidity, ignoring wider liquidity issues
which became apparent during the recent crisis-notably, the growing dependence on volatile
1The Sterling Stock regime basically required UK banks to be able to cover their five-day wholesale net
outflow and 5% of withdrawable retail deposits over the same period (Hall, 1999, Chapter 18, pages 304-26).
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wholesale funding. While the limits applied to the ‘cumulative net mismatched position’
of the remaining banks likewise failed to address key liquidity concerns. Accordingly, as
recognized in Basel III (BCBS, 2010b), there was a need for a thorough overhaul of liquidity
risk management and assessment.
Regulators now argued that liquidity regulation and supervision should be recognized
as being of equal importance to capital regulation. The new international framework for
liquidity risk regulation requires individual banks to retain enough liquidity, rather than
over rely on central bank funding, which might increase the problem of moral hazard as
emphasized by Mernyn King2. Indeed, the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA) was
one of the first national banking regulators to propose the adoption of a new liquidity
regime (see FSA (2008a), FSA (2009b), FSA (2009c) and FSA (2009d)), just after the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision (2008) announced new principles for sound liquidity
risk management and supervision in September 2008 .
The first contribution of this chapter is to enhance individual banks’ liquidity risk mea-
surement and management by applying quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis, based
upon modified versions of the BCBS (2010b) and Moody’s (2001) models. The fundamen-
tal aim of this chapter is to remind banks should understand their own business model
and funding strategies in order to match liquidity needs on different time horizons more
efficiently.
The second contribution of this chapter is to take a comprehensive look at the UK
banks’ consolidated balance sheet information. This analytical framework provides valuable
operational information, such as a bank’s funding strategy and business model, for external
agencies and regulators to analyze.
The third contribution of this chapter is to measure a bank’s short-term or long-term liq-
uidity position using a single number (‘liquidity coverage’ or ‘net cash capital’, respectively).
As they are calculated using balance sheet information according to different time scales,
these numbers are more accurate than more commonly used ‘liquidity ratios’, such as the
deposits-to-assets ratio (Barrell, Davis, Liadze and Karim, 2010) or the loans-to-deposits
2Mernyn King’s letter to Treasury and Civil Service Select Committee on 12th September 2007: ‘ ...
there is a case for the provision of additional central bank liquidity against a wider range of collateral and
over longer periods in order to reduce market interest rates at longer maturities? This is the most difficult
issue facing central banks at present and requires a balancing act between two different considerations. On
the one hand, the provision of greater short-term liquidity against illiquid collateral might ease the process of
taking the assets of vehicles back onto bank balance sheets and so reduce term market interest rates. But, on
the other hand, the provision of such liquidity support undermines the efficient pricing of risk by providing
ex post insurance for risk behaviour’
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ratio (Gambacorta, 2011), as measures of a bank’s liquidity position. Different from BCBS’s
short-term Liquidity Coverage Ratio and long-term Net Stable Funding Ratio, my short-
term liquidity framework is built to measure whether a bank’s liquid assets can cover its
cash outflow for up to one year or not. And my long-term liquidity framework is built to
measure whether a bank’s long-term funding due to mature in more than a year can cover
its illiquid assets and securities or not.
The fourth contribution of this chapter is to explain why the previous intra-day or one
week liquidity focus no longer ensures a bank can survive an unexpected, serious systemic
bank crisis, such as that which caused the demise of Lehman Brothers in September 20083.
I analyze eight UK banks’ liquidity positions from 2005 to 2010 using consistent financial
reporting information. Most primary accounting data is taken from the Bankscope database,
with secondary data being collected from each bank’s financial reports.
I show that, in these six years, only Barclays Bank kept adequate short-term liquidity
positions throughout, although the HSBC Bank also remained liquid on a short-term basis,
except in 2008 and 2010. Meanwhile, Santander UK was able to cover illiquid assets and
securities using long-term funding except in 2009; and, after receiving a huge equity injection
from the UK government, RBS also managed to maintain adequate long-term liquidity
positions after 2008. In contrast, the rest of the sampled banks (BOS, Lloyds TSB, Natwest,
and Standard Chartered) failed to manage their internal liquidity risks properly, exposing
themselves to both short-term and long-term illiquidity over the six year period.
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 is the literature review. Section
4.3 describes the data. Section 4.4 outlines the methodologies adopted. Section 4.5 presents
the results. And section 4.6 summarises and concludes.
3Lehman Brothers collapsed in September 2008, a year after the start of the US sub-prime crisis.
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4.2 Literature Review
As Allen and Gale (2001), Diamond and Rajan (2001), and Freixas and Rochet (1997) men-
tioned, banks are inherently fragile. This fragility arises because banks provide liquidity by
financing themselves with external funding. Song and Thakor (2007) argued that various
funding sources create risk for the bank owing to unanticipated withdrawals that may be
precipitated by adverse expectations of creditors about the bank’s payoffs (Chari and Ja-
gannathan, 1988) due to economic shocks (Gorton and Rosen, 1992) or perceived potential
bank portfolio risk (Calomiris and Kahn, 1991). Hence, a bank’s liquidity stress might be
diminished by both reducing its risk-taking on the asset side and extending stable funding
on the liability side. In order to assess a bank’s liquidity position accurately, it is essen-
tial to take a comprehensive look at the bank’s consolidated balance sheet information to
examine where banks invest and how they fund themselves rather than to evaluate simple
liquidity ratios, such as the ratio of cash and balances with the central bank plus securities
over total assets (Barrell, Davis, Liadze and Karim, 2010) and the loans-to-deposits ratio
(Gambacorta, 2011).
The balance sheet liquidity analysis differentiates between different balance sheet items
on both the assets side and the liabilities side, depending on whether the assets are liquid
or illiquid, and whether their funding is stable or volatile respectively (Neu, 2007). Under
this approach, a bank liquid in the short term would have enough liquid assets to cover
volatile short-term liabilities, while a bank liquid in the long term would have enough stable
long-term funding to cover sticky illiquid assets (see Table 4.1).
Table 4.1: Balance sheet liquidity analysis
Assets Liabilities
Cash and deposits with central bank Short term unsecured bank deposits
Trading assets Trading liabilities
Liquid securities Current portion of long term debt
Repos (and security borrowing) Repos (and security lending)
Illiquid assets Non-bank deposits
Illiquid securities Certified liabilities
Equity
Source: Neu (2007, pg. 19).
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4.2.1 Short-term Liquidity Framework
Fitch (2010), like other credit rating agencies, uses a short-standing liquidity framework to
analyze whether an institution is in the potentially vulnerable position of having insufficient
liquid assets or contingency funding to cover short-term debt. Fitch (2010) assumes that
a bank will not be able to use long-term funding to maintain short-term solvency, and it
focuses on short-term ‘liquidity coverage’, which is the difference between the liquidity pool
(a pool of liquid assets) and stress scenario cash outflows, as follows:
Liquidity coverage = Liquidity pool− Cash outflows.
A positive figure indicates that the bank would be able to maintain liquidity even with
a temporary idiosyncratic or market-wide shock. However, a negative figure means that a
bank may be seriously weakened by a disruption of funding capacity, and will need to access
other funding facilities to maintain its core business franchise.
Fitch (2010) defines the liquidity pool to include cash, unencumbered assets, government
securities, liquid financial assets at fair value, and committed un-drawn lines of credit.
The cash outflows come from short-term unsecured debt, brokered deposits, retail deposits,
wholesale deposits, collateralized financing, payables and other liabilities, trading liabilities,
and commitments to extend credit. To ensure prudence, Fitch (2010) applies different
‘shrinkage margins’ on the possible sources of cash outflow, as shown in Table 4.2 below.
Table 4.2: Shrinkage margins for short-term funding imposed by Fitch
Assumed Shrinkage Margins Cash Outflows
100% Short-term unsecured debt
25% Brokered/internet deposits
10% Retail deposits
50% Wholesale deposits
25% Payables and other liabilities
25% Trading liabilities
10% Collateralized financing
25% Commitments to extend credit
Source: Fitch (2010).
Fitch (2010) characterizes balance sheet positions only as ‘liquid’ or ‘illiquid’. There are
no statements about in which time frame positions can be liquidated or liabilities become
due. In particular, management cannot know from this analysis whether cash outflows
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becoming due within, say, the next eight days can be met. If the time to maturity of a
retail deposit is eight days, it cannot truly be considered as a retail deposit attracting a
10% shrinkage margin.
Learning from the serious financial crisis of 2007-2009, the FSA began overhauling the
supervision of bank liquidity risk after August 20084. FSA (2009d) sets out a new liquidity
reporting regime, a part of the overhaul of UK liquidity regulation, which took effect after
June 2010, which requires individual banks to collect daily flows out to three months (i.e. 90
days) to analyze survival periods and spot potential liquidity squeezes early 5. BCBS (2010b)
develops the liquidity coverage standard for supervisors to use to measure whether a bank
makes realistic assumptions about its future liquidity needs for the short-term that reflect
the complexities of its underlying business, products and markets. This standard aims to
ensure that a bank maintains an adequate level of unencumbered, high-quality liquid assets
that can be converted into cash to meet its liquidity needs for a 30 calendar day time
horizon under a significantly severe liquidity stress scenario specified by supervisors. At a
minimum, the stock of liquid assets should enable the bank to survive until Day 30 of the
stress scenario.
The Basel liquidity coverage ratio (LCR) builds on traditional ‘liquidity coverage ratio’
methodologies used internally by banks to assess exposure to contingent liquidity events.
As defined,
LCR =
Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Total net cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days
≥ 100%.
There are two categories of assets comprising the stock of high-quality liquidity assets,
namely ‘Level 1’ assets and ‘Level 2’ assets6. Assets to be included in each category are
those that the bank is holding for a month. Level 1 assets can comprise an unlimited share
4The FSA requires all UK banks to maintain adequate liquidity resources at all times and not to depend
on other parts of their group to satisfy the overall liquidity adequacy rule.
5Even though banks are required to report daily cash flow from both on-balance-sheet and off-balance-
sheet accounts, there is no requirement that all the information is made available to external analysts.
6Level 1 assets include: marketable securities guaranteed by sovereigns, central banks,the BIS, and the
IFS, assigned a 0% risk-weight under the Basel II standardised approach for credit risk, and traded in large,
deep and active repo markets; 0% risk-weighted sovereign or central bank debt securities issued in domestic
currencies; and 0% risk-weighted sovereign or central bank debt securities issued in foreign currencies. And
Level 2 assets include: marketable securities guaranteed by sovereigns and central banks, and assigned a
20% risk-weight under the Basel II standardised approach for credit risk; corporate bonds and covered bonds
issued by a financial institution or any of its affiliated entites; corporate bonds and covered bonds not issued
by a bank itself or any of its affiliated entities rated at least AA-.
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of the pool and are not subject to any discount under the LCR. Level 2 assets can be inluded
in the stock of liquid assets subject to the requirement that they comprise no more than
40% of the overall stock after an assumed weight (85%) has been applied.
Cash outflows come from retail deposits, unsecured wholesale funding provided by small
business customers, unsecured wholesale funding with operational relationships, unsecured
wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates, sovereigns, central banks and public
sector entities, unsecured wholesale funding provided by other legal entity customers, and
secured funding. Table 4.3 sets out the weights imposed by the Basel Committee for each
type of liability, based on the assumptions about the likely speed of cash outflow over the
next 30 calendar stressed days. These stress scenarios include bank-specific scenarios, such
as an unexpected rating downgrade and operational problems, and external scenarios, such
as Emerging Market crises, payment system disruption and macroeconomic shocks.
However, BCBS (2010b) faces the same problem as Fitch (2010) because of having a
uniform weight for a group of liabilities without considering the real contractual maturities.
If the time to maturity of a type of secured funding is less than one week, for example, it
should not really attract a weight of only 25%.
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Table 4.3: Weights imposed under the Basel Committee’s Liquidity Coverage Ratio
Stock of high-quality liquid assets Assumed
Weight
Cash and central bank reserves 100%
Level 1 assets at 1 month 100%
Level 2 assets at 1 month 85%
Total stock of high-quality liquid assets
Cash outflows over the next 30 calendar days Assumed
Weight
Stable deposits 5%
Less stable deposits 10%
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by small business customers 5-10%
Unsecured wholesale funding with operational relationships 25%
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by non-financial corporates,
sovereigns, central banks and public sector entities
75%
Unsecured wholesale funding provided by other legal entity customers 100%
Secured funding 25%
Total cash outflows
Surplus/deficit
Source: BCBS (2010b).
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4.2.2 Long-term Liquidity Framework
Moody’s (2001) has developed a long-standing liquidity framework to determine whether a
bank’s long-term funding is greater than its illiquid assets. Moody’s assume that the bank
will not be able to roll over its short-term funding or to sell its liquid assets to maintain
long-term solvency. Besides assuming no new short-term funding for a bank, the liquidation
of business by a bank cannot be viewed as a prudent alternative liquidity plan. Raffis
(2007) points out that the virtue of the tool is that it provides a bank with a consistent and
externally-accepted framework to quantify, analyze, and then report its liquidity position
to rating agencies and regulatory analysts.
Moody’s (2001) identifies that ‘net cash capital’ is the balance after deducting illiquid
assets and illiquid securities from long-term funding, as follows:
Net cash capital = Long-term funding− Illiquid assets− Illiquid securities.
A positive figure indicates that the bank would be able to continue operating from its
currently available resources, even with a temporary disruption in the unsecured wholesale
funding markets. However, a negative figure means the bank is in a challenging position,
requiring it to unwind its liquid assets or secure access to the central bank’s liquidity facility
in order to maintain its core business franchise.
Moody’s (2001) defines long-term funding to include hybrid capital securities, long term
debt, and insured deposits that are not brokered; while the illiquid assets include fixed
assets, intangibles, loans excluding residential mortgages (because of their marketability,
only 20% of the value of the latter is deemed illiquid), and other assets. Moody’s (2001)
gives no credit to a bank which can generate cash from credit cards or other securitizations
except residential mortgages. But it excludes loans and advances to banks from illiquid
assets in that these funds can be replaced quickly by funding elsewhere within the banking
system. However, following the sub-prime crisis of 2007, which created uncertainty about
the scale and location of associated losses, and, more recently, the eurozone sovereign debt
crisis, which created similar uncertainty, banks refused to lend to each other as they hoarded
liquidity. Therefore, in the light of recent crises, interbank loans should not be considered
as liquid assets under stress scenarios.
Because of the potential default risk, a part of available-for-sale financial investments
should also be considered as illiquid securities. Table 4.4 lists the weights, allowing for
haircuts, imposed on such securities by Moody’s (2001). These weights are based on feedback
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from market participants. In the future, it may be necessary to change the weights in
response to any change in market appetite.
Table 4.4: Investment securities’ weights imposed by Moody’s
Available-for-sale financial investments Liquid
Weights
Illiquid
Weights
MBS or ABS without government sponsorship, credit card
receivables, home equity loans, automobile loans, other cus-
tomer loans, commercial and industrial loans
0% 100%
MBS with government sponsorship 90% 10%
Other debt securities including foreign debt 67% 33%
Equity Securities 85% 15%
Treasury securities,government and central bank-sponsored
securities
98% 2%
Source: Moody’s (2001)
However, there is still no statement from Moody’s (2001) about the time scale in which
the long-term funding can be liquidated or become due. Even senior debt is generally
considered as long-term debt, although it cannot be considered long-term funding if the
time to maturity of it is eight days.
BCBS (2010b) also develops the ‘net stable funding’ standard for supervisors to use to
measure whether a bank makes realistic assumptions about its future liquidity needs for the
long-term that reflect the complexities of its underlying business, products and markets.
The Basel liquidity requirements are also designed to reinforce other supervisory efforts by
promoting structural changes in the liquidity risk profiles of institutions away from short-
term funding and toward more stable, longer-term funding of assets and business activities.
To promote more medium and long-term funding of the assets and activities of bank-
ing organizations, the Committee has developed the concept of a net stable funding ratio
(NSFR). The NSFR builds on traditional ‘net liquid asset’ and ‘cash capital’ methodolo-
gies used widely by internationally-active banking organizations, bank analysts and rating
agencies. As defined,
NSFR =
Available amount of stable funding
Required amount of stable funding
≥ 100%.
This metric establishes a minimum acceptable amount of stable funding based on the
liquidity characteristics of an institution’s assets and activities over a one year horizon. In
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particular, the NSFR standard is structured to ensure that long term assets are funded with
at least a minimum amount of stable liabilities in relation to their liquidity risk profiles. The
NSFR aims to limit over-reliance on short-term wholesale funding during times of buoyant
market liquidity and encourage better assessment of liquidity risk across all on- and off-
balance sheet items. In addition, the NSFR approach offsets incentives for institutions to
fund their stock of liquid assets with short-term funds that mature just outside the 30-day
horizon for that standard.
Table 4.5 sets out the NSFR’s composition according to BCBS (2010b). Even though
BCBS (2010b) imposes weights for each funding category according to the remaining period
to maturity, it failed to clarify the contractual maturity of long-term funding. Therefore,
even a part of on-demand deposits can also be considered as available stable funding. Be-
sides, it gives too much weight for funding within less than one year to maturity. For
instance, the Basel Committee does not explain why it assumes 90% of 1 year stable de-
posits as availalbe funding.
Table 4.5: Weights imposed under the Basel Committee’s Net Stable Funding Ratio
Available amount of stable funding Weight
Tier 1 and Tier 2 capital 100%
Preferred stock due in 1 year1 100%
Debt securities due in more than 1 year 100%
Liabilities due in more than 1 year 100%
Stable deposits due in 1 year 90%
Less stable deposits due in 1 year 80%
Unsecured wholesale funding or term deposits due in 1 year 50%
Required amount of stable funding Weight
Government debt securities 5%
Unencumbered corporate bonds rated over AA- 20%
Unencumbered corporate bonds/loans due in 1 year 50%
Unencumbered residential mortgages 65%
Retail loans due in 1 year 85%
Other assets due in more than 1 year2 100%
Note: 1: Preferred stock excludes Tier 2 capital. 2: Other assets exclude cash and
interbank loans.
Source: BCBS (2010b).
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4.3 Data Description
Since all listed EU companies have been required to use International Financial Reporting
Standards (IFRS) rather than local Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (GAAP)
since 2005, it does not any make sense to use pre-2005 bank data. In order to compare
consistent accounting information, I therefore estimate UK banks’ liquidity positions from
2005 to 2010 under IFRS. Most of the primary accounting data was obtained from the
Bankscope database, but some secondary data and contractual maturities information was
collected from the banks’ annual financial reports.
Because of the limited availability of bank data, I finally chose to focus on 8 banks
out of 121 banks incorporated in the UK and authorized by the FSA (2011a), namely
Barclays Bank plc (Barclays), Bank of Scotland (BOS), HSBC Bank plc (HSBC), Lloyds
TSB Bank plc (Lloyds TSB), National Westminster Bank plc (Natwest), The Royal Bank
of Scotland plc (RBS), Santander UK plc (Santander UK) and Standard Chartered plc
(Standard Chartered). These banks accounted for 88% of the total assets of the UK banking
sector in 2010.
Since much of the current literature focuses on measuring US banks’ liquidity risk, using
accounts based on GAAP, I need to make appropriate adjustments to reflect UK banks’ use
of IFRS accounting principles. There are two significant differences relating to recognizing
and calculating the assets and liabilities under GAAP and IFRS accounting policies which
might change the calculation of a bank’s short long-term liquidity position (Barclays, 2005).
The first difference relates to the treatment of derivatives and hedging accounting. Under
GAAP, derivatives are treated like other assets or other liabilities, as ‘balances arising
from off-balance-sheet financial instruments’. Furthermore, before 2004, derivatives were
classified as trading or non-trading. Trading derivatives were reported at market value in
the balance sheet, with movements in market value recognized immediately in the income
statement. Non-trading derivatives, which were transacted for hedging and risk management
purposes, were accounted for on an accruals basis in the balance sheet. However, under
IFRS, all derivatives are recognized at ‘fair value’ in the balance sheet as assets or liabilities.
The second difference concerns the classification and measurement of financial instru-
ments. Under GAAP, financial instruments are classified into three items, namely Treasury
bills, debt securities, and equity shares. Each item is measured according to the different
purpose for which it is held. Trading instruments are allocated to a trading book, and are
carried at fair value; while non-trading instruments are allocated to a banking book, and
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are carried at cost. Under IFRS, all the financial assets are treated as being held for trading
purposes and are measured at ‘fair value’. Table 4.6 is our stylized contractual maturity
balance sheet under IFRS accounting standards7.
7The contractual maturity balance sheet under GAAP standards is in Appendix E
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Table 4.6: UK Banks’ Balance Sheets Under IFRS
On < 3 3-6 6 mon- 1-5 5-10 > 10 Total
demand months months 1 year years years years
Assets
Cash and balances at central banks
Items in the course of collection from other banks
Trading portfolio assets
Financial assets designated at fair value
Derivative financial instruments
Net loans
Reverse repurchase agreements and secured lending
Available-for-sale financial investments
Other financial assets
Equity investments
Intangible assets
Fixed assets
Other assets
Liabilities
Deposits from banks
Items in the course of collection from other banks
Customer accounts
Trading portfolio liabilities
Financial liabilities designated at fair value
Derivative financial instruments
Senior debt securities in issue
Subordinated liabilities
Reverse repurchase agreements and secured borrowing
Other financial liabilities
Equity reconciliation
Equity
Hybrid capital securities accounted for as equity
Other adjustments
Published equity
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4.4 Methodology
A severe liquidity event affecting a bank usually lasts between two weeks and three months
(FSA, 2008a). In a severe crisis that is resolved, one way or an other, within days, liquidity
risk managers generally only have access to stand-by liquidity held on the balance sheet at
the start of the problem. However, a liquidity crisis with both an idiosyncratic impact and
market-wide impact might endure for several years. The latest global banking liquidity crisis
started in the summer of 2007 because of the United States’ sub-prime mortgage problem,
and lasted until the end of 2009. In these types of environment, liquidity needs are not
related to instantaneous shocks; instead, they develop in stages. Moreover, the stages can
drag on for a year or more. Therefore, holding enough liquidity to buy sufficient time to
access contingent sources is critical.
My short-term liquidity framework is built to measure whether a bank’s liquid assets
can cover its cash outflow for up to one year or not. A short-term illiquid position suggests
that the bank might face a potential liquidity event during the year and that it should try
to maximize the value of its assets portfolio and make necessary adjustment to its short-
term liability portfolio, such as rolling over deposits of less than one year to maturity. My
long-term liquidity framework is built to measure whether a bank’s long-term funding due
to mature in more than a year can cover its illiquid assets and securities or not. A long-
term illiquid position suggests that the bank’s funding capacity might be insufficient if the
liquidity crisis lasts for longer than one year. In such a scenario, the bank should adjust
its business model by, for example, switching dependence on wholesale short-term funding
to secured long-term funding, and considering its own funding capacity before making new
loans.
In this chapter, I establish a quantitative balance sheet liquidity framework to measure
a UK bank’s liquidity risk by considering the real contractual maturities of its assets and
liabilities, which has not been undertaken in previous studies.
4.4.1 Liquidity Coverage
As I am seeking to estimate one year short-term liquidity coverage, only the values of
assets and liabilities maturing within one year are considered. Unlike Fitch (2010) and
BCBS (2010b), therefore, I argue that government securities and trading assets with residual
maturities in excess of one year cannot be considered as high-quality liquid assets. The one
year liquidity coverage ratio we focus on is thus defined as follows:
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LCR =
Stock of high-quality liquid assets within one year to maturity
Total net cash outflows over the next year
.
If the ratio is over 100%, then the bank is deemed liquid in the short-term.
The stock of high-quality liquid assets within one year to maturity is taken to include
cash and deposits with central banks, items in the course of collection from other banks,
trading portfolio assets at fair value, financial assets designated at fair value, derivative
cash flow and repos. Since an available-for-sale security is a debt or equity security that
is purchased with the intent of selling before its maturity date, the major part of these
securities is liquid in capital markets. Therefore, I impose the assumed weights by Moody’s
(2001) to calculate the value of liquid available-for-sale securities. The short-term cash
outflows are assumed to arise from interbank deposits, stable retail deposits, other deposits,
trading portfolio liabilities, financial liabilities designated at fair value, derivative cash flow,
senior debt, subordinated debt, other financial liabilities and repos.
For valuation purposes, I firstly assume that no other asset sales or early-maturing assets
can be used to cover short-term cash outflows and that all of the assets and liabilities are in
the same maturity ladders. Secondly, I assume that the value of the stock of high-quality
liquid assets under normal circumstance would not be discounted, although the value would
be compromised under stress scenarios. Table 4.7 sets out both the normal and stress
weights imposed on high-quality liquid assets. According to the disclosure requirements of
IFRS (Deloitte, 2011), an entity has to classify its financial instruments held at fair value
according to a hierarchy that reflects the significance of observable market inputs. The fair
value hierarchy introduces three levels of inputs. The level 1 assets are considered as very
liquid assets, while the level 3 assets are considered as illiquid assets. The level 1 liabilities
are considered as very stable liabilities, while the level 3 liabilities are considered as the most
unstable liabilities. Therefore, under stress scenarios, the value of the stock of high-quality
liquid assets would be compromised and level 3 assets would no longer be considered as
high-quality liquid assets. As mentioned earlier, BCBS (2010b) uses a 85% weight for less
liquid assets; we also use the same weight to measure the stress value of less liquid financial
instruments held at fair value. The stress weight of the available-for-sale portfolio is 85% of
its normal weight8 .
8The available-for-sale portfolio includes Treasury and other bills, debt securities, and equity securities.
We also assume unexpected rating downgrades or other market volatility might reduce the market value of
fianncial assets by 15%.
90
I apply the same weights as the BCBS (2010b) for each liability with a remaining ma-
turity from 3 months up to 1 year to measure cash outflows during a liquidity stress year9.
But we assume it is difficult to roll over on-demand deposits and the most unstable financial
liabilities in a short time period; here, the weight should be 100%.
4.4.2 Net Cash Capital
Long-term debt with short maturity dates cannot be considered as long-term stable funding
to cover sticky assets with more than one year to maturity. As Raffis (2007) mentions,
some of the stable deposits at least should have a contractual maturity in excess of one
year. Therefore, long-term funding in my analysis only includes liabilities with contractual
maturity in excess of one year. The long-term net cash capital ratio I use is therefore defined
as follows:
NCCR =
Long-term Funding
Total Illiquid Assets + Total Illiquid Securities
.
If the ratio is over 100%, then the bank is deemed liquid in the long-term.
The long-term funding due in more than a year is taken to include deposits by banks,
customer deposits, financial liabilities designated at fair value, derivative cash flow, senior
debt securities, subordinated debt, other funding, equity and hybrid capital securities ac-
counted for as equity.
Some financial instruments that are held neither for trading nor sale should also be con-
sidered as illiquid assets, since they might be unable to generate cash inflow until the end
of their maturity. Therefore, different from Moody’s (2001), I include held-to-hedge deriva-
tives and other held-to-maturity financial investments as illiquid assets as well. The illiquid
assets include net loans10, equity investments, non-trading derivative financial instruments,
other real estate-owned, intangible assets, fixed assets, other assets and held-to-maturity
financial investments.
The illiquid securities from available-for-sale accounts are taken to include Treasury and
other bills, debt securities, and equity securities. Moody’s (2001) argues that the weights
on mortgage-backed securities (MBS) and other asset-backed securities (ABS) without gov-
ernment sponsorship should be higher (i.e. subject to higher haircuts) than those of other
9The stress scenarios include bank-specific scenarios and systemic funding strains.
10As loans and advances to banks were not replaced quickly by funding elsewhere within the banking
system between 2007 and 2009, different from Moody’s (2001), I therefore, include them as illiquid assets.
91
Table 4.7: Weights imposed under the short-term liquidity framework
Normal
Weights
Stress
Weights
Stock of high-quality liquid assets
Cash and deposits with central banks 100% 100%
Items in course of collection from other banks 100% 100%
Trading portfolio assets at fair value due in 1 year 100%
Trading portfolio assets at fair value due in 1 year (level 1) 100%
Trading portfolio assets at fair value due in 1 year (level 2) 85%
Financial assets designated at fair value due in 1 year 100%
Financial assets designated at fair value due in 1 year(level 1) 100%
Financial assets designated at fair value due in 1 year(level 2) 85%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year 100%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 1) 100%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 2) 85%
Treasury and other Bills 98% 83%
Debt securities without government sponsorship 0% 0%
Debt securities with government sponsorship 90% 77%
Other Debt securities, including foreign debt 67% 57%
Equity securities 85% 72%
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% 100%
Cash outflow over next 1 year Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100%
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50%
Stable retail deposits (on demand) 100%
Stable retail deposits due in 1 year 5%
Other less stable deposits (on demand) 100%
Other less stable deposits due in 1 year 10%
Trading portfolio liabilities (level 1 ) 10%
Trading portfolio liabilities (level 2 ) 75%
Trading portfolio liabilities (level 3 ) 100%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year (level1 ) 10%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year (level 2 ) 75%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year (level 3 ) 100%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 1) 10%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 2) 75%
Derivative cash flow due in 1 year (level 3) 100%
Senior debt due in 1 year 10%
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25%
Other financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year 25%
Repos (and security lending) 10%
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debt securities because of the higher default risk of such MBS and ABS. So the weight for
MBS or ABS without government sponsorship is set by them at 100%, compared with the
weight of MBS with government sponsorship of 10%, and the weight of other debt securities
of 33%. However, it is difficult to obtain accurate imformation on the composition of each
bank’s MBS or ABS from current information. I therefore assume the normal weight of all
debt securities without government sponsorship is 100%, the normal weight of debt securi-
ties with government sponshorship is 10%, and the normal weight of other debt securities
is 33%. Therefore, my estimated value of illiquid securities would be higher than Moody’s
(2001). The stress weights of illiquid securities are 1 minus the stress weights of liquid
securities listed in Table 4.7. The normal and stress weights imposed under this long-term
liqudiity framework are presented in Table 4.8.
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Table 4.8: Weights imposed under the long-term liquidity framework
Normal
Weights
Stress
Weights
Long-term Funding
Deposits by banks due in more than 1 year 100%
Customer deposits due in more than 1 year 100%
Financial liabilities designated at fair value due after 1 year 100%
Derivative cash flow due in more than 1 year 100%
Senior debt due in more than 1 year 100%
Other funding due in more than 1 year 100%
Subordinated debt due in more than 1 year 100%
Equity 100%
Hybrid capital securities accounted for as equity 100%
Total Illiquid Assets
Net loans 100%
(Residential mortgages)1 -80%
Equity investments 100%
Held-to-hedge financial instruments 100%
Held-to-maturity financial instruments 100%
Investment in property 100%
Intangible assets 100%
Fixed assets 100%
Other assets 100%
Total Illiquid Securities
Treasury and other Bills 2% 17%
Debt securities without government sponsorship 100% 100%
Debt securities with government sponsorship 10% 23%
Other debt securities, including foreign debt 33% 43%
Equity securities 15% 28%
Note: 1: The net loans should exclude 80% of residential mortgages because of their marketability.
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4.5 Results11
4.5.1 Liquidity Coverage
Barclays Bank was the only bank posting healthy short-term liquidity positions throughout
the six-year period. HSBC Bank also remained liquid, in both normal conditions and stress
scenarios, but not in 2008 and 2010. However, the other six banks, Bank of Scotland, Lloyds
TSB, Natwest, RBS, Santander UK and Standard Chartered, failed to maintain adequate
short-term liquidity positions under either normal or stress conditions in hardly any of the
years (see Tables 4.9 and 4.10)!
Barclays Bank’s ‘success’ was due to holding billions in cash with central banks and
in loans from other banks and engaging in repos. Since these assets are highly liquid, the
value of them would not be compromised even under stress circumstances. The bank also
continuously held stable liquid financial assets in its trading portfolio, as well as in the form
of financial assets designated at fair value, and derivatives. Meanwhile, the bank’s cash
outflows were well diversified, with the biggest exposures being due to on-demand stable
retail deposits which typically amounted to 30% or so of total cash outflows, and to level 2
derivative cash outflow.
Because of only a tiny dependence on those liabilities with 100% cash outflow weight,
HSBC’s total cash outflows were very limited, helping it to remain liquid in normal condi-
tions, except in 2008, the year the UK economy faced a steep recession. The positive stress
liquidity coverage in 2009 resulted from large cash holdings with central banks12. However,
under stress scenarios, HSBC turned out to be illiquid in both 2008 and 2010. This was
mainly because HSBC significantly increased its dependence on short-term trading portfolio
liabilities and derivatives in those two years, which generated significant cash outflow.
The Bank of Scotland, meanwhile, failed to hold enough high-quality liquid financial
assets to cover the total cash outflows, resulting in illiquidity in all years under both normal
and stress conditions. Moreover, the bank was over-dependent on deposit funding, which, on
average, accounted for around 74% of total cash outflows. After 2007, the average liquidity
coverage ratio was only 67% of that recorded between 2005 and 2006, largely because of the
large increase in the bank’s retail deposit holdings.
11The balance sheet data is available in Appendix F.
12The average level of cash and deposits held with central banks between 2009 and 2010 was 5 times
as high as it was between 2005 and 2007, reflecting the ‘hoarding’ of liquidity by banks during the global
financial crisis.
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As for Lloyds TSB, the bank’s total liquid assets rarely exceeded half of its total cash
outflow. As a result, it too remained illiquid throughout the period, in both normal and
stress years. Moreover, the bank over-concentrated its liabilities on on-demand deposits
which contributed, on average, around 73% of total cash outflows.
The average value of Natwest’s high-quality liquid assets in the six-year period was
limited to just under £6 billion, which represented around 10% of its average cash outflows in
the same period. As a result, the bank also remained illuiqid throughout the sample period,
under both normal and stress conditions, posting by far the lowest LCRs. The bank’s failure
to hold any items in the course of collection from other banks, trading portfolio assets, or
financial assets designated at fair value contributed to its poor performance.
RBS also experienced severe short-term liquidity problems throughout the sampled pe-
riod. In 2010, for instance, its total cash outflows were £548 billion but the total normal
value of liquid assets was just £150 billion. Moreover, total deposits were 3 times as much
as the bank’s total high quality liquid assets. And its total deposits contributed around
83% of its total cash outflow.
Santander UK Plc has not held significant amounts of investment securities for a long
time, resulting in its total liquid assets being, on average, only half of its total cash outflows.
Moreover, the bank has been over-dependent on the most unstable liabilities. Its on-demand
retail deposits contributed some 51% of total cash outflows, on average. As a result , the
bank proved illiquid throughout the sample period, under both normal and stress condition.
Finally, Standard Chartered had roughly the size of cash outflows as HSBC Bank, but
its size of high-quality liquid assets was, on average, less than 31% of the size of HSBC’s.
Thus, its liquid assets could not even cover cash outflow from on-demand retail deposits
in any of the sample years, causing the bank to remain illiquid, in both normal and stess
conditions, throughout the sample period.
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Table 4.9: UK banks’ normal LCRs
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 108.75 132.50 128.45 131.17 139.52 161.12
Bank of Scotland 36.33 41.71 31.51 29.37 22.02 22.12
HSBC Bank Plc 161.43 147.96 122.79 98.50 129.57 103.82
Lloyds TSB 43.56 43.01 34.53 85.26 35.94 60.71
Natwest 2.45 2.30 2.58 3.36 2.08 17.94
RBS Bank Plc 13.14 11.39 9.75 25.60 20.40 27.30
Santander UK Plc 91.27 31.79 64.10 53.07 48.55 63.56
Standard Chartered 30.09 30.32 32.71 45.62 33.94 37.73
Table 4.10: UK banks’ stress LCRs
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 100.18 119.37 114.43 111.22 123.37 143.34
Bank of Scotland 31.02 35.63 26.94 24.40 18.70 18.76
HSBC Bank Plc 138.66 126.86 105.23 88.69 119.62 96.43
Lloyds TSB 37.25 36.81 29.71 76.24 33.54 56.05
Natwest 2.20 1.99 2.26 2.61 1.85 12.15
RBS Bank Plc 11.35 9.87 8.35 21.78 17.88 24.48
Santander UK Plc 77.71 27.07 54.61 45.52 42.34 58.33
Standard Chartered 26.42 26.41 28.44 39.88 29.99 33.84
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4.5.2 Net Cash Capital
RBS’s long-term liquidity position dramatically improved from 2008. Between 2005 and
2007, however, its average net cash capital was -£173bn and -£176bn in normal and stress
conditions respectively, resulting in average NCCRs of 58.74% and 58.27% respectively
(see Tables 4.11 and 4.12). The post 2008 improvement reflected increased funding from
derivative trading, senior debt issuance, and equity issuance. For example, the bank’s 2009
equity increased by £9bn (20%) to £55.2bn.13 As a result, its total long-term funding could
cover both illiquid assets and securities, even under stressed conditions.
Santander UK Plc also posted healthy long-term liquidity positions, but not in 2009.
Although the bank’s illiquid assets and securities rose by only 4% between 2008 and 2009,
the size of its long-term funding shrank by 32%, causing the illiquidty. A 28% growth in
long-term funding in 2010 restored the bank’s healthy net cash capital position that year.
The other six banks, Barclays Bank, Bank of Scotland, HSBC, Lloyds TSB, Natwest
and Standard Chartered, all unfortunately failed to post any healthy long-term liquidity
positions in the sample period (see Tables 4.11 and 4.12), with Natwest again being by
far the worst performer (reporting a NCCR of only 29% in 2010, under both normal and
stressed conditions). Those banks’ long-term funding could not cover illiquid assets, let
alone illiquid securities. For instance, HSBC’s average illiquid assets were 3.58 times its
average long-term funding, and Natwest’s average illiquid assets were 3.26 times its average
long-term funding. And, during 2007 and 2008, Lloyds TSB’s long-term funding shrank
sharply (by nearly 50%) compared with its 2006 position while illiquid assets and securities
continued to grow, causing the record low NCCR figures for 2008.
13Between 2007 and 2011, the UK government spent £456.33bn in aggregate on bailing out the banks.
The figure breaks down into £123.93bn in loans or share purchases, which required cash injections from the
government to the banks, and £332.4bn in shoring up the failing banking system. Of the £123.93bn., the
RBS Group received £45.8bn. As a result, the UK government raised its stake in the RBS Group from 57%
to 84%.
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Table 4.11: UK banks’ normal NCCRs
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 90.27 84.18 80.72 61.14 62.77 68.71
Bank of Scotland 78.49 70.35 80.18 73.05 75.11 82.90
HSBC Bank Plc 23.11 28.09 25.43 21.08 26.28 31.48
Lloyds TSB 94.80 97.61 38.96 38.44 66.97 91.38
Natwest 26.45 28.51 26.53 29.66 43.05 29.37
RBS Bank Plc 53.54 57.05 65.63 153.59 109.40 121.64
Santander UK Plc 209.82 212.56 374.12 150.09 98.52 122.14
Standard Chartered 49.53 47.84 53.03 55.69 47.98 48.64
Table 4.12: UK banks’ stress NCCRs
2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
(%) (%) (%) (%) (%) (%)
Barclays Bank Plc 88.07 82.29 79.26 59.92 61.39 66.92
Bank of Scotland 76.85 68.84 78.82 72.41 74.47 82.35
HSBC Bank Plc 22.63 27.48 24.84 20.41 25.58 30.45
Lloyds TSB 94.36 90.17 38.68 37.17 66.32 90.43
Natwest 26.39 28.55 26.46 29.57 42.95 29.31
RBS Bank Plc 52.94 56.59 65.29 152.78 108.31 120.29
Santander UK Plc 209.70 212.54 374.05 149.40 98.40 122.11
Standard Chartered 47.51 49.05 51.04 53.49 46.11 47.10
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4.6 Summary and conclusions
My balance sheet analysis, based on the work of BCBS (2010b) and Moody’s (2001), but
modified to account for recent market experience and to give greater recognition to the
actual maturity profiles of banks’ assets and liabilities, has demonstrated that the largest
eight UK banks have all suffered some liquidity strains since 2005. My results show that
only Barclays Bank remained liquid on a short-term basis throughout the sample period
(2005-2010); while the HSBC Bank also proved liquid on a short-term basis, although not
in 2008 and 2010. On a long-term basis, RBS has remained liquid since 2008 after receiving
government support; while Santander UK also proved liquid, except in 2009. The other
banks, especially Natwest, are shown to have faced challenging conditions, on both a short-
term and long-term basis, over the sample period.
The balance sheet liquidity framework adopted not only provides straightforward liq-
uidity risk measurement, but also presents fundamental financial information to facilitate
analysis of banks’ business models and funding strategies. Risk managers, for example,
could adjust their liquidity risk management operations to secure more high-quality funding
in accordance with the limitations exposed by the quantitative analysis. Regulators, mean-
while, can see from the analysis whether or not banks are adopting appropriate business
models, and react accordingly.
While my approach, using updated weights to reflect recent market experience, is some-
what superior to that recommended by Moody’s and the BCBS, the results are still highly
sensitive to the key assumed weights adopted within the analysis. Moreover, no single snap-
shot measure can ever fully capture all the mitigating activities that can be undertaken by
bank management to enhance liquidity in a crisis. By focusing on the gap between assets
and liabilities under different maturity ladders, the analysis fails to capture dynamic changes
in banks’ liquidity positions. Accordingly, I develop a dynamic model to forecast UK banks’
liquidity positions in the next chapter.
100
Chapter 5
Estimating Liquidity Risk Using
the Exposure-Based
Cash-Flow-at-Risk Approach: An
Application to the UK Banking
Sector
5.1 Introduction
Even though liquidity management is a core activity of banks, it has not received much
attention in recent decades, as liquidity has not been perceived as scarce1. However, this
perception has completely changed since the global financial crisis of 20008/09. Both fi-
nancial regulators and academic researchers realized that the most serious crisis in the last
hundred years was due to liquidity events. However, up to the present, only very simple
reports are used for disclosing banks’ liquidity management. For instance, statistically cal-
culating the funding gap between assets and liabilities under different maturity ladders, or
1As noted by the FSA (2008a), however, the failure of Barings Bank, due to the fraudulent activities of
one of its traders, threatened the liquidity position of UK banks due to a general loss of confidence in the
robustness of the UK banking system. Moreover, the collapse of Long Term Capital Management(LTCM),
due to panic selling and divergence in the prices of US and Japanese/European bonds which led to LTCM
incurring massive losses, triggered investor panic and a general flight to liquidity in the market.
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listing both secured and unsecured funding channels, which banks can specify without test-
ing the quality of these resources in crisis situations, tend to be the height of sophistication.
The development of modeling bank liquidity has thus been rather slow, despite bankers
ranking liquidity risk as one of the top five risks to consider (CSFI, 2010). Contrasting
with the advanced techniques applied for other risks, such as credit and market risk, Fiedler
(2007) argues that there is no sophisticated method to capture a bank’s liquidity position
by testing whether there will be sufficient cash to pay future bills.
As I explained in chapter 2.3.1, liquidity relates to flows of cash only since it expresses
the degree to which a bank is capable of fulfilling its respective obligations. This chapter,
therefore, uses a relatively-new quantitative model, which is called the Exposure-Based
Cash-Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) model, for estimating UK banks’ liquidity risk. The model does
not only measure a bank’s liquidity risk tolerance, but also help to improve liquidity risk
management through the provision of additional risk exposure information.
The first contribution of this chapter is to improve individual banks’ liquidity risk mea-
surement and management by developing downside risk measurements. The main purpose
of this chapter is to remind banks should effectively control their intragroup cash flow and
rely on their own capacity to raise funding instead of ask central bank funding. Especially
like Milne and Wood (2009) argue that central banks would reject to lending as the last
resort because of the afraid of the undermining the efficient pricing of risk by providing ex
post insurance for risky behaviour2.
The second contribution of this chapter is to clarify the difference between VaR and
CFaR. Researchers typically choose VaR as the basis for risk management systems within
financial institutions, and CFaR when assessing risk management among non-financial firms,
because there is an argument that a financial institutions’s VaR is also their CFaR, since
portfolio holdings by financial firms are marked-to-market (Shimko, 1998). But, VaR, unlike
CFaR, will capture only a small part of the firm’s overall exposure since it ignores the risk of
its underlying commercial cash flow. Moreover, this chapter will demonstrate that reducing
the maximum shortfall of value cannot fully reflect the volatility of cash flow. Therefore,
VaR is not an efficient tool to manage liquidity risk. Banks should develop more advanced
cash flow models to control liquidity risk.
The third contribution of this chapter is to summarize a bank’s liquidity risk exposure
in a single number (CFaR), which is the maximum shortfall given the targeted probability
2Mervyn King, the Governor of the Bank of England, argued that central banks needed to be concerned
about the incentive implications of the providing liquidity to markets(Milne and Wood, 2009)
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level; it can be directly compared to the bank’s risk tolerance and used to guide corporate
risk management decisions.
The fourth contribution of this chapter is to estimate exposure-based CFaRs for UK
banks, which involves the estimation of the set of exposure coefficients that provide infor-
mation about how various macroeconomic and market variables are expected to affect the
banks’ cash flow, and that also attempt to take account of inter-dependencies and correla-
tions among such effects. For these reasons, they can also be used to predict how a hedging
contract or change in financial structure will affect a bank’s risk profile. Therefore, the cash
flow approach can avoid over dependency of banks on emergency central bank liquidity.
I use annual data over the period 1997 to 2010. The bank-specific data was collected
from Bankscope and banks’ annual reports. The macroeconomic data was collected from
the Datastream database, the Bank of England, the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database, and the IMF (2010).
I forecast that, by the end of 2011, the (102) UK banks’ average CFaR at the 95%
confidence level would be -£5.76 billion, Barclays Bank’s (Barclays’) CFaR -£0.34 billion,
the Royal Bank of Scotland’s (RBS’s) CFaR -£40.29 billion, HSBC Bank’s (HSBC’s) CFaR
£0.67 billion, Lloyds TSB Bank’s (Lloyds TSB’s) CFaR -£4.90 billion, National Westmin-
ister Bank’s (Natwest’s) CFaR -£10.38 billion, and Nationwide Buidling Society’s (Nation-
wide’s) CFaR -£0.72 billion. Moreover, it is clear that Lloyds TSB and Natwest are associ-
ated with the largest risk, according to the biggest percentage difference between downside
cash flow and expected cash flow (3600% and 816% respectively).
The structure of the chapter is as follows. Section 5.2 is the literature review. Section
5.3 describes the data. Section 5.4 outlines the methodologies adopted. Section 5.5 presents
the empirical results and risk analysis. And section 5.6 summarises and concludes.
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5.2 Literature Review
5.2.1 Value-at-Risk VS Cash-Flow-at-Risk
Essentially, VaR measures how much market value might be lost over a defined period for a
given confidence interval. For example, if the VaR on an asset is £100 million at a one-week,
95% confidence level, then there is only a 5% chance that the value of the asset will drop by
more than £100 million over any given week. Therefore, it has the intuitive interpretation
of the amount of economic or equity capital that must be held to support that level of risky
business activity. Likewise, an annual CFaR of £100 million with 95% confidence can be
explained as there being only a 5% probability that cash flows will drop by more than £100
million during the next year. It is clear that VaR specifies the maximum amount of the total
value of an asset that a firm is expected to lose under a given level of statistical confidence,
whereas CFaR determines the maximum short-fall of cash the firm is willing to tolerate with
a given confidence level (Andre´n et al., 2005).
In terms of the early history of VaR, Leavens (1945) offered a quantitative example to
measure bonds’ default risk, which may be the first VaR measure ever published. Markowitz
(1952) and Roy (1952) then independently published surprisingly similar VaR measures,
each of whom was working to develop a means of selecting portfolios that would optimize
reward for a given level of risk. Lietaer (1970) later described a practical VaR measure
for foreign exchange risk. His work may be the first instance of the Monte Carlo method
being employed in a VaR measure. Garbade (1986) subsequently presented sophisticated
measures of Value at Risk for a firm’s fixed income portfolios, based upon the covariance in
yields on bonds of different maturities.
By the early 1990s, many financial service firms had developed rudimentary measures of
VaR, generally following Markowitz’s (1952, 1959) approach to allocating capital or moni-
toring market risk limits. A portfolio’s value would be modeled as a linear polynomial of
certain risk factors. A covariance matrix would then be constructed for the risk factors and,
from this, the standard deviation of portfolio value would be calculated. If portfolio value
were assumed normal, a quantile of loss could be calculated. Wilson (1993) was the first to
attempt to address leptokurtosis and heteroskedasticity in the practical VaR measures used
on trading floors; while (Longerstaey and Spencer, 1996) pioneered the use of Value-at-Risk
to measure downside risk. The key contribution of the latter study was that it made the
variance and covariances across different asset classes freely compute the VaR for a portfolio.
104
Gupta and Liang (2005) argued that the definition of VaR is completely compatible
with the role of equity capital3, as perceived by financial institutions. A VaR-based capital
adequacy measure is also being increasingly adopted by regulators and supervisors. The
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has required securities firms to estimate one-
month, 95% VaR and hold enough capital to cover the potential losses since the 1980’s.
While the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) in 1995 allowed commercial
banks, subject to certain safeguards, to use their own interanl VaR estimates to determine
their capital requirements for market risk under an amendment to the Basel Capital Accord
(Holton, 2002). And finnaly, the SEC in 1997 also issued a ruling that requires companies
to disclose quantitative information about the risks associated with derivatives and other
financial instruments in financial reports filed with the SEC (Jorion, 2007).
Banks face a serious liquidity risk if their net cash flows cannot meet their liabilities
as they fall due. But taking market liquidity for granted, financial institutions are not
particularly interested in cash flows over decades. Shimko (1998) argues that a bank’s VaR
is also its CFaR, because banks’ marked-to-market portfolios are generally converted into
cash at short notice; any gain or loss in value immediately affects reported earnings and cash
flow. However, this argument would not hold in ‘thin’ markets and challenges fundamental
accounting principles. In thin markets, assets would become less marketable and wouldn’t
be readily converted into cash as the markets provide little chance of matching (Lippman
and McCall, 1986). A liquidity crisis, unlike other crises, can make the markets become even
thinner, possibly for years. It is quite possible that a well-capitalized bank would be forced
into bankruptcy, because very thin markets would not allow banks to transfer marketable
securities into cash in time. Moreover, under accounting theory, for a bank that has to make
contractual payments during a particular period, the drying up of cash flow income might
put the bank at risk of default, even though its net worth remain relatively stable. And,
Returns on a bank’s assets and liabilities (or Net Incomes), as the key VaR matrix, cannot
provide a more accurate picture of the bank’s current cash holding without taking account
of non-cash expense items. Changes in a bank’s profit and loss might not always capture
the changes in cash flow, especially during stressed periods. Therefore, in these studies,
CFaR will be more useful than VaR in terms of measuring liquidity risk. Despite VaR being
a method to determine capital requirements for absorbing investment loss, it has nothing
to do with estimating sufficient cash holdings for financial institutions. Besides, the VaR
3The equity capital is held to provide a capital cushion against any potential unexpected losses.
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computes over only days or weeks, whereas the CFaR is measured over quarters or years.
5.2.2 A Short History of Cash-Flow-at-Risk
CFaR is gaining in popularity among industrial companies for easily summing up all of their
risk exposures in a single number that directly reflects the firm’s risk tolerance. In particular,
the lower end tail of the cash flow distribution could indicate very costly consequences for
the firm, such as not having enough funds to carry out the company’s investment program,
or even bankruptcy. Recent research in corporate finance, for example Froot et al. (n.d.),
Stulz (1996), and Froot and Stein (1998), has shown that risk management can indeed be an
important tool for creating shareholder value. But theses work also stress that the value of
risk management is greater when there is a higher probability that operating cashflows will
fall to the point that important strategic investments are compromised. Miller and Leiblein
(1996) also proves that downside risk measures are more consistent with how risk is actually
perceived by managers and investors.
Thus, in order to quantify the benefits of risk management, one again needs to have an
accurate picture of the probability distribution of cashflows. The calculation of the single
risk statistic requires a forecast of the probability distribution of cash flow at some future
point in time. There are two dominant methods to simulate such distributions. One is the
bottom-up approach, the other is the top-down approach.
Hayt and Song (1995) and Lee (1999), using the bottom-up approach, begins with a pro
forma cash flow in which production volumes, prices, and costs are the key factors. The
conditional value of cash flow distribution can be calculated by random prices and rates
generating their own variance-covariance matrix. The basic assumption of this approach is
that there is a direct link between production prices and exchange rates on the one hand
and cash flow on the other. But this assumption appears to be contradicted by one of the
main conclusions coming out of more than 20 years of research into how and why firms are
exposed to macroeconomic and market risks (Oxelheim and Wihlborg, 1997). It is dangerous
to use a pro forma statement because total corporate risk exposures are so complex and
multifaceted. How, for example, would one model the effect on corporate cash flow of an
exchange rate change that influences both the firm’s and its competitors’ input and output
prices and their future sales volumes due to consumers’ responses to price changes, while at
the same time affecting interest rates, which in turn affect the firm’s interest expense and
consumers’ willingness to spend money on consumption goods? Andre´n et al. (2005) believe
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that the use of pro form cash flow statements to model risk exposures would yield biased
results since it cannot deal with more than one exposure at a time. Even when bottom-
up modeling attempts to reflect such competitive exposures by introducing more complex
relationships between changes in rates and cash flow, such modeling has a tendency to ignore
the simultaneous impact of exchange rates and the effects of other macroeconomic market
variables such as interest rates, inflation, and asset prices. Because of these complex linkages
and interactions, the exposures that can be meaningfully captured in a pro forma statement
are generally only a small part of a firm’s total exposure.
Stein et al. (2001) use, instead, a top-down approach based on the assumption that total
cash flow volatility is the ultimate variable of interest. Such volatility can be estimated
from a company’s historical cash flows when such data exists. But because the data on any
given company’s cash flow might be insufficient to provide a statistically-significant estimate
of volatility, they call for pooling of cash flow data for a large number of firms, and then
identify four characteristics with significant explanatory power for predicting patterns in
unexpected changes in cash flow in their sample: size, profitability, riskiness of industry
cash flow, and stock price volatility. On the basis of these key characteristics, Stein et al.
(2001) sort all the firms into pools of comparable companies. The pooled cash flows for the
comparable companies are then used to calculate each firm’s cash flow distribution. Thus,
even though this approach aggregates data for a large number of companies, the results are
applied to individual firms in a way to reflect these four key characteristics. Andre´n et al.
(2005) point out a limitation in that the firm in question could be very different from the
‘average’ company in the sample. Moreover, the top-down approach does not provide an
estimation of CFaR conditional on market risks.
Given the limitations of both bottom-up and top-down methods, Andre´n et al. (2005)
use a third approach, called exposure-based CFaR. Different from Stein et al. (2001), Andre´n
et al. (2005) estimate a company’s cash flow volatility by taking account of its own corpo-
rate macroeconomic exposure and the various channels through which such variables affect
corporate cash flow. They begin with a fundamental analysis of the company’s exposure
to changes in the macro economy. Such analysis attempts to provide answers to impor-
tant questions about the current composition of the company’s operating activities, and the
structure of its financial positions. The conditional CFaR, in turn, can tell managers how
much cash flow is at risk, given the specified probabilities associated with fluctuations in
macroeconomic and market factors such as interest rates, exchange rates, and other key
(e.g.commodity) prices. Therefore, CFaR can also be used to evaluate how the expected
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future distribution of cash flow would be affected if, for example, an option contract were
used to reduce a specific exposure. The exposure-based cash flow model can also provide
information about the relative contribution of macroeconomic and market risks to volatility
compared with that of other sources of cash flow volatility.
The exposure-based cash flow at risk model, involving a process of mapping out the
firm’s exposure and the asking of difficult questions about how and through what channels
the firm’s cash flow is exposed to risk, is one of the key benefits of having a risk management
program. With this in mind, we follow Andre´n et al. (2005) and use a exposure-based CFaR
model to measure UK banks’ downside risk. It establishes a framework for banks to control
their own liquidity risk by undertaking a more careful analysis of the drivers of corporate
macroeconomic exposure.
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5.3 Data description
5.3.1 Cash Flow
A bank’s cash receipts and payments are classified on the cash flow statements as either
operating, investing, or financing activities (See Table 5.1). Therefore, its total cash flows
are the sum of the operational cash flow (or CFO), the investment cash flow (or CFI), and
the financing cash flow (or CFF). However, our analysis can only use profit before tax as the
target cash flow variable. There are three main reasons for this. Firstly, in order to analyze
the liquidity risk of UK banks, I collect all the relevant bank information from Bankscope,
the standard database for both private and public banks. However, since the database only
contains balance sheets and income statements, the best cash flow data we can get from
Bankscope is for profit before tax, starting from the end of 1997 and running through to the
end of 2010. Secondly, even though some public banks release their own annual cash flow
data on their official websites, the series of accurate cash flow is only available after 2002.
The sample is too small to accurately estimate the relationships between banks’ cash flow
and macroeconomic risk variables. Thirdly, I also notice that despite some major banking
groups4 providing both annual and half-yearly cash flow data after 2005, even the future
cash flow distribution estimated from this information cannot represent the 102 UK banks’
average cash flow distribution5.
Besides measuring, annually, cash flow volatility, I also need to estimate quarterly volatil-
ity or at least half-yearly volatility, since a liquidity crisis usually lasts between 3 months
and 1 year. The significant data limitation problem does not only prove that both regu-
lators and banks’ managers have ignored liquidity risk for a long time, but also deters the
development of bank liquidity modeling . Klumpes et al. (2009), by case studies of Northern
Rock and HBOS, show that analysis of the cash flow statement can provide fresh insight into
a bank’s finanical health. However, they argue that the international accounting standard
governing cash flow reporting, which requires more information about robust sovlency and
strong returns, is poorly suited to the needs of banks. I also argue that it will jeopardize
academic research if regulators still refuse to release banks’ historical cash flow information,
at least for the last decade.
4These are Barclays Plc, HSBC Group, and Lloyds Banking Group.
5We included 102 out of a total of 190 UK banks because of the unbalanced data limitation. There
were 121 incorporated banks operating in the UK, according to the FSA, on 30 June 2011, and 69 building
societies. Together, they accounted for 98.9% of UK banking sector assets in 2010. However, this sample
does not include banks incorporated outside the UK but accepting deposits through a branch in the UK.
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Table 5.1: Make-up of A Typical Consolidated Cash Flow Statement
Profit before tax
Adjustments for:
Change in operating assets
Change in operating liabilities
Non-cash and other items
Tax received
Net cash used in operating activities
Cash flows from investing activities
Purchase of available-for-sale financial assets
Proceeds from sale and maturity of available-for-sale financial assets
Purchase of held-to-maturity investments
Purchase of fixed assets
Proceeds from sale of fixed assets
Acquisition of businesses, net of cash acquired
Disposal of businesses, net of cash disposed
Net cash provided by investing activities
Cash flow from financing activities
Dividends paid to non-controlling interests
Interest paid on subordinated liabilities
Proceeds from issue of subordinated liabilities
Proceeds from issue of ordinary shares
Repayment of subordinated liabilities
Change in stake of non-controlling interests
Net cash provided by financing activities
Effects of exchange rate changes on cash and cash equivalents
Change in cash and cash equivalents
Cash and cash equivalents at beginning of year
Cash and cash equivalents at end of year
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5.3.2 Risk Exposure Factors
It is obvious that the market and macroeconomic risks faced by banks are from their own
operational activities. Based on the saving/lending business, banks’ cash flows are sensitive
to uncertainty of interest rates. 3-month or 90 day interbank lending rates (i.e. UK LIBOR)
and 10-year government bond yields are widely used as leading short-term and long-term
interest rates respectively. Banks use these interest rates to decide what they want to earn
from loans and what they will pay for deposits. Some interest rates on special savings prod-
ucts, like Certificates of Deposit and Eurodollar Deposits, are highly correlated with those
two interest rates in various maturities. Therefore, I chose 3-month short-term interbank
lending rates (SI) and 10-year long-term government bond yields (LI) as the interest rate
risk exposure factors.
Banks need to manage their exposure to debt securities, equities and derivatives traded
in their investment business. Both RBS and Barclays Bank suffered huge losses during the
2008/09 banking crisis because of the collapse of derivative markets. At that time, RBS’s
net exposure to asset-backed-securities was £64,130 million, which represented 84.29% of its
investment assets. And Barclays’s net exposure to asset-backed-securities (£42,052 million)
was 64.34% of its investment assets. I therefore chose the UK bond market index (UB)6
and spreads of US asset-backed securities (ABS)7 as the leading indices to represent the risk
exposure factors for debt securities. For the equity and derivatives markets, I chose the price
volatility index (PV)8 and Euro area swap spreads (Swap) as the relevant exposure factors
since banks were holding significant amounts of options and swaps in their asset portfolios
over the sample period.
Taking market funding for granted, banks became much more reliant on the wholesale
funding market in the run up to the recent global crisis. Merton (2005) explains that the
large components of a commercial bank’s financing are short-term, not least sticky deposits.
By the summer of 2007, for example, 77% of Northern Rock’s funding came from non-
retail funding (Shin, 2009). However, it had to rely on government guarantees for funding
when the private wholesale funding markets closed in the wake of the US sub-prime crisis.
Between 2008 and 2009, even stronger banks across the world hardly obtained any funding
6The reason for not also choosing the global bond market index is that both indices are highly correlated
(i.e. cor=0.79).
7Even though UK banks are heavily exposed to the UK ABS market and EU ABS market, the relevant
indices are only available after 2004. Hence the choice of the US ABS index.
8The asset price volatility index uses implied volatility derived from options from stock market indices,
interest and exchange rates. A higher value indicates more vulnerable asset markets.
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in any major currency. I therefore chose market liquidity indices (LQ) 9 and repo spreads
(Repo)10 to measure the funding ability effect on cash flow.
Beyond their domestic trading business, the main overseas trading businesses of these
major banks are in the Americas, Asia and Europe, more than 80% of which are traded in
US dollars and Euros. In 2009, the sterling equivalents of total trading products priced in
US dollars and Euros by HSBC, Barclays, and RBS were £14.66 bn, £23.45 bn, and £16.78
bn, repectively. Therefore, we selected two sources of exchange rate exposure for UK banks,
namely the British pounds against US dollars exchange rate ($/£) and the British pounds
against Euros exchange rate(¿/£).
Banks’ risk exposures also arise from the domestic macroeconomic environment. Banks
will gain , for example, from exposure to relatively low inflation and high economic growth
because of lower expenses and higher investment income. For example, without significant
inflationary pressures, the major UK banks’ growth rate of assets was close to the growth
of nominal GDP in 1999. I thus chose the inflation rate (pi) and real GDP growth rate (g)
to capture the macroeconomic risk effect on banks’ cash flow.
To summarize, I used eleven risk factors (Table 5.2 describes where the data was obtained
from.) within the exposure-based cash-flow-at-risk model. These are the short-term interest
rate (SI), the long-term interest rate (LI), the UK bond market index (UB), the price
volatility index (PV), the Euro area swap spreads (Swap), the market liquidity index (LQ),
Repo spreads (Repo), the British pounds-US dollars exchange rate($/£), the British pounds-
Euros exchange rate (¿/£), the inflation rate (pi), and the real GDP growth rate (g). The
reason for not also using spreads of US asset-backed-securities (ABS) is because they are
highly correlated with LQ, PV, Repo, Swap, and pi (see Table 5.3).
9The funding and market liquidity indices use the spreads between yields on government securities and
interbank rates, the spreads between term and overnight interbank rates, currency bid-ask spreads, and daily
return-to-volume ratios of equity markets. A higher value indicates tighter market liquidity conditions.
10Repo spreads are the difference between yields on three-month Gilt Repos and on three-month UK
treasury bills.
112
Table 5.2: Description of Variables and Data Sources Used
Variable Definitions Source Dataset Code
SI 3-month or 90 day UK LIBOR OECD
LI 10-year government bond yields OECD
UB All bands of UK bond clean prices in-
dex edited by International City/ County
Manager Association
DATASTREAM ISMSTAL
ABS US spreads of asset-backed-securities IMF GISR 04/2010
PV Asset price volatility IMF GISR 04/2010
Swap Euro area swaps spreads IMF GISR 04/2010
LQ Market liquidity index IMF GISR 04/2010
Repo Spreads between yield on a 3-month gilt
repo and on a 3-month UK treasury bill
BOE
$/£ British pounds against US dollars ex-
change rate
IFS AH.ZF
¿/£ British pounds against Euros exchange
rate
IFS ED.ZF
pi Inflation rate IFS 64 ..XZF
g Real GDP growth rate IFS 99BPXZF
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Table 5.3: Correlation of Independent Variables after First Differencing
∆ SI LI pi LQ PV $/£ ¿/£ Repo Swap g ABS UB
SI 1.00 0.51 0.35 0.58 0.22 0.75 0.57 0.51 0.59 0.60 0.48 -0.28
LI 1.00 0.20 0.47 0.21 0.48 0.31 -0.07 0.33 0.34 0.18 -0.60
pi 1.00 0.56 0.61 0.22 -0.13 0.49 0.44 0.44 0.75 0.17
LQ 1.00 0.71 0.59 0.07 0.54 0.66 0.29 0.79 -0.44
PV 1.00 0.02 -0.20 0.70 0.60 -0.03 0.85 -0.05
$/£ 1.00 0.28 0.23 0.17 0.48 0.29 -0.39
¿/£ 1.00 -0.17 0.25 0.55 -0.06 -0.06
Repo 1.00 0.59 -0.05 0.77 0.04
Swap 1.00 0.29 0.74 -0.46
g 1.00 0.19 -0.02
ABS 1.00 -0.16
UB 1.00
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5.4 Methodology
5.4.1 Exposure-Based Model
From a managerial perspective, the total variability of cash flow can be attributed to a
number of different factors. Therefore, in assessing exposures, total cash flow variability
is decomposed into several fluctuations which are independent of the changes of cash flow.
The exposure model is a multivariate regression of relevant macro and market variables on
corporate cash flow that looks as follows:
CFt − E(CFt|It−1) = β0 +
n∑
i=1
βi(Xit − E(Xit|It−1)) + εt (5.1)
where CFt is the cash flow in period t, and Xt=[SI, LI, UB, PV, Swap, LQ, Repo, $/£,
¿/£, pi, g]. Et−1[.] are included to capture forecasted or expected developments of the
variables in each period. Because risk derives from random and unexpected deviations from
the expected or forecasted values, the above regression implies that the risk of cash flow
[CFt−E(CFt|It−1)] is dependent on the risks associated with the relevant macro and market
variables [Xit − E(Xit|It−1)].
Then the reduced form of the exposure cash flow model can be interpreted by all past
information as follows:
∆CFt = β0 +
n∑
i=1
βi∆Xit + εt. (5.2)
5.4.2 Simulation of CFaR
To derive a conditional distribution of cash flow, the regression model must be used together
with the variance/covariance matrix of the significant macroeconomic and market variables
identified in the exposure model. I run simulations in which the values for the various
explanatory variables are picked randomly from the variance/covariance matrix. In each
of these iterations, the randomly-picked values are inserted into the regression model to
generate a simulated value of cash flow conditional on macroeconomic and market variables.
10,000 scenarios were simulated, so I got 10,000 simulated values of cash flow.
To estimate total cash flow, I must also complement the conditional cash flow distribution
with a distribution of the error term. If the error term is well behaved it has, by definition,
no correlation with any of the explanatory variables or its own past values, and I can simply
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draw a value from a normal distribution (ε ∼ N(0, σ2)) and add that value to the conditional
distribution. To summarize, the calculation of Exposure-Based CFaR is a six-step process.
Firstly, choosing an annual data set (CFt, Xit) from 1997 to 2010, estimating regressions to
get relevant coefficients (βˆi). Secondly, calculating the mean and covariance matrix of the
first differences (∆Xit). Thirdly, generating 10,000 new ∆Xi2011 based on the mean and
covariance matrix:
∆Xi2011 ∼ N(µ,Ω) (5.3)
where the mean vector:µ = E(∆X1,2011,∆X2,2011...∆Xn,2011) and the covariance vector:
Ω = COV (∆Xi2011,∆Xj2011)i,j=1,2...n.
And then generating 10,000 new error terms (ε2011):
ε2011 ∼ N(0, σ2). (5.4)
Fifthly, predicting a bank’s cash flow volatility in 2011 as a sum of intercepts, the
simulated variables multiplied by exposure coefficients, and error terms:
∆CF2011 = β0 +
n∑
i=1
βi∆Xi,2011 + ε2011. (5.5)
Finally, deriving the distribution of cash flow in 2011 as follows:
CF2011 = E(CF2011|I2010) + ∆CF2011
= CF2010 + ∆CF2011.
(5.6)
5.5 Results
5.5.1 Exposure-Based Model
Before analyzing the results of the exposure assessments, we need to check that the effects
of different risk factors on banks’ cash flow are in accordance with economic theory, since
specifying an acceptable exposure model is a combination of art and science. First of all, we
use the stepwise regression (Rawlings et al., 1998) to find a subset of independent risk factors
(Xi) mentioned above that best predict cash flow. The general idea of stepwise regression
is either to start with a simple model and add variables that have significant p-values (i.e.
forward stepwise selection) or to start with a large model and keep variables whose p-values
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are below a certain significance level (i.e. backward elimination). Neither forward selection
nor backward elimination takes into account the effect that the addition or deletion of a
variable can have on the contributions of other variables to the model. A variable added
early to the model in forward selection can become unimportant after other variables are
added, or variables previously dropped in backward elimination can become important after
other variables are dropped from the model. Therefore, we combine the two selections to
test at each step for variables to be included or excluded. We start with a froward selection
process that rechecks at each step the importance of all previously included variables. If
the partial sums of squares for any previously-included variables do not meet a minimum
criterion to stay in the model, the selection procedure changes to backward elimination
and variables are dropped one at a time until all remaining variables meet the minimum
criterion. Then, forward selection resumes.
According to the results of stepwise regression on each UK bank’s cash flow, we get
various sizes for the subsets of risk factors. For instance, the cash flow of Barclays Bank,
HSBC Bank, and Natwest can be predicted using 6 different risk factors. And the cash flow
of Lloyds and Nationwide can be predicted using 5 different risk factors11. However, with
such a small sample of data, we have to balance the numbers of degree of freedom against
a high adjusted R2. We finally choose 4 risk factors as independent variables and leave 8
degree of freedom for each regression.
Table 5.4 presents the exposure results for all the UK banks sampled plus individual
results for the six biggest banks (which held over 80% of total UK bank assets in 2010).
As argued by Andre´n et al. (2005), the preferred exposure model should include variables
with a strong basis in economic theory which are supported by empirical evidence. In other
words, to gain acceptance from management, a risk estimation model must have not only
statistical backing, including high significance levels12, a high goodness of fit statistic (R2),
no serial correlation problems, and well-behaved error terms (ε), but also an emphatic logic
as to how one would expect the main variables to affect the banks’ cash flow.
11The market liquidity index (LQ) might not be a significant variable to predict UK banks’ cash flow
since it was deleted under each stepwise regression.
12The minimum significance in our model is at the 90% confidence level.
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Table 5.4: Exposure Model Results
Bank Name UK banks Barclays RBS Lloyds HSBC NatWst Nationwide
Intercept 0.14** 0.39*** 1.16 0.11 0.25*** -0.21 0.017
(0.056) (0.110) (0.71) (0.148) (0.062) (0.195) (0.026)
SI 0.26*** 2.49*** 0.38** 0.33*** 1.5**** 0.14****
(0.054) (0.656) (0.151) (0.083) (0.288) (0.022)
LI -1.32*** -1.74*** -0.26***
(0.284) (0.429) (0.059)
UB 2.59* -1.31*
(1.338)
PV -0.36*** -0.87***
(0.082) (0.178)
Swap 3.36** -21.62***
(1.10) (6.362)
LQ
Repo -2.03* -25.99** -2.78** -12.11***
(0.982) (9.413) (1.114) (2.9)
$/£
¿/£ 4.62** 4.3*
(1.426) (1.91)
pi 0.88** -3.78*** 0.38** 0.15***
(0.199) (1.093) (0.123) (0.037)
g 0.84**** -0.15*** -0.6****
(0.072) (0.044) (0.107)
R2 0.911 0.891 0.896 0.976 0.73 0.833 0.909
Ad R2 0.867 0.837 0.844 0.965 0.595 0.749 0.863
P(normal) 0.419 0.168 0.225 0.428 0.742 0.353 0.535
P(non-auto) 0.646 0.447 0.301 0.692 0.311 0.162 0.137
standard error 0.186 0.382 2.28 0.464 0.199 0.610 0.078
Note: Coefficients show average cash flow changes in billions of British pounds from one-unit increases in the
independent variables. In order to keep enough degrees of freedom, we apply stepwise regressions to use the best
estimation results with a maximum of 4 explanatory variables in each model. ‘∗’ indicates significance at the 90%
confidence level, ‘∗∗’ at the 95% confidence level, ‘∗ ∗ ∗’ at the 99% confidence level, and ‘∗ ∗ ∗∗’ at the 99.9%
confidence level.
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Representing the basic price of loans, short-term interbank lending rates should posi-
tively affect a bank’s cash flows. And the long-term government bond yields, representing a
major part of a bank’s interest expenses as they determine long-term deposit rates, should
have a negative effect on its cash flow. As an indicator of equity market uncertainty, we ex-
pect the price volatility index to have a negative effect on a bank’s cash flows. But I suggest
the UK bond clear price index and swap spreads may have either positive or negative effects
on cash flows, dependent on a bank’s own investment strategy and portfolio management
i.e. whether it is a seller or a holder of the specified financial instruments. The market
liquidity index and UK Repo spreads, indicating funding pressures, are expected to have a
negative effect on a bank’s cash flows. A depreciation in foreign currency or appreciation in
pounds sterling would increase banks’ cash inflow by increasing trading income or reducing
trading expense. Inflation effects on banks’ cash flows are variable and can be simultane-
ously positive and negative. High inflation may increase banks’ operational costs and lead
to low revenues by discouraging aggregate investment and savings. However, positive effects
include encouraging banks to offer more credit to industrial firms and households. Finally,
GDP growth rates should positively affect a bank’s assets and profitability. But a bank with
expanding assets and high book profits can still face liquidity problems, as Northern Rock
demonstrated.
My UK banks’ exposure model indicates a one percentage point short-term interest rate
increase, on average, increases the UK banking industry’s cash flow by £0.26 billion. It
confirms my expectation that banks’ cash flow will increase with an increase in the short-
term interbank lending rates. Their bond market exposure is £2.59 billion, indicating that
banks have a long position in bonds and gain cash inflow from the bond market of around
£2.59 billion based on a one percentage point increase in the bond index. However, a one
percentage point increase in the price volatility index shrinks cash flow by £0.36 billion,
showing that equity market volatility negatively impacts on UK banks’ cash flow. Finally,
the significant negative relationship (i.e. -2.03) between Repo spreads and banks’ cash flow
also proves that UK banks face funding pressures when the spreads become bigger.
Barclays’ exposure model also confirms that its cash flow will decline with an increase
in the price volatility index. A one percentage point increase in the price volatility index
shrinks cash flow by £0.87 billion. The positive coefficient (i.e. 3.36) of swaps indicates that
Barclays benefits from the use of swaps. Moreover, Barclays also gains cash inflow from its
overseas trading activities of £4.62 billion for a one percent point euro deprecation against
sterling. Finally, the significant positive coefficient of the inflation rate indicates Barclays
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also secured cash inflow over the last fourteen years because of this factor.
RBS’s cash flow in shown to increase by £2.49 billion with a one percentage point increase
in short-term interest rates. A one percentage point increase in Repo spreads, however,
shrinks cash flow by £25.99 billion. And there is a big loss on its derivatives portfolio,
which were mostly held for hedging purposes, since a one percentage point increase in swap
spreads is accompanied by a decrease in cash flow of £21.62 billion. Moreover, the domestic
inflation rate has a negative effect on RBS’s cash flow, with a one percentage point increase
in the inflation rate causing a £3.78 billion cash outflow.
As expected, Lloyds TSB’ cash flow is also affected positively by short-term interest
rate increases, but negatively by increases in the long-term interest rate. The short-term
interest rate exposure is £0.38 billion but the long-term interest rate exposure is -£1.32
billion. Overseas trading business also contributes £4.3 billion to Lloyds TSB’s cash inflow
for a one percent point euro depreciation against sterling. Finally, a one percent point
increase in the growth rate will be accompanied by an increase in Lloyds TSB’s cash flow
of £0.84 billion.
HSBC’s exposure model demonstrated that a one percentage point increase in short-
term interest rates will increase its cash flow by £0.33 billion. While a one percentage point
increase in Repo spreads will shrink its cash flow by £2.78 billion. Somewhat surprisingly,
however, HSBC’s cash flow will increase in response to rising inflation, but decline in re-
sponse to a higher GDP growth rate. This means the bank will lose cash in high GDP
growth years, but gain it in an inflationary environment.
Natwest’s cash flow is also affected positively by short-term interest rate increases and
negatively by increases in the long-term interest rate. The short-term interest rate exposure
is £1.5 billion while the long-term interest rate exposure is -£1.74 billion. A one percentage
point increase in Repo spreads will also shrink its cash flow by £12.11 billion. Moreover,
Natwest faces liquidity problems in periods of rising GDP growth rates.
Finally, for Nationwide, cash flow is also affected positively by short-term interest rate
increases and negatively by increases in the long-term interest rate. Its short-term interest
rate exposure is £0.14 billion but its long-term interest rate exposure is -£0.26 billion. Like
Barclays and HSBC, domestic inflation positively contributes to its cash inflow. However,
it lost out in the bond market over the past fourteen years, with cash outflow amounting to
£1.31 billion for each one percentage point increase in the bond index.
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5.5.2 Risk Exposure Analysis
Since the exposure-based model decomposes the cash flow estimates into individual risk
exposures, it provides insights into the cash flow dynamics of the company and the key
drivers of risk. In particular, the model allows for a clearer view of the portfolio aspects of
corporate risk.
First, it suggests banks should take liquidity risk seriously, since the significant negative
coefficients of Repo spreads would indicate a significant source of funding pressure across
the UK banking industry. Second, it can help to improve the offsetting of risk exposures
by focusing on correlated risk factors. A high correlation between two risk factors will
have a significant impact on estimated cash flow, and the sign of the exposure coefficients
determines whether the overall net impact is positive or negative. For example, the short-
term interest rate (SI) and real GDP growth rate (g) are positively correlated (see Table
5.3), but HSBC is positively exposed to one and negatively to the other; therefore the cash
flow risk will be dampened in this case. Third, it may encourage some banks to review their
investment strategies by comparing with peers. For instance, in light of the significant cash
inflow secured by Barclays’ trading in swaps , RBS should limit its exposure by changing
its trading business strategies.
Another benefit of the exposure-based model is its ability to inform hedging decisions
which can mitigate the impact on cash flow variability.13 In Lloyds TSB’s model, the
indicated exposure to the euro/sterling exchange rate is £4.3 billion for each percentage point
depreciation of the euro. This means that if management expects a 1% future appreciation
in sterling and wishes to neutralize its exposure to this exchange rate for the next year, it
should sell forward exactly this number of pounds.
5.5.3 Simulation of Cash-Flow-at-Risk
Using the variance/covariance matrix of significant variables identified in Table 5.4, I firstly
programmed a simulation to run 10,000 scenarios of those variables in the forecasting system.
Then, following the methodology outlined in the previous section, I apply the software to
estimate these commercial banks’ cash flow for each of the 10,000 simulations as a function
of the simulated macroeconomic and market variables multiplied by the relevant exposure
coefficients. By so doing, I end up with a distribution of expected cash flow that reflects
13However, not all the information necessary for deciding the size of the hedge positions is contained in
the coefficients in the exposure model.
121
not just the cash flow sensitives to each of the individual risk factors, but also the expected
variances and covariances of these risks. And the resulting distribution of cash flow in turn
enables me to estimate the CFaR for 2011 for each of the banks.
As shown in Figures 5.1 to 5.7, there is a 5% possibility that the UK banking industry’s
average cash flow will fall below -£5.76 billion, that Barclays’ cash flow will fall below -£0.34
billion, that RBS’s cash flow will fall below -£40.29 billion, that HSBC’s cash flow will fall
below £0.67 billion, that Lloyds TSB’s cash flow will fall below -£4.90 billion, that Natwest’s
cash flow will fall below -£10.38 billion, and that Nationwide’s cash flow will fall below -
£0.72 billion in 2011. Figures 5.8 and 5.9, comparing these banks’ cash flow positions, shows
only HSBC contributed positive cash flow to the UK banking industry at the 5% confidence
level. The other banks (barring Barclays and Nationwide), with fatter-tailed distributions,
face relatively greater downside risk. Table 5.5 also compares banks’ downside cash flow at
risk as a percent of expected cash flow. It is clear that Lloyds TSB and Natwest face the
largest risks (with figures of 3600% and 816%, respectively).
Table 5.5: Exposure-Based CFaR Estimates for 2011 (£bn)
Mean CFaR at 5% CFaR
Cash Flow confidence level in percent
(A) (B) (|A− B|/A)× 100
Barclays 6.54 -0.34 109%
RBS 9.97 -40.29 504%
HSBC 5.40 0.67 88%
Lloyds TSB 0.14 -4.90 3600%
Natwest 1.45 -10.38 816%
Nationwide 0.93 -0.72 177%
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Figure 5.1: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions
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Figure 5.2: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions (contd)
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Figure 5.3: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions (contd)
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Figure 5.4: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions (contd)
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Figure 5.5: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions (contd)
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Figure 5.6: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions (contd)
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Figure 5.7: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions (contd)
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Figure 5.8: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions: A Comparison
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Figure 5.9: UK Banks’ Simulated Cash Flow Distributions: A Comparison (contd)
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5.6 Summary and Conclusions
For a long time of period, the banking industry (and its regulators) considered solvency to
be more important than liquidity within their risk management operations. But the global
financial crisis of 2008/09 has changed all that (Duttweiler, 2009).
In recognition of the potentially-serious risks associated with illiquidity and the unde-
veloped state of liquidity risk modeling, this chapter uses a cash flow model to estimate UK
banks’ liquidity risk. The results demonstrate that the UK banking industry suffers variable
funding pressure. The negative forecasted average CFaR (at -£0.06 billion) indicates that
the UK banking industry would be slightly illiquid by the end of 2011. Of the six biggest UK
banks, only HSBC maintains positive CFaR throughout the 1997-2011 period, while RBS
faces the largest liquidity risk, with a 5% chance that CFaR would be less than -£40.29
billion during 2011. Meanwhile, Lloyds TSB and Natwest have the most volatile cash flows,
as measured by downside cash flow at risk as a percent of expected cash flow.
I acknowledge, however, that the chapter has several limitations. First, with only four-
teen years of annual data, the accuracy of the exposure-based cash flow model might be
compromised. Second, I are currently only able to estimate annual CFaR because of data
limitations; it would be nice to have quarterly and half-yearly data to analyze shorter-term
liquidity positions. And third, the estimated future cash flows are sensitive to the selec-
tion of target cash flow data (e.g. profit before tax). Notwithstanding this, I do my best
to quantify liquidity risk for the UK banking industry with a single number. My results
support the work of the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision which, under Basel III
(BCBS, 2010b), pays attention to both liquidity and solvency, a major change in emphasis
on previous iterations of the Basel Capital Accord. In addition, this chapter recommends
an internal risk manangmeent framework, the cash flow approach, instead of dependency
on emergency central bank liquidity.
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Chapter 6
Cost Benefit Analysis of Basel III:
Some Evidence from the UK
6.1 Introduction
Banking crises have been much more frequent than we would like. The annual probability of
a crisis is 4-5% in both industrial and emerging market countries (Walter, 2010). There are
many factors that contribute to the vulnerability of the banking sector. At the top of the
list are too little high-quality capital and too much unsecured liquidity. Moreover, banking
crises are usually associated with significant economic losses. In order to promote financial
stability, the Basel Committee (BCBS, 2010c) has therefore established stronger capital and
liquidity requirements (i.e. Basel III).
This chapter assesses the long-term United Kingdom economic impact of the Basel III
capital and liquidity requirements (‘the requirements’). The results suggest that, in terms
of the impact on output, there is considerable room to further tighten capital and liquidity
requirements, while still providing positive effects for the United Kingdom economy.
Similar to the cross-country analyses conducted by the Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision (BCBS)(2010a) and Angelini et al. (2011), the benefit of the requirements
is assumed to be represented by the forestalled loss (in terms of the level of GDP) of a
banking crisis, which in turn is determined by the extent to which the requirements reduce
the probability of a banking crisis occurring and the associated GDP loss. Therefore, I
identify the benefit of the new requirements as the reduction in the probability of a banking
crisis multiplied by the expected loss arising from a one-off crisis. The main channel driving
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the economic costs of the requirements is the bank credit market, in which higher lending
rates reduce output levels. Here, I quantify the cost of the new requirements as a negative
function of the lending spread.
Comparing with previous studies, the first contribution of this chapter is to estimate
the long-term economic impact of both tighter capital and liquidity requirements for the
UK economy. Second, I calculate the capital and liquidity ratios based on the Basel III
definitions, rather than the more commonly used Tier 1 capital ratio and the Loans-to-
Deposits liquidity ratio. Third, I choose a non-linear-in-factor probit model including bank
capital and liquidity to forecast the probability of a bank crisis by considering the imperfect
substitutability between UK banks’ capital and liquidity. And fourth, I estimate the long-
run cost of the requirements with a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), which shows
holding higher capital and liquidity would reduce output by a small amount but increase
bank profitability in the long run.
I use quarterly data over the period 1997:q1 to 2010:q2. The bank-specific data were col-
lected from Bankscope and banks’ annual reports. The macroeconomic data were collected
from the the Bank of England (BOE) database, the Office for National Statistics (ONS)
database, and the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database. My maximum tempo-
rary net benefit and permanent net benefit is shown to be 1.284% and 35.484% of pre-crisis
GDP 1 respectively when the tangible common equity ratio stays at 10%. Assuming all UK
banks also meet the Basel III long-term liquidity requirements, the temporary net benefit
and permanent net benefit will be 0.347% and 14.318% of pre-crisis GDP respectively.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: Section 6.2 reviews the existing literature on
the economic benefits and costs of the Basel III requirements. Section 6.3 explains the data
used. Section 6.4 describes the methodology I use to estimate benefit and cost. Section 6.5
presents the main empirical results. And Section 6.6 summarises and concludes.
6.2 Literature Review
6.2.1 Economic Benefits
The economic benefits of the enhanced capital and liquidity regulations reflect mainly the
fact that a more robust banking system would be less prone to crises, which can impose
large losses in terms of forgone output. This section synthesizes the evidence on these two
1The pre-crisis GDP in this chapter is expressed as real GDP in 2007:q4.
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effects. It firstly reviews the literature on the impact of capital and liquidity regulation
on the probability of systemic banking crises occurring. It then proceeds to review the
approaches adopted to assess the GDP loss associated with a specific banking crisis.
The impact of capital and liquidity requirements on the probability of banking
crises occurring
Table 6.1 shows the main methods used to estimate the relationship between regulatory
requirements and the probability of a banking crisis occurring in a given year; reduced-
form models, calibrated portfolio models and calibrated stress test models. The results,
summarized in Table 6.1, point to a clear role for capital. But the impact of liquidity is
addressed by far fewer models, even though liquidity has been shown to be just as important
for maintaining the stability of banking systems. It is worth noting that the definitions of
both bank capital and bank liquidity used in these models are not exactly the same as those
specified by Basel III. I will discuss this in greater detail below.
Barrell et al. (2009), Kato et al. (2010) and Wong et al. (2010) adopt reduced-from
probit models for a panel of countries over a period of years. The probability of a crisis
occurring is based on the statistical relationship between the incidence of crisis episodes
and aggregate data on bank capital and liquidity, as well as other variables that serve as
controls. Comparing with Barrell et al. (2009), Kato et al. (2010) use a general-to-specific
approach to choose the preferred specification by considering the substitutability between
Japanese banks’ capital and liquidity.
Tarashev and Zhu (2008) use a standard portfolio credit risk model to estimate links
between capital and the probability of bank default, which is treated as a signal for a
systemic banking crisis. They interpret the banking system as a portfolio of banks and
estimate the loss distribution arising from bank defaults. Bank failures are correlated and
the correlations can be estimated from market information.
Gauthier et al. (2010) use a stress testing model to generate loss distributions under
severe but plausible scenarios. This methodology assumes losses arise from systemic spillover
effects, either from counter-party exposures in the interbank markets or from asset fire sales
that affect the mark-to-market value of banks’ portfolios. In this context, a greater capital
buffer can only be beneficial insofar as it helps the bank avoid asset fire sales. Therefore,
the probability of bank asset fire sales, which depends on holdings of capital, is a key trigger
of systemic banking crises. Meanwhile, Miles et al. (2011) use an assumed probability
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distribution for changes in annual GDP to calculate the probability of a banking crisis
occurring in any given year for different levels of bank capital. They generate distributions
of GDP with added stressed shocks by using calibrated parameters.
However, neither the portfolio model nor the stress testing models can assess the impact
of liquidity requirements. With this in mind, I estimate the reduced-form relationship
between the probability of a banking crisis occurring and UK banks’ capital and liquidity
ratios.
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Table 6.1: Crisis prediction/simulation models
Article Model Reference Bank Bank Main
type country capital liquidity findings
Barrell
et al.
(2009)
Reduced Euro
area
yes yes Increasing the levels of capital and liquid-
ity by 1% would have reduced the proba-
bility of a crisis in the UK by more than
6%, and by smaller amounts in other coun-
tries.
Kato et al.
(2010)
Reduced Japan yes yes By introducing a 1% increase in the capi-
tal ratio, the probability of a crisis occur-
ing will fall by 3.10% without any increase
in liquidity. The probability of a crisis oc-
curing will fall by 2.8% when a 1% increase
in the capital ratio as well as a 10% in-
crease in the deposits-to-total-assets-ratio
are implemented.
Wong et al.
(2010)
Reduced Hong
Kong
yes yes Further reductions in the probability of
a banking crisis from an increase in the
tangible common equity ratio beyond 7%
may not be significant. The marginal
benefit becomes virtually zero when the
TCE/RWA ratio is higher than 11%.
Continued on next page
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Table 6.1 –continued from previous page
Article Model Reference Bank Bank Main
type country capital liquidity findings
Tarashev
and Zhu
(2008)
Portfolio Euro
area
yes no Increasing capital ratios from 6% to 9%,
without any increase in liquidity, de-
creases the likelihood of a systemic cri-
sis by more than a half (e.g.from 4.9% to
2.3%).
Miles et al.
(2011)
Stress
testing
UK yes no The probability of a crisis occurring will
fall from 4.57% to 0.75%, if banks increase
their capital ratio from 5% to 20%.
Gauthier
et al. (2010)
Stress
testing
Canada yes no Increasing capital ratios from 7% to 8%,
without any increase in liquidity, de-
creases the likelihood of a systemic crisis
by two thirds (e.g.from 4.7% to 1.7%).
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Expected GDP loss associated with a banking crisis
The paths of GDP over the different phases of a banking crisis are generally measured from
the peak of the business cycle prior to the crisis to a subsequent trough point for GDP; the
end phase is when GDP remains on a new sustainable path. Therefore, two types of GDP
loss might occur in a specific banking crisis. The first one is a temporary GDP loss since
the path of GDP may regain its pre-crisis trend growth rate. The second is a permanent
GDP loss because of a permanently lower GDP growth trend than the pre-crisis one (see
Figure 6.1).
Bordo et al. (2001), Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000), and Hutchison and Noy (2002) measure
the temporary GDP loss from the pre-crisis cycle peak to the point when the pre-crisis trend
growth rate has been retrieved. Cecchetti et al. (2009), Laeven and Valencia (2008), and
Haugh et al. (2009) measure the cumulative temporary GDP loss through the period of
a given banking crisis, which comprises the peak to trough loss of output plus the loss
of output until the pre-crisis trend growth rate has been reached. Hoggarth et al. (2002)
measure both types of temporary GDP loss. Their findings are summarised in Table 6.2.
Table 6.2: Studies looking at the cost of a banking crisis (relative to pre-crisis GDP)
Study Estimated
mean losses
Estimated cu-
mulative losses
Temporary losses
Bordo et al. (2001) 6
Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2000) 7
Hutchison and Noy (2002) 10
Laeven and Valencia (2008) 20
Haugh et al. (2009) 21
Cecchetti et al. (2009) 18
Hoggarth et al. (2002) 14 16
Permanent losses
Cerra and Saxena (2008) 7.5 158
Ro¨ger et al. (2010) 9.4 197
Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010) 4.5 210
Barrell, Davis and Liadze (2010) 2 42
Boyd et al. (2005) 302
Haldane (2010) 200
In contrast, Cerra and Saxena (2008), Ro¨ger et al. (2010), Furceri and Zdzienicka (2010)
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Figure 6.1: Real UK GDP, 1997-2010
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Note: The trend of real GDP is estimated by regressing the real GDP on a constant and a linear time trend.
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and Barrell, Davis and Liadze (2010) calculate the permanent GDP loss from the pre-crisis
cycle peak to the point when the new, lower trend growth rate has been established as well
as the cumulative permanent loss in GDP, over the pre-crisis cycle peak to trough period
plus the period until the new lower growth trend rate is established. Meanwhile, Boyd et al.
(2005) and Haldane (2010) calculate just the cumulative permanent loss in GDP. Again,
their findings are presented in Table 6.2.
6.2.2 Economic Costs
The main channel through which changes in capital and liquidity regulation affect economic
activity is via an increase in the cost of bank intermediation. Banks will increase lending
rates to compensate for the cost of holding more capital and liquidity. Owing to imperfect
substitutability between bank credit and other forms of market financing, this leads to lower
investment and lower output.
The computation of the steady-state economic costs of higher capital and liquidity re-
quirements for the level of output are based on a variety of macroeconomic models (see
Table 6.3 for the details and findings of the authors). The models differ in many respects.
First, they refer to different countries or areas. Second, some are almost fully estimated,
whereas others are entirely calibrated (the value of the coefficients are taken from unrelated,
generally microeconomic, studies casting light on the specific parameters). Finally, some
models explicitly feature a banking sector and a role for bank capital and liquidity, while
others do not.
Gambacorta (2011) and Wong et al. (2010) use an error correction model to estimate
long-term output reduction caused by higher lending spreads arising from stronger capital
and liquidity standards. The main advantage of this approach is that it helps to disen-
tangle loan demand and loan supply factors in the steady state. Based on aggregated
historical data, it can establish the long-run relationship between capital (or liquidity) and
the reduction in output. The main disadvantage is that it does not allow for the conduct
of counter-factual experiments, such as the introduction of countercyclical capital buffers
(BCBS, 2010a).
Ro¨ger et al. (2010) calibrate the costs for an Euro Area crisis from both higher capital
and liquidity using a DSGE model including financial frictions and a banking sector. Their
model features banks’ balance sheets and credit markets explicitly. It provides a unified
framework to analyze how changes in capital and liquidity requirements affect banking
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conditions (spreads and lending) and output. DSGE models also allow counter-factual policy
experiments in a conceptually consistent manner. However, since it is fully calibrated, the
estimation process is often daunting. And the other DSGE models cited here (i.e. Van den
Heuvel (2008),Dellas et al. (2010), and Meh and Moran (2008)) are still experimental, so
that they are not fully integrated to the policy-making process.
Locarno (2004) uses semi-structural models; however, these models do not directly incor-
porate banks’ balance sheet conditions and income statements as input variables. Instead,
these effects must be incorporated into other variables, such as lending spreads. This means
that the first step is to map the impact of the higher capital and liquidity requirements on
lending spreads. Therefore, it is difficult to estimate the impact of the cost effect of capital
(or liquidity) on output. Moreover, the computation of long-term effects is difficult due to
the size of the models, and cost can be approximated only by simulations over a reasonably
large number of years.
Miles et al. (2011) assume an alternative channel through which changes in capital affect
economic activity, that is via an increase in the funding cost of bank intermediation. The
rising bank funding costs (typically referred to in corporate finance theory as the weighted
average cost of capital, WACC) are passed on, one-for-one, by banks to their customers,
who will suffer a higher cost of capital for external financing. They assume that output is
produced with firms’ capital and labour in a way described by a single standard production
function. The steady-state output will be changed by higher bank capital requirements.
Therefore, they apply a production function with a calibrated constant elasticity of substi-
tution to estimate the calibrated output loss caused by banks’ higher WACC.
To estimate the long-term cost effect of both higher bank capital and liquidity require-
ments, we follow Gambacorta (2011) and use a Vector Error Correction Model to estimate
the long-run relationships among a small set of variables for the UK. This analysis focuses
on the long run effects on interest rates, lending, GDP and bank profitability of the Basel
III requirements. It establishes a framework to estimate the effects of higher bank capital
and liquidity on output and bank profitability.
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Table 6.3: Long-term cost estimation/calibration models
Article Model Reference Estimated Bank Bank Main
type country /Calibrated capital liquidity findings
Gambacorta
(2011)
VECM US estimated yes yes The impact of changes in capital
and liquidity ratios on long-term
output are quite small.
Wong et al.
(2010)
ECM Hong
Kong
estimated yes no A 1% increase in capital will re-
duce output by 4.2 basis points
in the long run.
Ro¨ger et al.
(2010)
DSGE Euro
area
calibrated yes yes A 6% increase in capital with no
changes of liquidity will reduce
output by 0.81%. Fiscal policy
appears to matter for the im-
pact of banking crises on head-
line growth but not on potential
output.
Van den
Heuvel
(2008)
DSGE US calibrated yes no The welfare cost of current capi-
tal adequacy regulation is found
to be equivalent to a permanent
loss in consumption of between
0.1% and 1%.
Dellas et al.
(2010)
DSGE US estimated no yes Monetary policy becomes less ac-
commodating to liquidity shocks
under equity market frictions.
Continued on next page
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Table 6.3 –continued from previous page
Article Model Reference Estimated Bank Bank Main
type country /Calibrated capital liquidity findings
Meh and
Moran
(2008)
DSGE US calibrated yes no Bank capital increases an econ-
omy’s ability to absorb shocks.
Following adverse shocks, well-
capitalized banking sectors expe-
rience smaller decreases in bank
lending and less pronounced
downturns.
Locarno
(2004)
Semi-
structural
Italy estimated no no The mean results are the same as
those of the DSGE models.
Miles et al.
(2011)
Single
equation
UK calibrated yes no Doubling capital (from 8.4% to
16.8%) would reduce by output
15% where there is no tax effect
and 45% M-M offset.
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6.3 Data description
6.3.1 Definitions of Capital and Liquidity
It is crucial to clarify the definitions of capital and liquidity before doing empirical work.
In most recent banking sector research, the Tier 1 capital ratio 2 , is the variable chosen
to represent bank capital. Likewise, the most commonly used variable for liquidity is the
Loans-to-Deposits ratio. However, under Basel III, the focus is on very different ratios.
For the capital base, the first breakthrough in Basel III is to focus on the ratio of
tangible common equity capital (i.e. paid-up capital plus retained earnings net of regulatory
adjustments) to risk-weighted assets (TCE/RWA), since tangible common equity is the
highest-quality component of bank capital:
TCE/RWA =
Common Equity-Intangibles-Goodwill
Risk Weighted Assets
(6.1)
Therefore, any analysis about the Basel III capital requirements should use TCE/RWA as
the key capital variable. However, since this variable is only available for a few banks since
2009, most studies have used the core Tier 1 ratio in their analyses, translating the core
Tier 1 ratio into the TCE/RWA ratio by assuming a linear link between the two in order to
assess the long-run impact of stronger Basel III capital requirements. Luckily for me, I am
able to get accurate historical UK bank data for the TCE/RWA ratio based on information
from the Bankscope database and UK banks’ annual reports.
For liquidity, Basel III evaluates banks’ long-term 3 liquidity adequacy using a ‘net stable
funding ratio’ (NSFR), which is the available amount of stable funding (ASF) divided by the
required amount of stable funding (RSF). The ASF includes equity, debt and other liabilities
(Liabs) with an effective maturity of 1 year or greater, 85% of stable deposits (StbDeposits)
with residual maturity less than 1 year, and 70% of less stable deposits (OtherDeposits)
with a residual matuirty of less than one year. The RSF includes 5% of government debt
(GovetDebt), 50% of Corporate loans (CorpLoans) with less than 1 year to maturity, 85%
of Retail loans (RetLoans) having a maturity of less than 1 year and 100% of Other Assets
2The overall Tier 1 capital ratio includes common equity plus other qualifying financial instruments
having a loss-absorbing capacity on a ‘going concern’ basis in the numerator, with risk weighted assets
(RWA) comprising the denominator.
3The BCBS also uses a ‘liquidity coverage ratio’ (LCR) to assess the short-term (i.e. up to 30 days)
liquidity adequacy of banks-see BCBS (2010b).
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(excluding cash and interbank loans, which attract a 0% weighting) 4. Accordingly,
NSFR =
Equity + Debt≥1yr + Liabs≥1yr + 85%StbDeposits<1yr + 70%OtherDeposits<1yr
5%GovtDebt + 50%CorpLoans<1yr + 85%RetLoans<1yr + 100%OtherAssets
(6.2)
Basel III requires that the NSFR should be more than 1 which means the sources of
funding are bigger than the uses of funding. Previous studies have used the same approach
to assess the impact of Basel III’s liquidity requirements by translating the NSFR into a
Loans-to-Deposits ratio. Wong et al. (2010) estimate a one percentage-point increase in
NSFR roughly corresponds to a decrease of 46 basis points in the Loans-to-Deposits ratio
on average, with the assumption that there is a linear relationship between the two ratios.
Even though it is impossible for me to estimate the relationship between the NSFR and the
Loans-to-Deposits ratio with a small sample of data, I can get an approximated NSFR by
checking UK banks’ historical balance sheets and income statements. Accordingly,
NSFR ≈
Equity + Snrdebt≥1yr + Liabs≥1yr + 85%RetDeposits<1yr + 70%OtherDeposits<1yr
5%Itbloans<1yr + 50%DebtSecurities<1yr + 85%AdvLoans<1yr + OtherAssets
where Snrdebt is senior debts, RetDeposits are retail deposits, Itbloans are interbank loans,
and AdvLoans are advances and loans. Given the recent global financial crisis, it might
be too optimistic to exclude cash and interbank loans from the RSF. Therefore, I assume
5% of interbank loans would be funded by ASF. Similarly, since I do not clearly know the
portfolio structure of each bank’s asset holdings, I apply a 50% discount factor to all less
than 1 year Debt Securities, which includes both Government Debt and Corporate Loans.
Given the 5% discount factor applied by Basel III to Government Debt, my approximated
NSFR is thus less than the real NSFR.
6.3.2 Data
I use quarterly data over the period 1997:q1 to 2010:q2. The bank-specific data were col-
lected from Bankscope and banks’ annual reports. Tables 6.4 and 6.5 show that I included
4N.B. I have used the December 2009 definition of the NSFR here (BCBS, 2009) to allow for comparision
with other studies of its effects, especially (BCBS, 2010a). For the final version see (BCBS, 2010c).
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only 12 (17) out of a total of 190 UK banks 5 from the Bankscope database for the calcu-
lation of the industry capital (liquidity) ratio, because of the unbalanced data limitation.
However, those selected banks accounted for 91.48% of total UK bank assets in 2010. The
macroeconomic data were collected from the the Bank of England (BOE) database, the Of-
fice for National Statistics (ONS) database, and the International Financial Statistics (IFS)
database. Detailed description of the variables used is given in Table 6.6.
Table 6.4: Sample of UK banks used to calculate the capital ratio
Incorporated banks in the UK Building Societies
Barclays Bank plc Bradford & Bingley Building Society
Clydesdale Bank plc
Co-operative Bank plc
HSBC Bank plc
Investec Bank plc
Lloyds TSB Bank plc
NatWest Bank plc
Northern Rock plc
Royal Bank of Scotland plc
Santander UK
Standard Chartered Bank
Source: Bankscope; FSA.
To estimate the probitability of a banking crisis occurring, I use a dependent variable-
binary banking crisis dummy (one for 2008:q1-2010:q2 and zero otherwise). There are two
reasons to identify the first quarter of 2008 as the beginning of the systemic banking crisis
in the United Kingdom. First of all, it is the peak point of the business cycle prior to the
crisis. Second, the Bank of England announced in February 2008 that it would accept a
broad range of mortgage-backed securities and swap those for Treasury Bills for a period of
one year to aid banks with liquidity problems. And the reason for identifying the second
quarter of 2010 as the end of the systemic banking crisis is because its real GDP growth
rate had caught up with its pre-crisis level. Finally,the explanatory variables in this model
include the sample UK banks’ average tangible common equity capital ratio (TCE/RWA),
the average UK banks’ net stable funding ratio (NSFR), the real estate price inflation ratio
5 There were 121 incorporated banks operating in the UK, according to the FSA, on 30 June 2011, and 69
building societies. However, this sample does not include banks incorporated outside the UK but accepting
deposits through a branch in the UK.
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Table 6.5: Sample of UK banks used to calculate the liquidity ratio
Incorporated banks in the UK Building Societies
Barclays Bank plc Britannia Building Society
Clydesdale Bank plc Bradford & Bingley Building Society
Co-operative Bank plc Nationwide Building Society
HSBC Bank plc Newcastle Building Society
Investec Bank plc Skipton Building Society
Lloyds TSB Bank plc West Bromwich Building Society
NatWest Bank plc
Northern Rock plc
Royal Bank of Scotland plc
Santander UK
Standard Chartered Bank
Source: Bankscope; FSA.
(RPI) and the ratio of current account balance to nominal GDP (CA).
The reason for including real estate price inflation has been explained by Barrell et al.
(2009). Basically, real estate price inflation , rather than other financial factors such as
interest rates or returns on assets, has a superior predictive power than the others. Or, as
Kato et al. (2010) argue, the RPI may contain a larger information set than the others. For
instance, when housing markets are booming, interest rates would quite frequently remain
low as a backdrop to those asset market bubbles. Finally, the reason for including the
current account balance ratio is more straightforward. I know from history that a banking
crisis usually tended to coincide with a currency crisis, which were well acknowledged as the
‘twin crises’. Given that a large current account deficit can frequently precede a currency
crisis, the CA term can thus also predict a banking crisis.
To estimate the steady-state economic cost, I use the following variables: real GDP
and real 6 bank lending (L) to the private sector, which includes lending to both banking
and non-bank financial firms; the real short term interest rate (i − pi), as given by the
3-month interbank rate minus CPI inflation; the lending spread (r − i), as given by the 3-
month clearing banks’ lending rate for different types of loans minus the 3-month interbank
rate; the average return on equity (ROE) of UK banks; the average UK banks’ tangible
common equity capital ratio (TCE/RWA); and the average UK banks’ net stable funding
6The real bank lending is calculated by seasonal adjusted bank lending over one plus the inflation rate.
148
Table 6.6: Description of Variables and Sources Used
Variable Definitions Source Dataset
Name/Code
TCE/RWA The quarterly average ratio of tangible com-
mon equity to risk-weighted assets.
Bankscope
& FAR∗
NSFR The quarterly average net stable funding ra-
tio calculated based on the definition in the
December 2009 proposal.
Bankscope
& FAR∗
ROE The quarterly average return on equity ratio. Bankscope
i The quarterly average 3-month interbank
rate.
BOE IUQAAMIJ
pi The quarterly inflation rate (CPI % change). IFS 64. . . .XZF
r The quarterly average 3-month clearing
banks ’ lending rate for different types of
loans.
IFS 60p. . .ZF
RPI The quarterly real estate price inflation rate
(% change of real estate price index).
ONS rpi1q
CA The quarterly ratio of current account bal-
ance to nominal GDP.
ONS pnbp:B:HBOP
& YBHA
GDP(Y ) United Kingdom’s quarterly real GDP. IFS 99B.RWF
L Quarterly amount of real bank lending to pri-
vate sector.
BOE & IFS LPQVQJM &
64. . . .XZF
Note: * FAR is Financial Annual Reports of UK banks.
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ratio (NSFR).
6.4 Methodology
6.4.1 Estimation of the economic benefit of new capital and liquidity
requirements
The benefit of the new requirements is measured as the reduction in the probability of a
financial crisis occurring multiplied by the expected loss arising from a one-off banking crisis.
Thus,
Benefit = ∆Pr ∗ expected loss from a financial crisis. (6.3)
Therefore, estimation of the expected long-term benefit from the regulatory reforms consists
of two parts. The first part involves an estimation of the impact of higher capital and
liquidity requirements on the probability of a banking crisis occurring. The second part is
an estimation of output losses arising from a one-off banking crisis.
The impact of higher capital and liquidity requirements on the probability of a
banking crisis occurring
Normally, in the binary-state model, the probability depends on each explanatory variable
linearly:
Prt = Φ(αiTCE/RWAt + βiNSFRt + γiZit) (6.4)
where TCE/RWAt and NSFRt denote the tangible common equity capital ratio and net
stable funding ratio, respectively, and Zt represents a vector of macroeconomic variables,
including the real estate price inflation ratio (RPIt) and the current account balance ratio
(CAt). All of these variables are in log form. Φ denotes a cumulative normal distribu-
tion function typically used in the standard probit models. Accordingly, Pr denotes the
probability of a financial crisis materializing.
However, linear formation, as in the plain-vanilla probit models, gives rise to some
difficulties in estimating the cumulative impacts of the regulatory tools used to reduce the
probability of crises occurring (Kato et al., 2010). The linear-probit model, imposing the
perfect substitution between variables, requires a bank to make a take-it-or-leave-it choice
between capital and liquidity. But, both factors are of equal importance to a bank. Indeed,
liquidity might be even more important than capital during a systemic banking crisis. As
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a result, I employ a slightly more flexible (and sensible) form, a non-linear probit model,
with a few cross-terms to allow for imperfect substitutability between capital and liquidity
indicators. The estimated benchmark specification of the non-linear-in-factor probit model
can be expressed as:
Prt = Φ(αiTCE/RWAt ∗NSFRt + βiZit) (6.5)
Estimation of output losses arising from a one-off banking crisis
As noted earlier, the paths of GDP over the different phases of a banking crisis of relevance
are from the peak of the business cycle prior to the crisis to a subsequent trough point of
GDP; the end phase is when GDP returns to a new path. Therefore, two types of GDP
loss might occur in a specific banking crisis. The first one is a temporary GDP loss since
the path of GDP may regain its pre-crisis trend growth rate. The second is a permanent
GDP loss because of a permanently lower GDP growth trend than before the crisis. Both
possibilities are examined in this chapter.
6.4.2 Estimation of the output loss arising from higher capital and liq-
uidity requirements
Since it is difficult to measure the long-run relationships between variables during the finan-
cial turmoil post-2008, I use quarterly data for the period of 1997:q1-2007:q4 in the VECM
model. Figure 6.2 compares the behavior of real GDP and real bank credit. It shows a high
correlation between the two series, suggesting the possibility that they have a long-run re-
lationship. Kashyap et al. (1993) mention that better economic conditions usually increase
the number of profitable projects in terms of expected net present value and hence increase
the demand for credit. The behavior of the spread and the real short term interest rate are
shown in Figure 6.3. As can be seen, the spreads remained extremely low over the decade
under easy bank lending conditions, as did real interest rates. However, a year before the
2008 financial turmoil began, the lending spreads were at a ten year high. It was a warning
sign of future systemic financial instability. As can been in Figure 6.4, both the capital ratio
and the liquidity ratio remained quite low over the period, mostly because of the widespread
use of securitization techniques and cheap wholesale funding. While the significant decrease
in bank profitability from 2001 to 2002 is due to the fragile financial system, especially
against the background of the 11th September terrorist attack, the collapse of Enron and
Argentina’s default. To reduce the heteroskedastic problem, I also take logarithmic forms of
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real GDP (Y ), real bank lending (L), return on equity (ROE), the capital ratio (TCE/RWA)
and the liquidity ratio (NSFR).
Figure 6.2: Bank lending and GDP, 1997-2007
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Note: GDP is gross domestic product (output measure) at constant prices. The real bank lending series
includes lending to both banking and non-bank financial firms.
152
Figure 6.3: Short term real interest rates and lending spreads, 1997-2007
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Note: The short term real interest rate is given by the 3-month interbank rate minus CPI inflation. The
spread is the difference between the lending rate and the 3-month interbank rate.
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Figure 6.4: Bank profitability, the capital ratio and the liquidity ratio, 1997-2007
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Note: The return on equity of UK banks is in real terms; and the tangible common equity capital ratio and
net stable funding ratio are calculated using data from Bankscope as well as banks’ annual reports.
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In order to estimate the the output loss arising from higher capital and liquidity require-
ments, I firstly set these seven variables in a VAR system in which all variables are treated
as endogenous:
zt = µ+
p∑
k=1
Φtzt−k + t
t = 1, 2..., T
t ∼ VWN(0,Σ) (6.6)
where zt = [Y, i− pi, r − i, L,ROE,NSFR,TCE/RWA]. The deterministic part of the
model includes a constant and t is a vector of white noise residuals. The number of lags(p)
has been set equal to 3 based on the Akaike information criteria (AIC). Normality of the
VAR may be achieved with the dummy for 1999:q1 and 2004:q1.
Based on the Augmented Dickey Fuller (ADF) test, I found that all of these data have one
unit root. The I(1) nature of the variables included in zt may imply existing cointegrating
relationships. Equation (6.6) therefore can be rearranged as a reduced-form error correction
model:
∆zt = Π(µ, zt−1) +
p−1∑
k=1
Γk∆zt−k + ηdumt + t
t = 1, 2..., T
Π = (Θ1 − I) = αβ′ . (6.7)
This framework can be used to apply Johansen’s trace test to verify the order of in-
tegration of the matrix Π. In fact, the rank of Π determines the number of cointegrating
vectors r such that α is an n ∗ r matrix of loading coefficients and β is an n ∗ r matrix of
cointegrating vectors. The results show the presence of four cointegrating vectors in the
model (see Table 6.7). So there might be four possible long term relationships amongst the
variables.
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Table 6.7: Johansen Cointegration Test (Trace)
test 10pct 5pct 1pct
r <= 6 7.16 7.52 9.24 12.97
r <= 5 11.51 13.75 15.67 20.2
r <= 4 23.47 19.77 22 26.81
r <= 3 29.54 25.56 28.14 33.24
r <= 2 31.93 31.66 34.4 39.79
r <= 1 42.65 37.45 40.3 46.82
r = 0 61.71 43.25 46.45 51.91
Note: Trace test indicates 4 cointegrating equation(s) at the 0.01 level.
The first long run relationship represents the banks’ loan supply curve. Freixas and
Rochet (1997) argue that each bank sets the lending rate as the sum of the exogenous cost of
the bank’s refinancing on the money market, other costs (such as bank capital and liquidity
requirements) and a constant mark-up in a model of imperfect competition. Therefore, a
bank’s spread-setting can be represented as:
r − i = γ0 + γ1TCE/RWA + γ2NSFR. (6.8)
The second long run relationship is a Commodities and Credit (CC) curve (Bernanke
and Blinder, 1988), where the IS curve is modified to take account of the existence of the
credit market. Under the assumption of the imperfect substitutability between loans and
other forms of firms’ financing, an increase in the lending spread captures a tightening in
loan supply that should produce a drop in investment and output. The CC curve has the
following form:
Y = α0 + α1(i− pi) + α2(r − i) + α3ROE. (6.9)
The third long term relationship is a lending demand curve. Demand for bank lending
should be a positive function of real GDP and a negative function of the spread. Similar
to Gambacorta (2011), I suppose the existence of a log-linear long run relationship of the
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following type:
L = β0 + β1Y + β2(r − i). (6.10)
The fourth long term relationship is the bank profitability equation. A bank’s profit depends
on lending volume and the spreads:
ROE = δ0 + δ1L+ δ2(r − i) + δ2(i− pi). (6.11)
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6.5 Results
6.5.1 Economic Benefit
The probit model estimation results are set out in Table 6.8. I took a general-to-specific
approach to finally choose the most preferred specification (i.e. spec 12 in Table 6.8).
All coefficients have the expected signs. The negative coefficient of the non-linear-in-factors
imply that higher capital and liquidity requirements can prevent the occurrence of a banking
crisis. The positive sign of the estimated coefficient on RPIt shows that higher real estate
price inflation would increase the probability of crisis. And the insignificance of the CAt
term implies a limited chance of a currency crisis following the 2008 banking crisis in the
UK.
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Table 6.8: Estimation Results
Variable / Nest Linear-term-only Nonlinear-term-included
Spec 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Pr(crisis)=0 or 1
TCE/RWA*NSFR 844.36 NA NA NA 2.06 0.58 -1.99 -4.383*
TCE/RWA 42.31 0.48 -2.7 -6.24* 1.78 0.48 -2.7 -6.24*
NSFR 2360.02 3.44 10.43 19.41 8.62 3.44 10.43 19.41
RPI 4.77 0.038 -1.41 -3.14* 0.81 0.04 -1.41 -3.14* 0.85 0.05 1.24 2.518*
CA -0.02 -0.005 0.5172 0.88* 0.1 -0.006 0.52 0.88* 0.004 -0.049 -0.3 -0.447
lag 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3
Log likelihood -8.11 -16.8 -15.19 -12.51 -15.68 -16.81 -15.2 -12.51 -15.84 -16.84 -15.75 -14.22
Note: *denotes the 5% level of significance.
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The non-linear-in-factor model does not only capture the high probability of a crisis
occurring in 2008 (see Figure 6.5), but also provides useful information to help assess the
cumulative impact of the multiple regulatory requirements. Table 6.9 shows the relationship
between TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and changes in the probability of a crisis occurring. I firstly
estimated the base-line probability of a crisis at the mean level of all variables. The average
UK historical TCE/RWA (or NSFR) is 6% (or 0.95). Holding other factors constant, a 1%
increase in the TCE/RWA ratio will reduce the probability of a crisis occuring by around
3.211%. The probability of a crisis will be reduced by 4.996% when the capital ratio increases
to 12%. If the NSFR ratio remains at 1, the reduction in the probability of a crisis will be
2.036%.
Table 6.9: The relationship between TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and changes in the probability
of a banking crisis occurring
TCE/RWA Reduction in the probability
of a crisis
NSFR Reduction in the probability
of a crisis
7% 3.211% 0.96 0.612%
8% 4.634% 0.97 1.020%
9% 4.930% 0.98 1.389%
10% 4.984% 0.99 1.727%
11% 4.993% 1 2.036%
12% 4.996%
13% 4.996%
14% 4.996%
15% 4.996%
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Figure 6.5: Crisis Prediction
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I calculate that the cumulative temporary GDP loss associated with a systemic banking
crisis from 2008:q1 to 2010:q2 is 10% of pre-crisis UK GDP. Using a conservative discount
factor of 5% (i.e.the same as that used by BCBS (2010a)), the converted cumulative per-
manent GDP loss is estimated to be 210% 7 (see Table 6.10). Using the probability of crisis
estimated by the model presented in the previous section, it is straightforward to quan-
tify the marginal benefit from raising capital (or liquidity) requirements by increaments of
one percent. Tables 6.11 and 6.12 summarise the economic benefits of higher capital and
7 Assuming a current temporary loss of (δ), a growth rate (g) equal to 0 and an interest rate (r) equal to
5% in the infinite horizon, then the present value of the future permanent loss can be calculated as δ( 1+r
r−g ).
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liquidity requirements. If the TCE/RWA catio stays between 7% and 12%, the range of
temporary expected benefit will be from 1.102% to 1.714%, and the range of the permanent
expected benefit will be from 23.136% to 35.997%. If the NSFR stays at 1, the temporary
and permanent expected benefits will be 0.699% and 14.670% respectively.
Table 6.10: Output losses associated with a banking crisis (as a percentage of pre-crisis
GDP)
Difference between GDP Cumulative
at beginning and end discounted
of period loss
Period from peak to trough 6
Period until growth rate recovers 4
Period from peak to end of crisis 10
Infinite horizon 210∗
Notes: *assumes a conservative discount factor of 5%.
Table 6.11: Economic benefit of higher capital requirements
TCE/RWA Temporary expected Permanent expected
benefit(%) benefit(%)
7% 1.102 23.136
8% 1.590 33.389
9% 1.691 35.521
10% 1.710 35.910
11% 1.713 35.975
12% 1.714 35.997
13% 1.714 35.997
14% 1.714 35.997
15% 1.714 35.997
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Table 6.12: Economic benefit of higher liquidity requirements
NSFR Temporary expected Permanent expected
benefit(%) benefit(%)
0.96 0.210 4.410
0.97 0.350 7.349
0.98 0.477 10.008
0.99 0.593 12.443
1 0.699 14.670
6.5.2 Economic Cost
These are the estimated long run relationships from the VECM model (with standard errors
in brackets):
r − i = 17.83 + 5.27TCE/RWA + 10.04NSFR
(1.135) (4.083)
(6.12)
Y = 5.8 − 0.084(r − i) − 0.216(i− pi) + 3.04ROE
(0.027) (0.021) (0.420)
(6.13)
L = −11.75 + 3.21Y + 0.15(r − i)
(0.185) (0.021)
(6.14)
ROE = −0.074 + 0.11L + 0.73(r − i) + 0.18(i− pi).
(0.028) (0.072) (0.074)
(6.15)
As for the estimated coefficients, the long run elasticities between the spread and the
two regulatory variables are quite low. For a 1% increase in the capital (or liquidity) ratio
, the spread increases by 5% (10%). As expected, there is a negative relationship between
GDP and both the real interest rate and the spread. The semi-elasticity between GDP and
the lending spread is -0.084. The long-run elasticity between lending and GDP is equal
to 3.21. Bank lending, spreads and the short term real interest rate all positively impact
bank profitability. The long-run elasticity between ROE and lending is 0.11, and the semi-
elasticitiy between ROE and the lending spread (or real short term interest rate) is 0.73 (or
0.18).
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Table 6.13 summarises the long-run impact of TCE/RWA (or NSFR) on output, based
on the estimation results. Other things being equal, a one percentage-point increase in the
capital ratio will cause a 0.238% loss of pre-crisis output. The maximum reduction in output
will be 0.598% when the capital ratio increases to 15%. If the NSFR liquidity requirement
is met, the loss of output will be 0.352%.
Table 6.13: The relationship between TCE/RWA (or NSFR) and reduction in output
TCE/RWA Reduction in output NSFR Reduction in output
7% 0.238% 0.96 0.318%
8% 0.318% 0.97 0.327%
9% 0.377% 0.98 0.336%
10% 0.426% 0.99 0.344%
11% 0.468% 1 0.352%
12% 0.505%
13% 0.539%
14% 0.570%
15% 0.598%
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6.5.3 Net Benefit
The estimated net benefit for the United Kingdom is dependent on whether banking crises
are assumed to result in a temporary or permanent GDP loss. As mentioned in previous
sections, the estimated cumulative temporary GDP loss is 10% of pre-crisis UK GDP, and
the permanent GDP loss during the recent crisis is estimated to be 210%. The expected
economic benefit can thus be quantified as the product of the marginal reduction in prob-
ability of a crisis occuring because of increasing capital (or liquidity) requirements and the
two types of expected GDP loss arising from a banking crisis. From Table 6.14, I can see
that the maximum net benefit (temporary plus permanent) occurs when the TCE/RWA
ratio is set at 10%. At this capital level, the temporary net benefit and permanent net
benefit will be 1.284% and 35.484% of pre-crisis GDP respectively. Assuming all UK banks
meet the new long-term liquidity requirement, the temporary net benefit and permanent
net benefit will be 0.347% and 14.318% respectively (see Table 6.15).
Table 6.14: Economic impact of higher capital requirements
Temporary GDP loss Permanent GDP loss
TCE/RWA Expected Expected Net Expected Net
cost(%) benefit(%) benefit(%) benefit(%) benefit(%)
7% 0.238 1.102 0.864 23.136 22.898
8% 0.318 1.590 1.272 33.389 33.071
9% 0.377 1.691 1.314 35.521 35.144
10% 0.426 1.710 1.284 35.910 35.484
11% 0.468 1.713 1.245 35.975 35.507
12% 0.505 1.714 1.209 35.997 35.492
13% 0.539 1.714 1.175 35.997 35.458
14% 0.57 1.714 1.144 35.997 35.427
15% 0.598 1.714 1.116 35.997 35.399
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Table 6.15: Economic impact of higher liquidity requirements
Temporary GDP loss Permanent GDP loss
NSFR Expected Expected Net Expected Net
cost(%) benefit(%) benefit(%) benefit(%) benefit(%)
0.96 0.318 0.210 -0.108 4.410 4.092
0.97 0.327 0.350 0.023 7.349 7.022
0.98 0.336 0.477 0.141 10.008 9.672
0.99 0.344 0.593 0.249 12.443 12.099
1 0.352 0.699 0.347 14.670 14.318
6.6 Summary and Conclusions
In summary, the Basel III reforms are expected to generate a significant positive net benefit
for the United Kingdom economy. My estimated optimal level of tangible common equity
(the highest quality, loss-absorbing capital) is 10% of risk weighted assets, which is higher
than the normal Basel III target for the minimum common equity capital ratio of 7% 8,
and even that set for ‘systemically important financial institutions’ (SIFIs) 9. This finding
supports those who argue for tighter capital standards under Basel III, at least as far as the
UK is concerned.
In addition, I estimate the maximum net benefit when banks also meet the Basel III
long-term liquidity requirements (i.e. when the NSFR stays at 1). Our results prove there
is a clear role for liquidity to prevent banking crises and economic downturns. Overall, my
results are consistent with the proposition that the reforms are likely to increase financial
stability in the UK by strengthening the quality of both banks’ capital bases and funding
structures.
My estimated temporary net benefit is similar to the average estimation for selected
economies of the BCBS (2010a). However, the permanent net benefit is higher than the
average permanent net benefit calculated by the BCBS (2010a). The temporary net benefit
is estimated by me to range from 0.864% to 1.314% compared to the BCBS estimates
of 0 to 1.96%; while the permanent net benefit is estimated to range from 22.898% to
35.507% compared to the BCBS estimates of 0 to 5.90%. The reason for the higher expected
8The target, which has to be met by Janurary 2019, comprises a minimum 4.5% common equity capital
ratio requirement (to be met by January 2015) and a minimum 2.5% conservation buffer requirment.
9The BCBS agreed in June 2011 to phase in (between 2016 and 2019) a capital surcharge of up to 2.5%
of RWA for such institutions.
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permanent benefit is that my estimated permanent GDP loss is 210%, which is higher than
the average estimate of 158% of the BCBS (2010a).
I acknowledge, however, that the chapter has several limitations. First, because only one
UK banking crisis has occurred since 1997, I cannot use out-of-sample tests to evaluate the
forecasting ability of the non-linear-in-factor probit model. Second, other possible economic
benefits and costs arising from the Basel III requirements have not been taken into account
in this study due to difficulties in quantification 10. And third, the estimated benefits (or
costs) of the NSFR requirements are sensitive to the assumptions used to calculate the
NSFR. Notwithstanding this, I do my best to quantify the long-term economic impact of
the new requirements for the UK economy in one of the first stand-alone country analyses
of the combined impact of the recently-agreed changes to the international standards for
banks’ capital and liquidity.
10For a broad cost-benefit style of analysis of the Basel Capital Accord see (Hall, 2004).
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Chapter 7
Conclusions
7.1 Main findings and Contributions
This thesis makes a number of contributions to the theoretical and empirical literature.
First, I review the history of financial regulation and point out that financial deregulation
or ‘non-regulation’ would not help to build up a healthy financial system and boost the real
economy in the long term. Learning from the global financial crisis of 2007-2009, I find
out that: the collapse of an illiquid bank might be eventually followed by a large number
of other liquid banks since banks are susceptible to the domino model of contagion and
the difficulties in the financial system would greatly harm the real economy; it is easy for
banks to mislead customers and regulators or even commit frauds with their informational
advantages; it may be impossible for individual consumers to monitor the fiduciary role
of financial institutions, especially for long term investment products; without financial
regulation, market confidence might easily disappear since consumers would worry that
no one cares about their benefits; without restraining risky actions, the potential ‘Grid
Lock’ problems could be caused by the herd behavior of banks who are chasing short-
term profits without concern for the stability of financial markets and social welfare. I
also explain that building up banking liquidity regulation and supervision is a crucial part
of improving modern financial regulation frameworks since banks have extended market
shares and secured higher returns by increasing dependence on higher levels of debt and
over funding from short-term wholesale markets in the last decade.
Second, I discussed the meaning of liquidity risk as well as the the respective framework
of liquidity regulation and the liquidity provision operation of central banks. I explained
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that liquidity is neither an amount nor a ratio, but only relates to cash flow. I also argued
that central banks’ liquidity support is uncertain ans socially costly. The involvement of
the central banks is necessary to maintain financial stability. However, the rational liquidity
regulation should require banks to manage their risk activities effectively and reduce reliance
on central banks.
Third, I demonstrate that the Principles of 2008 represent a substantial improvement
on the Principles of 2000 and reflect the lessons of the financial market turmoil since 2007.
It explains that the work is drawn from recent and ongoing work on liquidity risk by the
public and private sectors and is intended to strengthen banks’ liquidity risk frameworks
to withstand a range of stress events, including those that affect secured and unsecured
funding. All the 30 interested parties welcomed the Principles 2008, but they preferred
a more flexible application of the principles. I also explain the compositions of the Basel
liquidity ratios and examine the side effects of the Basel liquidity standards; for example,
it will reshape interbank deposit markets and bond markets as a result of the increase in
demand for ‘liquid assets’ and ‘stable funding’.
Fourth, I found out that the FSA’s risk-assessment framework is too general without
specifically considering banks’ liquidity risk, which has low probability but high impact. I
also review the failure of FSA’s role as banking supervisor for high impact banks, like the
Northern Rock. These failures included the frequently-changing supervisory responsibility,
inadequate ARROW panel meetings to review risk positions, non-availability of regular
management information to identify emerging risks and re-assess business risks, and little
emphasis on liquidity risk and the use of market intelligence. I also manage to explain
the limitations of the FSA’s banking liquidity regimes before 2008. The Sterling Stock
regime applied to large UK retail banks is no longer appropriate since it cannot cover
‘core outflow’ at a given time. The Maturity Mismatch regime for other banks did not
update the discounts applying to marketable assets. Some regularly-traded assets may no
longer be as marketable as previously thought during the last decade. The Building Society
regime only reflected a simpler business model for UK building societies, although they had
engaged in more complex activities especially after 2005. Finally, I examine whether the new
regimes would have coped with UK banks’ liquidity risks if they had been applied properly.
The fundamental changes in the FSA’s liquidity supervision reflect three considerations.
First, it introduces a systemic control requirement by measuring individual firms’ liquidity
risks with a market-wide stress or combination of idiosyncratic and market-wide stresses.
Second, it emphasizes the monitoring of business model risks and the capability of senior
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managers. Third, it allows both internal and external managers to access more information
by increasing the liquidity reporting frequencies.
Fifth, I refers to some contrasted views on the revision of Basel III’s LCR and FSA’s
liquidity buffer. Some universal banks or even financial regulators welcome the eased require-
ment as giving them more time to adapt new liquidity regulation. While others criticized
these changes are exactly a ‘watering-down’ effect on Basel III by powerful lobbies.
Sixth, I use quantitative balance sheet liquidity analysis, based upon modified versions of
the BCBS (2010b) and Moody’s (2001) models, to estimate UK banks’ short and long-term
liquidity positions respectively. The study also presents fundamental financial information
to facilitate analysis of banks’ business models and funding strategies. Different from the
Basel liquidity ratios (BCBS, 2010b), my short-term liquidity framework is built to measure
whether a bank’s liquid assets can cover its cash outflow for up to one year or not since the
severe liquidity stress can drag on for a year or more. And my long-term liquidity framework
is built to measure whether a bank’s long-term funding due to mature in more than a year
can cover its illiquid assets and securities or not. My quantitative balance sheet liquidity
framework also measures a UK bank’s liquidity risk by considering the real contractual
maturities of its assets and liabilities, which has not been undertaken in previous studies.
I analyze eight UK banks’ liquidity positions from 2005 to 2010 using consistent financial
reporting information. My results show that only Barclays Bank remained liquid on a short-
term basis throughout the sample period (2005-2010); while the HSBC Bank also proved
liquid on a short-term basis, although not in 2008 and 2010. On a long-term basis, RBS has
remained liquid since 2008 after receiving government support; while Santander UK also
proved liquid, except in 2009. The other banks, especially Natwest, are shown to have faced
challenging conditions, on both a short-term and long-term basis, over the sample period.
Seventh, I use a relatively-new quantitative model for estimating UK banks’ liquidity
risks. The model is called the Exposure-Based Cash-Flow-at-Risk (CFaR) model, which
not only measures a bank’s liquidity risk tolerance, but also helps to improve liquidity
risk management through the provision of additional risk exposure information. Specially,
I clarify the difference between VaR and CFaR. Researchers typically choose VaR as the
basis for risk management systems within financial institutions, and CFaR when assessing
risk management among non-financial firms, because there is an argument that a financial
institutions’s VaR is also their CFaR, since portfolio holdings by financial firms are marked-
to-market (Shimko, 1998). But, VaR, unlike CFaR, will capture only a small part of the
firm’s overall exposure since it ignores the risk of its underlying commercial cash flow.
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Moreover, I successfully demonstrate that reducing the maximum shortfall of value cannot
fully reflect the volatility of cash flow. Therefore, VaR is not an efficient tool to manage
liquidity risk. Banks should develop more advanced cash flow models to control liquidity
risk.
I use annual data over the period 1997 to 2010 for forecast banks’ CFaRs. By the end of
2011, the (102) UK banks’ average CFaR at the 95% confidence level was forecast be -£5.76
billion, Barclays Bank’s (Barclays’) CFaR to be -£0.34 billion, the Royal Bank of Scotland’s
(RBS’s) CFaR to be -£40.29 billion, HSBC Bank’s (HSBC’s) CFaR to be £0.67 billion,
Lloyds TSB Bank’s (Lloyds TSB’s) CFaR to be -£4.90 billion, National Westminister Bank’s
(Natwest’s) CFaR to be -£10.38 billion, and Nationwide Buidling Society’s (Nationwide’s)
CFaR to be -£0.72 billion. Moreover, it is clear that Lloyds TSB and Natwest are associated
with the largest risk, according to the biggest percentage difference between downside cash
flow and expected cash flow (3600% and 816% respectively). Since I summarize a bank’s
liquidity risk exposure in a single number (CFaR), which is the maximum shortfall given the
targeted probability level, it can be directly compared to the bank’s risk tolerance and used
to guide corporate risk management decisions. My exposure-based CFaR model also can
help senior managers to develop a proper strategy to manage liquidity risk, since the model
involves the estimation of the set of exposure coefficients that provide information about
how various macroeconomic and market variables are expected to affect the banks’ cash
flow, and that also attempt to take account of inter-dependencies and correlations among
such effects. For these reasons, they can also be used to predict how a hedging contract or
change in financial structure will affect a bank’s risk profile.
Finally, I assess the long-term United Kingdom economic impact of the Basel III capital
and liquidity requirements (‘the requirements’). I identify the benefit of the new require-
ments as the reduction in the probability of a banking crisis multiplied by the expected
loss arising from a one-off crisis. The main channel driving the economic costs of the re-
quirements is through the bank credit market, in which higher lending rates reduce output
levels. Here, I quantify the cost of the new requirements as a negative function of the lending
spread.
Comparing with previous studies, I focus on estimating the impact of both tighter capital
and liquidity requirements for the UK economy. And I calculate the capital and liquidity
ratios based on the Basel III definitions, rather than the more commonly used Tier 1 capital
ratio and the Loans-to-Deposits liquidity ratio. Based on quarterly data over the period
1997:q1 to 2010:q2, I choose a non-linear-in-factor probit model, which shows increasing
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bank capital and liquidity would reduce the probability of a bank crisis significantly. I
also estimate the long-run cost of the requirements with a Vector Error Correction Model
(VECM), which shows holding higher capital and liquidity would reduce output by a small
amount but increase bank profitability in the long run. My maximum temporary net benefit
and permanent net benefit is shown to be 1.284% and 35.484% of pre-crisis GDP respectively
when the tangible common equity ratio stays at 10%. Assuming all UK banks also meet
the Basel III long-term liquidity requirements, the temporary net benefit and permanent
net benefit will be 0.347% and 14.318% of pre-crisis GDP respectively. Therefore, the
results suggest that, in terms of the impact on output, there is considerable room to further
tighten capital and liquidity requirements, while still providing positive benefits for the
United Kingdom economy.
7.2 Directions for Future Research
In order to extend the research using quantitative balance-sheet analysis, it would also be
helpful to include a model to measure the imposed weights for each asset or liability items
according to the remaining period to maturity. Also, research that linked bank liquidity
and financing conditions for corporates would be very interesting.
In the area of measuring banks’ downside liquidity risk, the study currently is only able
to estimate annual CFaR because of data limitation; it would be nice to have quarterly and
half-yearly data to analyze shorter-term liquidity positions, which would make it easier for
senior managers and regulators to adjust their operational strategies in terms of bearing
unpredictable liquidity pressures. Significant data limitation problems help to explain why
both regulators and bank managers ignored liquidity risk for a long time, and retarded the
development of bank liquidity modeling. Since the SEC has already asked all US listed
companies to publicly disclose their quarterly financial reports, I would also like to propose
that the FSA requires banks to release at least quarterly financial data.
In the cost-benefit analysis of the Basel III requirements for the UK economy, the key
problem is that the paper tries to derive the relationship between the causal factors and
financial crises using a single crisis event. There are potential problems with using only
one crisis to estimate the links with regulation and macroeconomic factors. To enrich
the analysis, therefore, it is suggested that future research uses a sample of crises a cross
countries. Again, it would be nice to have a longer period for the VECM with more banking
sector data for satisfactory cointegration.
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Improved regulation of liquidity is essential not just at the micro level, but also at the
macro level. There are at least two important issues waiting to be addressed: How to guide
financial institutions to ‘service’ the real economy and how to design and provide stable
liquidity to the markets. Therefore, further possible research could be undertaken to assess
the liquidity regulation and supervision at the macro-prudential level. For macro-prudential
supervision, it is very important to understand the roles of both supervisor and regulator.
Policymakers’ decisions should be based on fundamental Financial Economic theory and
be independent from short-term political pressures. It is very frustrate to see inconsistent
policies which not only reduce market confidence, but also slow down the growth of real
economy.
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Appendix A
Commentators’ Opinions of the of
Basel Liquidity Principles of 2008
Table A.1: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 1
Affinity Group Principle 1: a bank should establish a robust liquidity risk management
framework and supervisors should assess the adequacy of this framework.
Financial ser-
vice industry
associations
Febelfin (2008) believes the text proposal is too prescriptive in nature,
and advocate that the principle of materiality could be taken into ac-
count when finalizing the document. In order to avoid overregulation
and to support the high-level principles and the proportional approach,
ESBG-WSBI (2008) would encourage the Basel Committee to insert
also a reference to the materiality principle. Thereby it would be en-
sured that the regulatory guidance applies primarily to cases of material
risks and in material circumstances. As regards the requirement for
the integration of liquidity risk management with other types of risk,
Zentraler Kreditausschuss (2008) suggests integration should not be ex-
cessively deep because this would overextend the banks’ operational and
organizational capabilities.
Supervisors They believe implementation of the liquidity management framework
should be consistent with the supervisory objectives.
Continued on next page
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Table A.1 –continued from previous page
Affinity Group Principle 1
Financial insti-
tutions
In considering what constitutes the highest quality of liquid assets, the
authorities must recognize that eligibility as collateral at central banks
in both normal and stressed times will be a consideration. RBS (2008)
would counter the Basel Committee’s argument that banks should not
rely on central bank support in times of stress. RBS thinks that whilst
this may be true for a bank-specific event, where there is a risk to the
system as a whole then the banks will need to have support from the
central banks. Systemic problems are after all a shared problem between
the private and public sectors.
Others Independent Audit Limited (2008) suggests that the Board of directors
is ultimately responsible for the operations and financial soundness of
the bank. While Carrel (2008) agrees with the concept of a cushion, it
believes stronger emphasis should be made on prevention and exposure
monitoring as the cornerstone of a liquidity risk management frame-
work. Moreover, Desrochers and Pre´fontaine (2008) emphasizes that it
should be stated in the formulation of the fundamental principle that
supervisors should communicate and coordinate their actions with other
bodies such as central banks, deposit insurers education and protection
agencies.
175
Table A.2: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 2
Affinity Group Principle 2: a bank should clearly articulate a liquidity risk tolerance.
Financial ser-
vice industry
associations
Firstly, a bank should determine its liquidity risk tolerance in quan-
titative and qualitative terms that are appropriate for the bank, and
expect that national supervisors’ liquidity risk rules will confirm this
practice (CBA, 2008). Secondly, with respect to liquidity risk, a firm’s
risk tolerance may change depending on market conditions. Provided
change is congruent with the firm’s liquidity risk and risk-management
strategies and practices, this is entirely appropriate and necessary (IIF,
2008). Thirdly, there is an important difference between short-term and
long-term stress which require a different type of liquidity risk tolerance.
Moreover, liquidity risk tolerance cannot be defined and evaluated inde-
pendently of other significant types of risk (Zentraler Kreditausschuss,
2008).
Supervisors It is useful to have access to technical discussion about ways of defining
and measuring liquidity risk tolerance (RBNZ, 2008).
Financial insti-
tutions
It is important that the tolerance level is understood at all levels of
the bank. In expressing liquidity risk tolerance a bank will therefore
be balancing prudence against profitability and this is clearly an issue
of the utmost importance to the Board. There is no need to disclose
publicly a bank’s liquidity risk tolerance (RBS, 2008).
Others Firstly, the concept of risk tolerance is complex and difficult to define and
use; it continues to evolve in use in their institutions (Independent Audit
Limited, 2008). Secondly, liquidity risks should indeed be considered and
aligned with the overall risk policy of a bank when making decisions such
as entering a new market or embarking on new strategies (Carrel, 2008).
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Table A.3: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 3
Affinity Group Principle 3: senior management should develop a strategy to manage
liquidity risk and report to the board of directors on a regular basis.
Board of directors should review and approve the strategy.
Financial ser-
vice industry
associations
For big banks, it is not realistic that the Board of Directors ensures that
senior management has carefully executed such a far-reaching review.
Smaller banks, due to limited resources, will have problems to ensure
operational independence in control functions (EACB, 2008). Further-
more, the segregation of operational and monitoring functions between
the Board of Directors and Executive Committee should be done accord-
ing to the organizational structure of the banking group (FBF, 2008).
Supervisors They suggest a close coordination of Treasury functions with respect
to liquidity risk management, incorporating information on all relevant
business activities. Since the Treasury department has full view of all
liquidity risk, operations, involvement of the Treasury department may
help to ensure greater completeness of liquidity risk capture.
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 –continued from previous page
Affinity Group Principle 3
Financial insti-
tutions
In order to ensure that personnel in independent control functions have
the skills and authority to challenge information and modeling assump-
tions, they would recommend that, in large banks, there be an inde-
pendent committee comprised of senior risk functions covering liquidity
risk, market risk and credit risk. This would ensure professionalism,
consistency and continuity of risk measurement methodologies applied
(Credit Suisse, 2008). Moreover, supervisors and central banks should
cooperate to increase consistency between the eligibility criteria of as-
sets that may be used, on the one hand, as a prudential liquidity buffer
and, on the other hand, as underlying collateral for central banks’ credit
operations which, by definition, also make highly liquid non-marketable
assets, such as credit claims (UniCredit Group, 2008). As regards the
Board’s responsibilities, the principle as written does not state that the
Board has the discretion to delegate its liquidity management obligation
rather than assign responsibility to other agencies (USbank, 2008). In
terms of asking for personnel in independent control functions, they rec-
ommend that the Committee clarify its intent on independent control
functions (USbank, 2008).
Continued on next page
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Table A.3 –continued from previous page
Affinity Group Principle 3
Others Firstly, liquidity requirements must be estimated on a daily basis and
not only based on internal measurements but also on external factors
such as cross-industry business outlook, cross-market correlations, coun-
terparties’ own funding needs, business continuity and connectivity of
the network related to each business activity (Carrel, 2008). Secondly,
it can be extremely difficult for small banks to have operationally-
independent personnel for ensuring the adequacy of internal controls
(Matz and Fiedler, 2008). Furthermore, inside auditors, if any, rarely
have the necessary training or experience. Matz and Fiedler (2008) sug-
gest that the regulatory guidance permit alternatives to operationally-
independent personnel. Possible alternative includes: strong internal
controls that require Board approval before they can be modified; an-
nual reviews by outside auditors; and/or periodic reviews by outside
experts.
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Table A.4: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 4
Affinity Group Principle 4:a bank should incorporates liquidity cost, benefits and risks
in the product pricing.
Financial
service
industry
associations
While the principle sets out appropriate goals, UK Joint Trade Associ-
ation (2008) request that reasonable flexibility be allowed in evaluating
how banks go about meeting this principle. They encourage the inser-
tion of a concept of materiality into this principle. In aligning prices
with liquidity costs the industry cautions against the use of liquidity
pricing models which are overly complex and burdensome, especially for
smaller, non-complex banks (EACB, 2008). JBA (2008) agree the need
to consider liquidity costs in product pricing and performance measure-
ment. However, they do not think it rational to present only quanti-
tative approaches as guidance for regulatory authorities, because doing
so would necessarily exclude other approaches (for example, techniques
that qualitatively consider these factors from the perspective of liquidity
risk governance). NVB (2008) would like the expression to be amended
to something more flexible that would allow for multiple options in light
of the objectives of this principle. Moreover, supervisors should allow
the banks’ methods of calculating liquidity costs to reflect their busi-
ness models (Zentraler Kreditausschuss, 2008). Regulatory requirements
should not go into excessive detail. Incorporating liquidity risk costs in
pricing could exaggerate financial market volatility in business dynam-
ics. This innovation of using liquidity costs entails keeping in mind
that appropriate regulations and necessary implementable interventions
need to be carried out in a time frame which is not short (Association
Bancaria Italiana, 2008).
Supervisors No comments.
Continued on next page
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Table A.4 –continued from previous page
Affinity Group Principle 4
Financial in-
stitutions
This does imply a need to educate customers regarding how liquidity is-
sues impact product pricing. For the avoidance of doubt liquidity costs,
benefits and risks should be incorporated in international product pric-
ing (RBS, 2008). Whether or not a bank can, or is willing to, adjust
external product pricing (i.e. vs. its customers) depends on the com-
petitive environment, the integration of client relationship vs. product
management and organizational aspects (Credit Suisse, 2008). Further-
more, internal charging should be introduced carefully to ensure that it
encourages the right behaviour and does not create an atmosphere of
internal cost avoidance (RBS, 2008). Charging is only one way, after all,
to encourage the right behaviour.
Others Matz and Fiedler (2008) would like to see a more carefully articulated
discussion of attributing liquidity cost and benefits at the product or
transaction levels versus at line-of-business or more aggregated levels.
Both deposits and contingent liabilities merit particular attention. Off
balance sheet commitments are a major area requiring more attention
being paid to the liquidity cost. Banks should remain free to pass on
funding costs or not to their customers. Strong directives in this field
may lead to the abandonment of some products and a shift to unregu-
lated markets or products (Carrel, 2008).
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Table A.5: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 5
Affinity Group Principle 5: a bank should have a sound process for identifying, mea-
suring, monitoring and controlling liquidity risk.
Financial
service
industry
associations
They urge more specific attention be paid to any liquidity risk require-
ments applicable to ‘monoline insurers’ and SPVs (Miles et al., 2011).
In assessing the stickiness of funding sources, it is preferable to focus on
‘core’ or ‘relationship’ deposits, rather than just ‘retail’ deposits, because
there is certainly a range of commercial and business deposits that may
be very stable and as ‘sticky’ as retail deposits (IIF, 2008). Evaluating
the creditworthiness of each counterparty in off-balance-sheet positions
should always be considered when determining the liquidity demand
relating to every off-balance-sheet position (CBA, 2008). MICA (2008)
urge adoption of the proposed treatment for recourse, guarantee and sim-
ilar off balance sheet obligations, as these risks are painfully apparent in
current financial markets but ill captured under current capital and risk
management requirements. In terms of matching incoming flows with
outgoing resources, this is acceptable if it refers to only the short term;
while for an extended timeframe these rules should not translate into an
excessive limitation to the transformation of maturity (Association Ban-
caria Italiana, 2008). UK Joint Trade Association (2008) recommend
that reference is made to the significance of monitoring and managing
liquidity in the ‘immediate future’, as longer term liquidity projections
are very difficult to make in anything but the broadest terms. They
believe it unnecessary to project cash flows on an intraday basis, since
they consider the existing special requirements for the management of
intraday liquidity to be sufficient. Finally, the Basel Committee takes
the view that the banks should consider not only outgoing and incom-
ing nominal amounts when projecting cash flows but also outgoing and
incoming interest. The associations believe it is inappropriate to make
the consideration of interest mandatory. The principles of materiality
and proportionality demand that this decision also be left to the banks.
Continued on next page
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Supervisors Reference to underlying risk factors that could result in liquidity de-
mands understanding the underlying risk factors, and how these can be
conducted to liquidity stress is important. It would be worth empha-
sizing this throughout the document. Banks’ monitoring should thus
address the underlying macroeconomic and financial market conditions,
and should not be confined to the immediate indicators of liquidity prob-
lems (RBNZ, 2008).
Financial in-
stitutions
When incorporating contingent cash flows, it is important not just to
look at the individual credit-worthiness of the counterparties but also
at the aggregate exposures to major business lines as a number of coun-
terparties operating in the same businesses could be affected in some
stress scenarios (Credit Suisse, 2008). Moreover, setting up liquidity
back-stop facilities should strongly depend on the nature of the business
and organization of the bank (Dexia, 2008).
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Others Matz and Fiedler (2008) suggest that the time horizon guidelines be a
bit more specific. For example, experience shows that whole sale funded
banks need to focus on daily time buckets over short time horizons, while
predominately retail deposit funded banks may find longer time horizons
more appropriate. Similarly, bank- specific liquidity events triggered by
credit problems seem to unfold over quarters while market-driven prob-
lems unfold much more quickly. Secondly, cash flows determining the
future liquidity exposure should not only stem from the existing assets
and liabilities on the balance sheet, but in specific scenarios as well as
from anticipated new business. Projecting cash-flows arising from as-
sets, liabilities and off-balance-sheet items and aggregating them under
a broad range of business scenarios is central to managing funding re-
quirements (Carrel, 2008). To assess liquidity risks, the scenarios would
have to be cross-asset and cross-industry, involving correlation changes
and unprecedented volatility swings in particular. A realistic scenario
on liquidity risk would need to take into consideration many qualitative
criteria such as the price transparency of the assets, the probable reac-
tions of customers or counterparties to similar market moves and the
availability of prices and data under extreme market conditions.
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Table A.6: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 6
Affinity Group Principle 6:a bank should actively manage liquidity risk exposures and
funding needs within and across legal entities, business lines and curren-
cies.
Financial
service
industry
associations
IBFed (2008) suggests that the role of cross-border groups could be more
thoroughly taken into account by stressing the need for enhanced flex-
ibility with regard to the international transferability of collateral and
liquidity. The principle should encourage the reduction of barriers to the
transfer of liquidity to enhance the ability of firms to perform effective
liquidity-risk management and reduce risk in the system overall (IIF,
2008). Zentraler Kreditausschuss (2008) recommends that the require-
ment always to manage risk at both a solo/business line and group level
should be dropped. The sole key point should be for liquidity risk man-
agement to be organized in a way which is appropriate to the structure
of the group involved. It should be able to capture all material risks
adequately while avoiding duplicate and unproductive work.
Supervisors Similar to the principle that asks a bank to have expertise about country-
specific features of the legal and regulatory regime that influence liquid-
ity risk management, RBNZ (2008) believes that supervisors-both home
and host-should understand the liquidity rules and the legal and regu-
latory regimes in the countries in which a bank is active. This promotes
consistency of rules, where possible. It also promotes clarity about ac-
tions that supervisors would need to take in the event of liquidity stress.
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Financial in-
stitutions
There might be possible conflicting goals of regulators and globally man-
aged banks in the management of liquidity. Regulators want to protect
depositors in their jurisdiction whilst the global banks more likely want
to seek to support depositors throughout their global operations. RBS
(2008) believes the problem is not insurmountable if regulators establish
a form of understanding on how global banks are to be regulated-e.g.
via ‘colleges of regulators’ and if global banks are prepared to articulate
the contingency plans in respect of cross-border support. It is probably
worth making a distinction between jurisdictions whose currencies are
readily traded and those where the liquidity of the currency is lower.
Moreover, UniCredit Group (2008) suggests that all efforts should be
undertaken to ensure that those limitations to the transferability of liq-
uidity are removed. There are national legal impediments that may
hamper the capability of the parent company from managing effectively
the group liquidity risks, especially under stress conditions. For exam-
ple, there are restrictions to intra-group transfers of assets or liquidity
on a cross-border basis.
Others In this principle, it may be helpful to be rather more explicit about
the distinction between a branch operation and that of a subsidiary. In
countries that do not follow the ‘separate entity’ liquidation doctrine, it
is not possible to shield a branch from a shortage of liquidity at head
office, but this point is not fully reflected in current supervisory ortho-
doxy. By contrast, such a policy is possible in the case of a subsidiary.
The Institute of Chartered Accountants (2008) points out that it is es-
sential to consider or design how the liquidity position of a subsidiary
based on its business model.
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Table A.7: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 7
Affinity Group Principle 7: a bank should establish a funding strategy that provides
effective diversification in the sources and tenor of funding.
Financial
service
industry
associations
CBA (2008) recommends that the principles be more flexible to allow
for a more dynamic monitoring of funding sources. Any analysis of the
reliance on wholesale funding should consider both the funding terms
of such type of funding and the bank’s capacity for accessing unused
wholesale funding. Over-reliance on internal funding can be a risk in
some instances, but in others not maximizing internal funding creates
unneeded additional costs. Limiting concentration on any one funding
source might not be possible (EACB, 2008). In particular, recent events
have shown that retail deposits are a relatively-stable form of funding.
A limitation on deposits would have a significant impact and would re-
duce stability. Furthermore, a mechanistic focus on diversification could
result in a diminution of a bank’s market participation (IIF, 2008). In
terms of maintaining a relationship with the central bank for liquidity
access, WOCCU (2008) suggests such a relationship must be a two-way
street. Central banks must be willing to provide liquidity access to finan-
cial institutions that mobilize deposits in their countries. They strongly
believe that the consultative paper should be modified to provide such
guidance to central banks.
Supervisors It is wrong to think a capital cushion can strengthen a bank’s repayment
ability. They suggest consultative paper should distinguish between cap-
ital and liquidity (IOSCO, 2008).
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Financial in-
stitutions
The funding plan should also consider capacity constraints to ensure
further diversification. The funding plan should also be tested with
regard to appropriate tenors to make the liquidity position resilient to a
sudden loss of funding capacity (Credit Suisse, 2008). From that analysis
a bank should be able to determine if it is overly reliant on any one source
of funds when assessing its liquidity risk tolerance and then to take steps
to reduce that risk (RBS, 2008). Another efficient mitigating possibility
is to reduce or stop the asset origination activity if the re-distribution
channels are not working as planned.
Others Regulators should be extremely careful not to drive entire segments of
the industry toward uniform tactics and funding strategies. There could
be systemic risk in doing so (Carrel, 2008).
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Table A.8: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 8
Affinity Group Principle 8: a bank should actively manage its intraday liquidity posi-
tions and risks.
Financial
service
industry
associations
Intraday cash and collateral management goes beyond liquidity risk
management (CBA, 2008). Therefore, there should be a flexible demar-
cation between what firms choose to cover in their liquidity policies and
other risk policies. While roles overlap, there should be further discus-
sions regarding coordination between liquidity, credit, and operational
risk managers to ensure that intraday liquidity risk is appropriately man-
aged (EAPB, 2008). Also, a review of the role of the banking supervisor
vs. the central bank in intraday liquidity management and settlement
systems would be useful. The stress-testing of the intraday processes
and systems would be very difficult and costly. While stress-situations
should certainly be considered, EACB (2008) wonder whether intra-day
systems should really be subject to systematic stress-tests. Furthermore,
EACB (2008) doubt that the described requirement could be fulfilled by
smaller, non-complex banks. They recommend that these principles be
more focused on the liquidity risk manager’s role in intraday liquidity
management. WOCCU (2008) also believe that accessing central bank
liquidity, the maintenance of reserve accounts at a central bank and di-
rect accessing to national clearing and settlement systems can strengthen
the retail financial systems and institutions.
Supervisors No comments.
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Financial in-
stitutions
Credit Suisse (2008) argues that asking key customers, including cus-
tomer banks, to forecast their intraday liquidity flows is not realistic,
as such information from customers is not legally binding and can be
changed at any time by them possibly leading to wrong decisions at
the bank and ultimately additional costs or missed opportunities. Since
intra-day exposures are supported by collateral placed into settlement
systems and controlled by close monitoring of the payments through
the settlement systems, there is a danger of forcing banks to treat ALL
collateral in payment systems as ring-fenced i.e. the minimum it needs
plus discretionary amounts (RBS, 2008). If this happens, banks may
look to minimize collateral in settlement systems and this could slow
down the settlement process. This risk could be further exacerbated
if banks look to recover the cost of intra-day liquidity through charg-
ing those counterpaties who are, for example, time sensitive. A correct
collateral mobilization could help intraday liquidity management (Uni-
Credit Group, 2008). First, central banks’ collateralisation procedures
are not always harmonized across countries. Second, collateral manage-
ment would substantially benefit if the option to re-use collateral was
effectively provided, especially within the operational framework of the
central banks.
Others Carrel (2008) sees difficulty in considering ‘stressed conditions’ in the
case of liquidity risk. There could be danger in relying on a commonly-
accepted definition, as liquidity issues tend to occur in unexpected times
and conditions. It is precisely because they are widely unexpected that
the issue has come to be of exceptional severity, leading to changes in
behaviour and tactical decisions that trigger liquidity holes.
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Table A.9: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 9
Affinity Group Principle 9: a bank should actively manage its collateral positions, dif-
ferentiating between encumbered and unencumbered assets.
Financial
service
industry
associations
Measures of available collateral do not necessarily need to be adjusted
down for tied assets if the firm can demonstrate that these assets can
be funded with third parties on a secured basis (e.g., under the normal
course of business conditions, or in a pre-defined stress scenario). There-
fore, it is necessary to explicitly recognize that a bank’ capability and
capacity to fund ‘tied assets’ on a secured basis is another key determi-
nant of the degree of liquidity of these assets (CBA, 2008). Furthermore,
although the principle, which requires that banks should monitor both
the legal entity and the physical location where collateral is held, is rea-
sonable in principle, it would be unnecessarily cumbersome where the
ECB system is concerned. Owing to the ECB’s common money market
and collateral policy, it is irrelevant in which country of the Euro area
collateral is held (Zentraler Kreditausschuss, 2008).
Supervisors In terms of the management of a bank’s collateral positions, it is useful
to monitor available collateral at the legal-entity level and at the location
level by the jurisdictional borders (RBNZ, 2008).
Financial in-
stitutions
This principle states that the bank should also monitor the physical
location where collateral is held. This is often not possible as banks
often use custodians (such as Euroclear, Clearstream, etc.) who in turn
use sub-custodians (Credit Suisse, 2008). Moreover, since collateral is
used in a variety of ways, it is clear that a bank must be able to identify
what collateral is available to generate liquidity in times of stress in the
same way it must be aware of any collateral calls that occur in such
times (RBS, 2008).
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Others This recommendation may prove difficult to implement in extreme mar-
ket conditions. Liquidity dries up when securities previously known as
unencumbered become encumbered. If a market turns illiquid progres-
sively as participants lose interest and shift to more profitable activi-
ties, then firms have enough time and margin of manoeuvre to re-assess
pledges and shift toward collateral with satisfactory depth, transparency
and resilience. Liquidity crises, however, typically strike because unex-
pected effects or turns of event take everyone by surprise (Carrel, 2008).
Table A.10: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 10
Affinity Group Principle 10: a bank should conduct stress tests on a regular basis for a
variety of institution-specific and market-wide stress scenarios.
Financial
service
industry
associations
It may not be meaningful to conduct separate stress tests at the unit
level, especially if the unit is integrated (CBA, 2008). Instead of recom-
mending that banks do not discount severe scenarios as ‘implausible’, it
would be preferable to include scenarios that are ‘extreme but plausi-
ble’ (EACB, 2008). Focus on too many highly unusual scenarios would
be counterproductive if the need for a significantly larger cushion were
automatically inferred from highly unlikely scenarios since this would
have an adverse effect on the bank’s refinancing (IBFed, 2008). Stress
testing should be flexible and based on a creative dialogue between the
risk and liquidity management departments and senior management to
explore possible outcomes (IIF, 2008). It is important to note that good
stress testing must include the possibility that it may be appropriate
not to take specific action in response to a stress test, provided that it
is evaluated carefully.
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The principles do not distinguish between unexpected liquidity condi-
tions and conditions of severe stress, therefore resulting in ambiguity
of the principles themselves. Rather it should be recognized that the
techniques for measuring liquidity risk are at such a level that, in the
absence of solid quantitative models to measure unexpected liquidity to
assess cash flows linked to defined techniques, it would be advisable to
use ‘judgmental’ stress tests, but not necessarily for severe stress. As-
sociation Bancaria Italiana (2008) proposes that the frequent references
to stress tests should be further specified.
Supervisors The document is right to emphasize that banks should analyze a range
of material and relevant stress scenarios, and not just the scenarios that
supervisors specify for the purposes of requiring banks to meet survival
requirements. Where regulatory requirements focus on particular sce-
narios, there is a risk that banks can focus excessively on those regulatory
scenarios at the expense of a wider range of analysis (RBNZ, 2008).
Financial in-
stitutions
Before any stress test can be undertaken a bank must first collect data on
a contractual basis from across all its businesses (RBS, 2008). Once that
has been done the bank should set out how it expects normal behaviour
to impact the resulting liquidity risk. These normal assumptions should
be clearly documented and can be based on historical data since, by
definition, they represent what customers have done previously. Stress
testing will then take those normal assumptions and tailor them to the
particular stress scenario being tested. The important thing is that the
normal assumptions are used as a starting base and the movement away
from the norm is recorded together with the underlying argument for the
move. Credit Suisse (2008) suggest, including stress testing assumptions
about market shocks that can impact liquidity via reduced asset prices,
FX cash flow impact, etc.
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Others The difficulty arises in defining what ‘stress’ means, how it applies not
only to the bank’s exposure but also its effects on the bank’s clients, what
could be the unexpected, as yet unseen, correlations of the future and
what could be the effect on all other counterparties, including external
providers of pricing services. Desrochers and Pre´fontaine (2008) believes
that the focus of stress testing should be for the firms to identify points
of failure in the more extreme scenarios, and use these to decide on
mitigating action. Banks should endeavor continuously to refine and
adapt those scenarios and avoid relying on a false sense of safety.
Table A.11: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 11
Affinity Group Principle 11: a bank should have a formal contingency funding plan.
Financial
service
industry
associations
Each individual crisis will need to be handled in an individual way. Con-
tingency fonding plans (CFPs)can therefore only set a sensible frame-
work for action and define a basic structure within which to act (EAPB,
2008). There should be one CFP setting out a basic structure and var-
ious options for action for different types of crisis. Regular testing of
the CFP by the board would be enough for the approval to be given by
the responsible members of the board (Zentraler Kreditausschuss, 2008).
UK Joint Trade Association (2008) recommend that central banks ac-
tively involve themselves in the formulation of testing funding plans with
the industry to avoid negative impact on a firm’s reputation in terms of
funding ability. Finally, they disagree with any suggestions that there
can be prescriptive actions designated ahead of a crisis. A response will
need to be tailormade, based on the facts and circumstances existing at
the time of a disruption.
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Supervisors Objectives such as maintaining confidence and addressing liquidity
shortfalls could be treated as elements of that goal rather than being
stated explicitly in the Principle. The focus of ex ante identification of
particular actions to be taken by managers would better be placed on
the framework and tools for decision-making, as is the case in much of
the other discussion of contingency planning (RBNZ, 2008).
Financial in-
stitutions
UniCredit Group (2008) considers itself to be aligned concerning the
group wide contingency plan. RBS (2008) agrees with this principle.
Others Although The Clearing House (2008) agrees with designating clear roles
in decision making related to liquidity disruptions and identifying a
range of alternatives through the liquidity planning process, it disagree
with any suggestion that there can be prescriptive actions designated
ahead of a crisis. A response will need to be tailormade based on the
facts and circumstances existing at the time of disruption.
The means of addressing liquidity shortfalls in emergency situation
should not derive from an overarching strategy, but should rather be
a series of tactical emergency actions. The ability to take such ac-
tions effectively requires flexibility and adaptability. It should not be
thought of as a ‘strategy’ to be implemented with well-established pro-
cesses within the boundaries of discipline and escalation procedures, as
this may impede the agility of a firm’s response (Carrel, 2008).
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Table A.12: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 12
Affinity Group Principle 12: a bank should maintain a cushion of unencumbered, high
quality liquid assets.
Financial
service
industry
associations
In terms of the definition of liquid assets the only relevant criterion is
the liquidity-raising capacity of an asset. CBA (2008) suggests that high
quality liquid assets should not be limited to a prescribed list, such as
those that are eligible at central banks. The potential moral hazard and
the unintended consequences that could arise from adopting such a defi-
nition, need to be considered. It should be up to each firm to defend their
choice of highly liquid assets after consideration is given to its demon-
strated capabilities and capacities to monetize these assets under various
conditions. In terms of the size of liquidity cushion, IBFed (2008) recom-
mends reference to a bank’s risk tolerance as a flexible tool to establish
appropriate individual liquidity requirements. IMMFA (2008) considers
that money market funds could provide a valuable means through which
financial institutions manage their liquidity risk, and should be consid-
ered as a liquid asset. Zentraler Kreditausschuss (2008) points out that
there is a need, first, to clarify that not all liquid assets need to be man-
aged as a liquidity cushion and it must be structured around sustaining
liquidity for a planned ‘survival’ period. Second, the liquidity cushion
is not intended to cover needs in an unlikely stress scenario. Third, the
cushion should not be so big that it enables the bank to overcome a
serious stress scenario without the need to make any adjustments to its
business model.
Supervisors Relating to the requirement that banks ‘should’ have marketable assets,
they would suggest bank ‘s can’ have those marketable assets for insuring
against less severe stress and longer duration events (IOSCO, 2008).
Financial in-
stitutions
Regulators should recognize that some assets can be regarded as liquid
in many scenarios but only a very few will be liquid in all circumstances
(RBS, 2008).
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Others Carrel (2008) recommends that the regulators maintain an aggregated
view of the unencumbered assets used as collateral for the cushions as
there are risks of building new concentrations if all adopt a homogeneous
methodology across segments and regions.
Table A.13: Commentators’ Opinions on Principle 13
Affinity Group Principle 13: a bank should publicly disclose information on a regular
basis.
Financial
service
industry
associations
The possibility that making quantitative information publicly available,
especially during times of market volatility, could mislead investors and
further aggravate liquidity pressures (i.e. contagion effect) (CBA, 2008).
Assumptions used for quantitative disclosures can be discussed with in-
formed readers, such as regulators and rating agencies, but it is much
more difficult to do so with the public at large. There will be need for
further discussion regarding the range of practices that are appropriate
for public disclosures related to liquidity risk (IIF, 2008). EACB (2008)
thinks that expectations regarding public disclosure should not be too
high, but realistic. The amount of information to be disclosed should be
appropriate. Furthermore, the focus of the disclosure should be on qual-
itative information. IBFed (2008) believes that disclosing quantitative
information now is too early. And they believe that disclosure require-
ments should be developed in a dialogue between banks and market
participants, not initiated by regulators.
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Supervisors BCDB (2008) argues that the use of the term liquidity position may
induce some misunderstanding, as it could be interpreted that the fi-
nancial institution should disclose quantitative information concerning
its liquidity position. The disclosure of liquidity positions may have an
incremental effect on Financial crises, rather than mitigating them. The
intention of disclosure refers to information regarding the composition
of assets, and the breakdown of certain unconsolidated instruments. As
seen in recent events, the lack of information on off-balance-sheet con-
duits and firms’ holdings of ABS were a problem. BCDB (2008) suggests
a change in the wording of principle 13, which states that ‘A bank should
publicly disclose information on a regular basis that enables market par-
ticipants to make an informed judgment about the soundness of its liq-
uidity risk management framework and liquidity position’ to ‘A bank
should public disclose information on a regular basis that enables mar-
ket participants to make an informed judgment about the soundness of
its liquidity risk management framework’. The use of the term liquidity
position may induce some misunderstanding, as it could be interpreted
that the financial institution should disclose quantitative information
concerning its liquidity position.
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Financial in-
stitutions
There is a need to balance public disclosure of quantitative information
with confidentiality and an increase in qualitative information disclosure
(RBS, 2008). In setting regulatory quantitative measures it is recognized
that one size does not fit all and therefore the publication of any quan-
titative measure is open to misinterpretation. Furthermore, in stressed
conditions, a bank’s contingency plan will expect to make use of liquid-
ity buffers to supply liquidity. If a bank is forced to publish how it has
used those buffers there is the possibility that observers assume that
the bank has a problem. The buffer then becomes the minimum level
of liquid assets it must have-i.e. the liquidity buffer is no longer liquid!
UniCredit Group (2008) also recommends that a re-pricing of market
liquidity risk, including promoting market discipline, is crucial.
Others The extent of financial groups’ liquidity risk management public disclo-
sure is not satisfactory. Desrochers and Pre´fontaine (2008) suggests the
principle could provide further examples of quantitative disclosures and
qualitative disclosures for banks. Disclosures of the composition of a
bank’s liquidity reserve may be counter-productive. Experience shows
that potential counterparties will take advantage of information about
the seller’s positions. Since disclosing the size of a bank’s liquidity cush-
ion is meaningless by itself, disclosing the counter-balancing capacity is
only meaningful to the extent that it is sufficient or insufficient to meet
potential risks. Instead of disclosing the size of the liquidity cushion,
The Institute of Chartered Accountants (2008) suggests that banks be
required to disclose a range of survival horizon forecasts, much as they
currently disclose interest rate risk for a range of different future interest
rate environments.
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Table A.14: Commentators’ Opinions on Principles 14-17
Affinity Group Principle 14-17: supervisors should regularly assess and monitor a bank’s
liquidity risk management framework, intervene to require timely reme-
dial action by a bank to address liquidity problem, and communicate
with other supervisors and public authorities.
Financial
service
industry
associations
There should not be ‘one size fits all’ standardization of liquidity risk
management practices (CBA, 2008). But a further harmonization of
supervisory standards should be imposed at the international level. Su-
pervisors and central banks should clarify their role and requirements
during times of stress as it is not feasible for each bank to make such
preparations in isolation (IBFed, 2008). Central banks should provide
clarity as to the stress situations under which they will provide liquidity
to the markets, learning from the current stress situation. Also supervi-
sors should consider such factors as asset size, business model, liquidity
stress levels, and the roles of central banks when assessing each bank’s
liquidity risk management (EAPB, 2008). IIF (2008) warmly welcomes
the recommendation for supervisors to cooperate with one another on
monitoring liquidity risk. With this in mind, mechanisms such as joint
training workshops for staff and joint on-site inspections can be very
helpful in promoting the convergence of supervisory practices. More-
over, communications with rating agencies also need to be taken into
account.
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Supervisors IOSCO (2008) argues that supervisors should perform a comprehen-
sive assessment on an ongoing basis (not just be periodic) of a bank’s
overall liquidity risk management framework and liquidity position to
determine whether they deliver an adequate level of resilience to liquid-
ity stress and, if found to be inadequate, advise the bank to, among
other things, consider seeking longer term financing and/ or reducing
their illiquid positions. Furthermore, the Basel Committee’s Liquidity
CP should work hard to distinguish different between capital and liq-
uidity. With respect to the composition of its liquidity cushion, a bank
should hold a core of the most reliably liquid assets to guard against
the most severe stress scenarios. For insuring against less severe, longer
duration stress events, a bank can also hold unencumbered liquid assets
which are marketable without resulting in excessive losses or discounts
(RBNZ, 2008).
Financial in-
stitutions
Regulators will have a unique view of how banks manage liquidity across
their jurisdiction and will also be able to discuss that with regulators
from other jurisdictions (RBS, 2008). In some countries where the group
is present, supervisors use quantitative criteria for subsidiaries which
negatively affects the group’s efficiency and effectiveness. Supervisors
should consider the conditions for replacing those requirements with
adequate internal methodologies, consistent across the group (UniCredit
Group, 2008).
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Others In respect of the role of supervisors, first, there is a strong need for more
consistent regulation of liquidity across the globe, and supervisors should
work toward the adoption of consistent regulations along the lines of the
Principles. Supervisors should communicate with other relevant super-
visors and public authorities, such as central banks, deposit insurance
agencies and protection agencies. Second, supervisors should intervene
to require remedial action by a bank that shows certain weaknesses or
excessive liquidity risk, including requiring higher capital levels (The
Clearing House, 2008). Furthermore, supervisors involved in liquidity
management should be involved in product and marketing strategies
before a financial institution enters a new market or activity (Carrel,
2008). Both Desrochers and Pre´fontaine (2008) and Carrel (2008) sug-
gest to create an industry-wide liquidity risk data workgroup to provide
an effective means of conveying the information back to the supervisors
for any follow-up action.
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Appendix B
FSA’s post-mortem on Northern
Rock
In the March 2008 internal audit report on NR1, the FSA (2008c) admitted to failing to
exercise its supervisory powers properly in seven main ways:
1. the Responsibility for the Supervision of Northern Rock;
2. the ARROW Assessment;
3. the Close and Continuous (C&C) Supervision;
4. the Emerging Business Risks;
5. the Emerging Control Risks;
6. the Capital, Liquidity and Stress Testing; and
7. the Use of Intelligence.
The lessons and recommendations under each heading will now be addressed in turn.
1. Responsibilities under the Supervision of Northern Rock
Lessons learned embraced the following:
1 The FSA provided its regulatory and supervisory response on RBS’s failures in October 2008 (FSA,
2008b) and December 2011 (FSA, 2011b).
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(a) supervising a high impact firm away from its peers is an obstacle to informal
discussion between colleagues and formal peer group comparison;
(b) frequent divisional re-organizations, entailing high impact firms switching be-
tween departments, makes it difficult for Heads of Departments (HoDs) to build
up a good knowledge of a firm;
(c) as a result of the relatively short tenure, HoDs could not have enough engagement
with one of the high impact firms in their portfolio; and
(d) staff have not been appropriately trained to supervise high impact firms based
on the size, complexity and risk profiles of the firms in their portfolio.
In April 2004, the FSA effected a major re-organization. The principal outcome was to
create different Business Units for ‘group supervision’ of wholesale and retail firms. As
a part of this exercise, responsibility for the supervision of NR was firstly transferred
from the former Deposit Takers Division (DTD) into the Major Retail Groups Division
Department 1(MRGD1), which was primarily responsible for supervising insurance
groups. After June 2006, responsibility for the supervision of NR was transferred
to MRGD2, in which managers could not get benefit from direct oversight of other
banks. And after February 2007, NR was supervised by MRGD3, which directly
supervises banking groups and building societies. However, the lack of regular dialog
up within departments about information in the banking sector and the frequent
switching between supervisory departments, made it more difficult for the banking
sector supervisors to pick up and be alert to emerging issues affecting NR. According
to these lessons, the Internal Audit Division of the FSA recommended how to improve
the FSA’s senior management as follows FSA (2008c, chap.E, 2, 5.3, 6.3, and 7.1):
(a) the Major Retail Group Division director should consider whether there is a case
for a divisional reorganization to facilitate more effective peer comparison in firm
supervision;
(b) the presumption of tenure for a supervisory lead associate or manager, for a high
impact firm, should be a minimum of two years and a maximum of four years;
and
(c) HoDs responsible for supervising high impact firms should formally review the
supervision of each firm every six months.
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2. The ARROW assessment
Problems with the ARROW assessment programme comprise the following:
(a) a number of early ARROW discovery meetings (e.g. communication records with
NR’s Chief Executive and Deputy Chief Executive) were not written up and
therefore no record existed in either the FSA’s NR paper or electronic records;
(b) in the course of preparing for a high impact firm ARROW panel, the supervisory
team’s content and recommendations did unduly influence the Panel Chairman
and members and fetter the panel’s discretion;
(c) there was no checkpoint mechanism for the FSA to exercise when granting any
‘regulatory dividend’ to a high impact firm, such as the presence of a risk mitiga-
tion programme (RMP) to ensure all aspects of the risk profile have been assessed
;
(d) there was no uniform version of panel minutes. The Internal Audit Division of
the FSA found three different versions of the ARROW Panel minutes on 20th
February 2006 in the electronic filing structure, all of which had the ‘DRAFT’
watermark on the documents;
(e) an independent manager without appropriate experience can sit on the ARROW
Panel; before the Panel meetings, MRGD would e-mail all MRGD managers
to ask for a volunteer to attend as independent manager. Although it did not
happen in the NR case, this ‘blanket approach’ could easily have resulted in a
manager without the appropriate experience sitting on the Panel;
(f) the insufficient pack of information presented to an ARROW Panel for a high
impact firm would influence the judgment of the Panel. In the Northern Rock
case, papers provided to the Panel did not contain some important financial
information such as the ‘borrow short, lend long’ business model, the highest
year-on-year growth in gross lending, and the lowest net interest margin;
(g) the ARROW Panel did not challenge the team on all the ARROW core risk areas;
and
(h) Panel recommendations or explicit agreed actions were not followed up.
Based on these faults, formal records of each meeting and a maximum 24 month
supervisory period for high impact firms were asked for by the Internal Audit Division
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of the FSA. It also recommended that Panel information packs for high impact firms
should include more substantive, in-depth comparative financial analysis, which should
always cover the business model of the firm in question and its peers (FSA, 2008c,
chap.E, 2, 2.1, 7.1 and 7.7).
3. Close and Continuous supervision
Without a clear and consistent definition of ‘Close and Continuous’ for all high impact
firms, the FSA failed to get regular management information to identify emerging risks
and re-assess the business risks of high impact firms. Therefore, the Internal Audit
Division of the FSA recommended that a single Close and Continuous (C&C) approach
should be defined and applied to all high impact firms, as well as being consistent across
Business Units. The C&C approach should include, inter alia, the annual review
discussion of firms’ business/strategic plans, regular meetings with key contacts at
firms, and the minimum level of HoDs’ engagement. If a change in the assessment of
the control environment occurs, the C&C relationship should be reappraised (FSA,
2008c, chap.E, 2, 2.1).
4. Emerging Business Risks
The supervisory team failed to deliver an on-going assessment of NR’s emerging busi-
ness risks during a long supervisory period (i.e. 36 months). In the early 2008, the
FSA still assured that the quality of NR’s loan asset portfolio is good, even though
a significant number of NR’s borrowers cannot pay back mortgages as the Bank of
England raised interest rates to head off inflation (Mullineux, 2008). The Internal Au-
dit Division of the FSA recommended that there should be an on-going supervisory
assessment of all appropriate core ARROW risk areas for high impact firms. Panel
packs from high impact firms should include more substantive, in-depth comparative
financial analysis, the parameters of which should change with market conditions.
This analysis should always cover the business model of the firm in question and its
peers (FSA, 2008c, chap.E , 2, 3.1 and 5.1).
5. Emerging Control Risks
The following lessons from Emerging Control Risks are made:
(a) in assessing the composition of the boards of high impact firms, supervisors did
not assess each member and take account of longevity of service, in particular if
the business profile of the firm is changing;
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(b) without assessing the size and competence of the firms’ executive team alongside
the business plan, supervisors failed to discover whether there is undue manage-
ment stretch, or undue reliance on external advisors or specialists; and
(c) supervisors did not pay attention to the effect of dominant or aggressive individ-
uals among the executives of high impact firms .
The Internal Audit Division of the FSA suggested supervisors of high impact firms
should monitor the behaviour of firms’ management, challenge any lack of openness
of the firm in the supervisory relationship, and meet the firms’ external auditors at
least once a year (FSA, 2008c, chap.E, 2.8-2.10).
6. Capital, Liquidity and Stress Testing
Lessons relating to the FSA’s risk management of capital and liquidity embrace the
following:
(a) supervisors should factor into their general assessment of a firm learning points
which arise outside the Risk Mitigation Programme-for example, through special
project exercises, e.g. Basel, assessing a firm for suitability to operate a trading
book, thematic work, etc.;
(b) all breaches of high impact firm’ capital and liquidity requirements should be
reported to the Firms and Markets Committee (FMC);
(c) the FSA should improve Handbook material on Liquidity Risk;
(d) as a part of the prudential supervision element of the ARROW process, the as-
sessment of liquidity of high impact deposit-takers and investment firms should be
reprioritized. A minimum level of consideration of liquidity must be maintained;
(e) supervisors should call for relevant management information from some high im-
pact firms whose regulatory returns do not adequately capture the circumstances
of the business on a regular basis and analyses it;
(f) arrangements between the Major Retail Groups Division and the Contact, Rev-
enue and Information Management Department (CRIM) were not effective in
ensuring that all regulatory returns were checked2 ; and
2CRIM was responsible for monitoring capital adequacy and liquidity returns submitted by MTGD firms
for breaches of regulatory limits. Once CRIM completed its routine checks, an e-mail alert was sent to the
supervisor to confirm that the returns were available for their use. However, CRIM does not appear to have
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(g) more emphasis on stress testing should be given in the supervision of high impact
firms.
The Internal Audit Division of the FSA’s recommendations in this area comprise the
following (FSA, 2008c, chap.E, 2.4, 3.1-3.7):
(a) The Interim Risk Manager (IRM) should provide updated information to reflect
firms’ day-to-day supervision;
(b) firms should provide more details to explain the linkage between the level of
stress to test a firm’s resilience and the FSA’s risk appetite; and to explain the
relationship between the proposed quantitative framework and the qualitative
material;
(c) the FSA should confirm firms’ effective compliance with existing Handbook liq-
uidity risk material, qualitative and quantitative, and as a priority develop clear
timetables for the implementation of changes to the qualitative and quantitative
Handbook material on liquidity ; and
(d) the FSA should re-confirm the approach to stress testing taken following its 2006
thematic review, including the decision not to add further Handbook rules or
guidance; and consider the case for amendment of the Handbook to make it
easier to understand the body of material on stress testing and how its parts fit
together.
7. Use of Intelligence
With respect to the use of intelligence, supervisors need to improve their understand-
ing of high impact firms by using internal data sources (such as the Financial Risk
Outlook) and external data sources (such as Bank of England reports, share prices,
market analysts’ reports, senior credit default swap spreads and warning signals in the
securitization markets). To make better use of intelligence, management should clarify
supervisors’ responsibilities in relation to the use of analysts’ reports and market data
in the supervision of their firms (FSA, 2008c, chap.E , 2, 4.2).
checked any of the capital or liquidity returns submitted by NR during the January 2005 to August 2007
period. Moreover, NR supervisory team was under the mistaken impression that the returns were being
checked by CRIM so, in the event, on one was actively monitoring for breaches.
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Appendix C
Overview of the FSA’s
risk-assessment framework
The FSA introduced a new risk-based regulation framework called ‘ARROW’, the Advanced
Risk Responsive Operating framework in August 2006, to replace the ‘RATE’ framework in
January 2000. The main similarities between ARROW and RATE are:
1. they include a structured assessment and the formally communicated mitigation plans;
and
2. they include a concept of business risk (i.e. that which is inherent to a business) and
a separate assessment of controls.
However, the main difference are as follows:
1. ARROW covers all types of financial firms, but RATE just applied to banks;
2. ARROW explicitly includes a measure of impact (i.e. the potential harm the firm
could cause), whereas RATE had no such concept; and
3. ARROW is a universal model-it covers all types of risks, whereas RATE was a simple
prudential tool.
The ARROW model (see Figure C.1) starts by distinguishing different types of risks,
such as credit risk, market risk, liquidity risk, interest risk, etc.
In order to assess overall risk, the FSA uses a simple four-point scale to score the risk
against a number of probability and impact factors, which are each rated as either:
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Figure C.1: The FSA’s new operating framework (ARROW)
Source: FSA (2000, pg.44).
1. low;
2. medium low;
3. medium high; or
4. high.
The probability factors interpret the likelihood of the event happening, and the impact
factors relate to the scale and significance of the problem if it were to occur. Following the
Arthur Andersen (1996), who argued that liquidity regulation of banks should be overhauled,
the FSA required banks to provide a cashflow forecast out to six months from the reporting
date. After April 1999, the FSA also approved a new credit risk model introduced by the
Basel Committee. Following the adoption of the new Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD2)
regulation, the FSA allowed Value at Risk models for both banks and investment firms to
be used to assess capital requirements in respect of the foreign exchange and commodity
position risk of bank, as well as the interest rate and derivative risk of the bank on its
trading book. The production of the probability and impact factors gives a measure of the
priority level to be assigned by the FSA, to allow it to prioritize its resources.
The choice of impact factors and probability factors is dependent on the sources of risk.
The FSA clarified two types of risk: firm-specific risks which have arisen as a result of
particular problems within a significant firm or group; and consumer and industry-wide
risks which have arisen as a result of a new product being marketed direct to the public.
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Since risks in the banking industry mainly arise from the major banks with large market
shares, the FSA’s banking supervision approach should focus on controlling firm-specific
risks. In respect of firm-specific risk, the assessment of impact is carried out prior to the
measurement of the probability of a problem occurring. Figure C.2 illustrates how the
ARROW model is used to calculate firm-specific risks.
Figure C.2: Risk assessment and prioritisation under ARROW: firm-specific risk
Source: FSA (2000, pg.16).
The nature and intensity of the FSA’s relationship with a supervised firm consequently
depends on the risk-grading of a firm. The FSA uses a resource-intensive approach for
‘high impact’ graded firms, and remote monitoring for low-impact ones. In addition to
considering these impact and probability gradings, the FSA also takes into account several
further factors, such as the reliability of the information provided, and the quality of the
home regulatory regime.
After assessing and prioritizing risks, the next stage is to make decisions and take su-
pervisory responses. There are five popular approaches chosen by the FSA to respond
to firm-specific risks, namely market monitoring, desk-based reviews, on-site visits, firm-
specific standards, and investigations. The FSA has focused on theme projects in recent
years to deal with the most important risks, mainly because of limitations of resources.
In 2006, the FSA overhauled risk management processes under the name ‘ARROW II’
within the confines of six key objectives:
1. to build a better communication with firms;
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2. to increase the efficiency of the FSA’s management of risk;
3. to improve staff’s skills and supervisory knowledge; and
4. to fully integrate the ARROW II into current capital adequacy assessments- including
Pillar 2 of the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD) and Individual Capital Ade-
quacy Standards (ICAS) for insurance companies.
However, in its internal audit report on Northern Rock (FSA, 2008c), the FSA admitted
to failing to achieve these aims. Without sufficient formal records of early ARROW discovery
meetings, some of which were even missed, the FSA cannot build a good knowledge of NR.
Besides, it failed to update comprehensive understanding about risk positions of NR and
improve risk management skills because of the lack information (e.g. NR’s management
information on liquidity was not received by the FSA every month). In addition, although
NR failed the ARROW in 2006, the FSA did not subsequently prescribe a risk mitigation
programme (RMP) nor increase NR’s liquidity insurance (Heffernan, 2009).
212
Appendix D
FSA’s Liquidity Regulation Since
1998
 The Sterling Stock regime applied to large UK retail banks and required banks to hold
‘eligible assets’, such as cash, UK Treasury bills and gilts (Hall, 1999) to cover their
five-day wholesale net outflow and 5% of retail deposits withdrawable over the same
period:
sterling liquidity ratio =
stock of sterling liquid assets
[(wholesale sterling net outflow over next 5 working days - allowable certificates of deposits)
+5% sterling retail deposits contractually withdrawable over next 5 working days]
≥ 100% (D.1)
 The Maturity Mismatch Regime applied to all other banks in 1998-2008.
Table D.1: Procedures adopted in the assessment of liquidity adequacy for banks other than
large UK retail banks
Annexe1: discounts applying to marketable assets
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 –continued from previous page
UK central government debt, local authority paper and eligible bank bills (and
comparable assets from other Zone A countries):
The following benchmark discounts will apply to assets’ market values:
 Central government and central government-guaranteed marketable
securities with 12 or fewer months’ residual maturity, including Treasury
bills; and, in addition, eligible local authority paper and eligible bank
bills
0%
 Other central government, central government-guaranteed and local
authority marketable debt with five or fewer years residual maturity or
at variable rates
5%
 Other central government, central government-guaranteed and local
authority marketable debt with over five years’ residual maturity
10%
Other securities denominated in freely tradeable currencies (usually Zone A):
The following benchmark discounts will apply to assets’ market values:
 Non-government debt securities which are classified as ‘qualifying’ by
the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England (S&S)
in its implementation of the CAD, and which have six or fewer months’
residual maturity.
5%
 Non-government debt securities which are classified as ‘qualifying’
by the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England
(S&S) in its implementation of the CAD, and which have five or fewer
years’ residual maturity
10%
 Non-government debt securities which are classified as ‘qualifying’
by the Supervision and Surveillance Division of the Bank of England
(S&S) in its implementation of the Capital Adequacy Directive (CAD),
and which have more than five years’ residual maturity
15%
 Equities which implement of the CAD qualify for a specific risk
weight no higher than 4%
20%
Zone B central government debt:
Continued on next page
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Table D.1 –continued from previous page
where it is actively traded, a benchmark discount of 40% will apply to market values.
Note however, that where debt is denominated in local currency, it will only usually
be deemed to be available to provide liquidity in that currency.
Annexe 2: The system of measurement
Sight-8
days
8 days-1
month
1-3
months
3-6
months
6-12
months
Liabilities
Deposits
Commitments
Less Assets
Marketable
Non-marketable
Standby facilities
available
= Net position
± Carried forward
= Net cumulative
position
Source: Hall (1999); Bank of England, 1982, p402, as modified by S&S/1996/1 (Bank of England, 1996).
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Table D.2: Stress Scenarios
First two weeks of stress Remainder out to three months
Idiosyncratic impact
Inability to roll over wholesale fund-
ing
Sustained leakage of funds
Sizable retail outflow Sustained outflow
Reduction in amount of inter-day
credit provided to a customer by its
settlement banks; Increase in pay-
ments withheld to a direct partici-
pant by its counterparties; and In-
crease in need for all firms to make
payments
N/A
Closure of foreign exchange markets N/A
Intra-group deposits repaid at maturity, intra-group loans treated as evergreen
Downgrade of long-term rating, proportional impact of all other downgrade triggers.
Market-wide impact
Uncertainty as to the accuracy of the valuation of a firm’s assets and those of its
counterparties.
Inability to realize or ability to realize only at excessive cost particular classes of
assets.
Risk aversion among participants in the markets on which the firm relies for funding.
Uncertainty as to whether many firms will be able to meet liabilities as they fall
due.
Source: FSA (2009d, pg.33).
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Table D.3: Simpler firms identified by the FSA
Business model Simplified ILAS eligibility criteria
Building societies No foreign currency exposures in assets or liabilities.
UK incorporated banks Wholesale funding is no more than 30% of total fund-
ing.
The material majority of assets are mortgages secured
on residential property.
Simple retail banks Holding assets in US dollars, Euro or sterling and
around 0.5% of assets and liabilities may be held in
other currencies.
At least 75% of the firm’s total assets are accounted
for by loans to individuals.
Less than 25% of the firm’s total funding is from
wholesale sources.
‘Money box’ banks Holding assets in US dollars, Euro or sterling and
around 0.5% of assets and liabilities may be held in
other currencies.
At least 75% of the firm’s total assets are accounted
for by certain specified assets, such as in money mar-
ket instruments with less than three months residual
maturity.
Less than 25% of the firm’s total funding is from
wholesale sources.
Small wholesale banks Holding assets in US dollars, Euro or sterling and
around 0.5% of assets and liabilities may be held in
other currencies.
80% of the total funding is from the parent.
Total balance sheet assets must be less than £1bn.
Source: FSA (2009d, pg.43).
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Table D.4: The composition of short term sterling treasury bills
Short term
sterling
treasury
bills
> peak cumulative
contractual net
outflow over three
months, exclud-
ing retail deposits
and inflows from
treasury bills
+ 5% of all retail de-
posits due within
90 business days
+ 25% of un-drawn
commitments
Table D.5: Reporting-what to report
Data item Description Frequency Submission deadlines
FSA047
Daily Flows
Collects daily flows out
to three months to an-
alyze survival periods
and spot potential liq-
uidity squeezes early
Business-as-usual
(BAU): Weekly
BAU:end-of-day (22.00
London time) Monday
for the week ending the
previous Friday
Firm-specific and/or
market-wide liquidity
stress:Daily (respec-
tively monthly and
weekly for simplified
and low frequency
firms)
Stress:end-of-the-
following-business-day
for the previous busi-
ness day (respectively
15 days and end of
Monday for simplified
and low frequency
firms)
FSA048
Enhanced
Mismatch
Report
Captures the ILAS risk
drivers and contractual
flows across the full ma-
turity spectrum
As above As above
FSA 050
Liquidity
BUFFER
Qualifying Securities
Provides more granular
analysis of firms’ mar-
ketable asset holdings
Monthly 15 business days after
month end
Continued on next page
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Table D.5 –continued from previous page
Data item Description Frequency Submission deadlines
FSA 051
Funding
Concentra-
tion
Captures firms’ bor-
rowings from unsecured
wholesale funders
(excluding primary
issuance) by counter-
party class
Monthly 15 business days after
month end
FSA052
Wholesale
Liabilities
Collects daily trans-
action prices and
transacted volumes for
wholesale unsecured
liabilities
Weekly (becomes
monthly for simplified
and low frequency
firms)
End-of-day Tuesday for
the week ending the
previous Friday, T+2,
(15 business days after
month end for simpli-
fied and low frequency
firms)
FSA053
Retail,
SME and
Large En-
terprises
And Cor-
porate
Funding
Captures firms’ retail
and corporate funding
profiles and the sticki-
ness of various retail de-
posits
Quarterly 15 business days after
quarter end
FSA054
Currency
analysis
Provides an analysis of
foreign exchange expo-
sures on firms’ balance
sheets
Quarterly 15 business days after
quarter end
Source: Lombard Risk (2009).
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Figure D.1: Consolidation levels for UK lead regulated firms’ reporting
Source: FSA (2009d, pg.66).
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Figure D.2: Consolidation levels for non-UK lead regulated firms’ reporting
Source: FSA (2009d, pg.66).
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Table D.6: Reporting- when to report
Class of firm FSA047, 048, 052 FSA050,051,053,054
Sterling stock bank 1 June 2010 1 November 2010
Building Society (standard ILAS) 1 June 2010 1 November 2010
Building Society (simplified ILAS) 1 October 2010 1 November 2010
Mismatch banks 1 October 2010 1 November 2010
Branches, with or without GLCs,
Investment firms
1 November 2010 1 November 2010
Source: Lombard Risk (2009).
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Appendix E
UK Banks’ Balance Sheets Under
GAAP Before 2004
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Table E.1: UK Banks’ Balance Sheets Under GAAP
On < 3 3-6 6 mon- 1-5 5-10 > 10 Total
demand months months 1 year years years years
Assets
Cash and balances at central banks
Items in the course of collection from other banks
Treasury bills and other eligible bills
Net Loans -banking/ trading
Debt securities
Equity securities
Equity investments
Intangible assets
Fixed assets
Other assets
Liabilities
Deposits from banks-banking/ trading
Items in the course of collection from other banks
Customer accounts -banking/trading
Senior debt securities in issue
Subordinated liabilities
Other liabilities
Equity reconciliation
Equity
Hybrid capital securities accounted for as equity
Other adjustments
Published equity
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Appendix F
UK Banks’ Liquidity Positions
from 2005 to 2010
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Table F.1: Barclays Bank’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 28,157.29 132,838.22 148,265.91 332,441.23 244,718.71 366,568.35
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
108.75 132.50 128.45 131.17 139.52 161.12
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 3,506.00 6,795.00 5,801.00 30,019.00 81,483.00 97,630.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 1,901.00 2,408.00 1,836.00 1,695.00 1,593.00 1,384.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% 45,776.00 177,884.00 193,726.00 185,646.00 151,395.00 168,930.00
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% 66,874.00 5,111.00 8,789.00 22,031.00 15,609.00 10,350.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 33,496.00 137,470.00 247,157.00 983,010.00 416,058.00 418,817.00
Treasury and other bills 98% 2,178.54 2,371.60 2,668.54 3,922.94 4,805.60 5,886.86
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 13,596.30 12,262.50 32,431.41 50,354.59 2,046.20 51,288.30
Other debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 21,342.85 21,829.27 1,755.06 1,512.47 1,734.63 1,342.01
Equity securities 85% 1062.5 1377.00 1581.00 1820.70 5817.40 4939.35
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% 160,398.00 174,090.00 173,679.00 118,973.00 43,431.00 205,772.00
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 13,924.00 19,163.00 16,288.00 10,850.00 3,861.00 5,754.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 29,138.00 28,921.50 36,008.50 50,698.00 35,214.00 35,081.50
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 144,015.00 153,642.00 175,145.00 195,728.00 205,894.00 230,895.00
Continued on next page
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Table F.1 –continued from previous page
Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 28,157.29 132,838.22 148,265.91 332,441.23 244,718.71 366,568.35
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
108.75 132.50 128.45 131.17 139.52 161.12
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 4,223.90 4,913.85 5,572.55 6,603.50 5,332.35 5,149.40
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% 2,238.00 2,154.00 1,781.00 1,633.00 1,373.00 1,312.00
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% 10.30 6.70 1.10 0.20 9.30 0.90
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4,277.70 4,223.80 3,024.70
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 5,310.75 53,905.50 48,781.50 12,329.25 6,702.00 31,758.75
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 258.00 78.00 101.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.93 0.13
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 72,871.50 19,053.00 25,455.75 23,981.42 22,722.79 23,291.42
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,375.80 1,381.60 1,200.45
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 350.77 237.95 255.51
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 25,335.00 104,809.50 185,533.50 710,171.13 293,131.15 221,491.27
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 15,376.49 9,654.57 6,225.05
Continued on next page
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Table F.1 –continued from previous page
Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 28,157.29 132,838.22 148,265.91 332,441.23 244,718.71 366,568.35
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
108.75 132.50 128.45 131.17 139.52 161.12
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 894.00 17.00 90,201.00 2,567.00 64.00 17.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 7,687.40 8,478.50 9,020.10 10,684.60 8,055.90 10,188.90
Subordinated debt (on
demand)1
100% 2.00 - - 4.52 1.54 8.07
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 65.25 - - 147.50 50.25 263.25
Other financial liabilities
designated at fair value (on
demand)2
100% 434.00 - - 133.85 145.14 125.71
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 3,707.00 - - 1,143.25 1,239.75 1,073.75
Repos (and security lending) 10% 12,117.80 13,695.60 16,942.90 18,228.50 19,878.10 22,553.40
Notes: 1. On demand subordinated debt for 2008 to 2010 is calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand subordinated
debt to subordinated debt due in 1 year. 2. Other on demand financial liabilities designated at fair value for 2008 to 2010 is
calculated based on the 2005 ratio of other on demand liabilities designated at fair value to other financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year. 3. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.2: Barclays Bank’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 90.03 79,165.52 75,218.37 119,691.80 144,748.53 259,942.38
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
100.18 119.37 114.43 111.22 123.37 143.34
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 3,506.00 6,795.00 5,801.00 30,019.00 81,483.00 97,630.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 1,901.00 2,408.00 1,836.00 1,695.00 1,593.00 1,384.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100%
/85%
38,909.60 151,201.40 164,667.10 156,185.85 134,957.85 145,980.55
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100%
/85%
56,842.90 4,344.35 7,470.65 13.175.30 10,316.30 6,687.46
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100%
/85%
28,471.60 116,849.50 210,083.45 816,954.51 345,775.18 348,068.12
Treasury and other bills 83% 1,845.09 2,008.60 2,260.09 3,322.49 4,070.05 4,985.81
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 11,632.39 10,491.25 27,746.87 43,081.15 35,972.86 43,879.99
Other debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 18,157.35 18,571.17 1,493.11 1,286.73 1,475.73 1,141.71
Equity securities 72% 900.00 1,166.40 1,339.20 1,542.24 4,927.68 4,183.92
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% 160,398.00 174,090.00 173,679.00 118,973.00 143,431.00 205,772.00
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 13,924.00 19,163.00 16,288.00 10,850.00 3,861.00 5,754.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 29,138.00 28,921.50 36,008.50 50,698.00 35,214.00 35,081.50
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 144,015.00 153,642.00 175,145.00 195,728.00 205,894.00 230,895.00
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Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 90.03 79,165.52 75,218.37 119,691.80 144,748.53 259,942.38
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
100.18 119.37 114.43 111.22 123.37 143.34
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 4,223.90 4,913.85 5,572.55 6,603.50 5,332.35 5,149.40
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% 2,238.00 2,154.00 1,781.00 1,633.00 1,373.00 1,312.00
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% 10.30 6.70 1.10 0.20 9.30 0.90
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 4,277.70 4,223.80 3,024.70
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 5,310.75 53,905.50 48,781.50 12,329.25 6,702.00 31,758.75
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 258.00 78.00 101.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.00 3.93 0.13
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 72,871.50 19,053.00 25,455.75 23,981.42 22,722.79 23,291.42
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,375.80 1,381.60 1,200.45
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 350.77 237.95 255.51
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 25,335.00 104,809.50 185,533.50 710,171.13 293,131.15 221,491.27
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 15,376.49 9,654.57 6,225.05
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Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 90.03 79,165.52 75,218.37 119,691.80 144,748.53 259,942.38
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
100.18 119.37 114.43 111.22 123.37 143.34
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 894.00 17.00 90,201.00 2,567.00 64.00 17.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 7,687.40 8,478.50 9,020.10 10,684.60 8,055.90 10,188.90
Subordinated debt (on
demand)1
100% 2.00 - - 4.52 1.54 8.07
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 65.25 - - 147.50 50.25 263.25
Other financial liabilities
designated at fair value (on
demand)2
100% 434.00 - - 133.85 145.14 125.71
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 3,707.00 - - 1,143.25 1,239.75 1,073.75
Repos (and security lending) 10% 12,117.80 13,695.60 16,942.90 18,228.50 19,878.10 22,553.40
Notes: 1. On demand subordinated debt for 2008 to 2010 is calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand subordinated
debt to subordinated debt due in 1 year. 2. Other on demand financial liabilities designated at fair value for 2008 to 2010 is
calculated based on the 2005 ratio of other on demand liabilities designated at fair value to other financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year. 3. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.3: Barclays Bank’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m ) (22,002.81) (38,764.63) (58,357.93) (160,560.17)(131,190.64)(108,152.48)
Net Cash Capital Ratio(%) 90.27 84.18 80.72 61.14 62.77 68.71
Long-term Funding Weights 204,076.00 206,197.00 244,358.00 252,579.00 221,209.00 237,540.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 2,927.00 2,556.00 2,241.00 2,664.00 2,157.00 2,058.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 10,191.00 4,835.00 9,248.00 7,707.00 9,914.00 11,919.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 21,341.00 28,583.00 40,548.00 43,531.00 54,484.00 63,525.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 104,191.00 573.00 734.00 2,293.00 1,106.00 1,877.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 25,560.00 26,335.00 30,027.00 40,154.00 55,279.00 54,717.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 3,423.00 102,423.00 111,589.00 82,814.00 13,754.00 13,357.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 12,200.00 13,786.00 18,150.00 29,842.00 25,816.00 27,446.00
Equity 100% 24,213.00 27,072.00 31,775.00 43,514.00 58,639.00 62,581.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% 30.00 34.00 46.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 210,762.00 230,850.00 297,896.80 405,773.40 345,248.80 337,702.00
Net loans 100% 268,896.00 282,300.00 345,398.00 461,815.00 420,224.00 427,942.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (71,600.00) (78,560.00) (85,295.20) (108,061.60) (119,279.20) (134,444.00)
Equity investments 100% 546.00 228.00 377.00 341.00 422.00 518.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 657.00 1,080.00 1,138.00 2,806.00 1,177.00 1,307.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 866.00 13,196.00 23,334.00 30,057.00 22,390.00 22,352.00
Investment in property 100% 2,754.00 2,492.00 2,996.00 4,674.00 5,626.00 6,140.00
Continued on next page
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Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m ) (22,002.81) (38,764.63) (58,357.93) (160,560.17)(131,092.57)(108,032.34)
Net Cash Capital Ratio(%) 90.27 84.18 80.72 61.14 62.79 68.74
Intangible assets 100% 1,269.00 1,215.00 1,282.00 2,777.00 2,356.00 2,478.00
Fixed assets 100% 2,754.00 2,492.00 2,996.00 4,674.00 5,626.00 6,140.00
Other assets 100% 4,620.00 6,407.00 5,671.00 6,691.00 6,707.00 5,269.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 15,316.81 14,111.63 4,819.13 7,365.77 7150.84 7990.48
Treasury and other bills 2% 44.46 48.40 54.46 80.06 98.07 120.14
Debt securities 10%-
100%
15,084.85 13,820.23 4,485.67 6,964.41 6,026.17 6,998.69
Equity securities 15% 187.50 243.00 279.00 321.30 1,026.60 871.65
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.4: Barclays Bank’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (27,648.17) (44,367.58) (63,954.67) (168,938.27)(139,148.15)(117,417.57)
Net Cash Capital Ratio(%) 88.07 82.29 79.26 59.92 61.39 66.92
Long-term Funding Weights 204,076.00 206,197.00 244,358.00 252,579.00 221,209.00 237,540.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 2,927.00 2,556.00 2,241.00 2,664.00 2,157.00 2,058.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 10,191.00 4,835.00 9,248.00 7,707.00 9,914.00 11,919.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 21,341.00 28,583.00 40,548.00 43,531.00 54,484.00 63,525.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 104,191.00 573.00 734.00 2,293.00 1,106.00 1,877.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 25,560.00 26,335.00 30,027.00 40,154.00 55,279.00 54,717.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 3,423.00 102,423.00 111,589.00 82,814.00 13,754.00 13,357.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 12,200.00 13,786.00 18,150.00 29,842.00 25,816.00 27,446.00
Equity 100% 24,213.00 27,072.00 31,775.00 43,514.00 58,639.00 62,581.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% 30.00 34.00 46.00 60.00 60.00 60.00
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 210,762.00 230,850.00 297,896.80 405,773.40 345,248.80 337,702.00
Net loans 100% 268,896.00 282,300.00 345,398.00 461,815.00 420,224.00 427,942.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (71,600.00) (78,560.00) (85,295.20) (108,061.60) (119,279.20) (134,444.00)
Equity investments 100% 546.00 228.00 377.00 341.00 422.00 518.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 657.00 1,080.00 1,138.00 2,806.00 1,177.00 1,307.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 866.00 13,196.00 23,334.00 30,057.00 22,390.00 22,352.00
Investment in property 100% 2,754.00 2,492.00 2,996.00 4,674.00 5,626.00 6,140.00
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Barclays Bank plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (27,648.17) (44,367.58) (63,954.67) (168,938.27)(138,314.53)(116,396.38)
Net Cash Capital Ratio(%) 88.07 82.29 79.26 59.92 61.53 67.11
Intangible assets 100% 1,269.00 1,215.00 1,282.00 2,777.00 2,356.00 2,478.00
Fixed assets 100% 2,754.00 2,492.00 2,996.00 4,674.00 5,626.00 6,140.00
Other assets 100% 4,620.00 6,407.00 5,671.00 6,691.00 6,707.00 5,269.00
Total Illiquid Security Weights 20,962.17 19,714.58 10,415.87 15,743.87 15,108.35 17,255.57
Treasury and other bills 17% 377.91 411.40 462.91 680.51 833.62 1,021.19
Debt securities 23%-
100%
20,234.26 18,849.58 9,432.16 14,463.60 12,358.41 14,607.30
Equity securities 28% 350.00 453.60 520.80 599.76 1,916.32 1,627.08
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.5: Bank of Scotland’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (144,027.85)(126,985.94)(234,414.76)(229,868.04)(270,520.45)(235,673.82)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
36.33 41.71 31.51 29.37 22.02 22.12
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,384.00 1,641.00 2,571.00 2,502.00 2,905.00 2,375.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 603.00 733.00 945.00 445.00 534.00 319.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% 41,766.00 49,139.00 54,681.00 23,430.00 27,867.00 24,696.00
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 9,711.00 8,383.00 13,794.00 50,517.00 30,222.00 29,451.00
Treasury and other bills 98% - - - - 72.52 473.34
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 526.37 544.20 615.06 342.00 293.40 71.10
Other debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 27,576.53 28,510.51 32,222.98 16,440.46 12,870.03 7,702.99
Equity securities 85% 617.95 1,920.15 2,992.85 1,918.45 1,643.90 1,841.95
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 38,450.00 39,713.00 23,563.00 49,711.00 82,967.00 68,614.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 13,360.50 61,362.50 8,391.00 22,795.00 43,843.00 25,916.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 68,292.00 68,065.00 194,728.00 176,183.00 159,232.00 147,597.00
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Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (144,027.85)(126,985.94)(234,414.76)(229,868.04)(270,520.45)(235,673.82)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
36.33 41.71 31.51 29.37 22.02 22.12
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 555.00 871.65 2,339.30 2,971.35 2,623.25 1,887.45
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.10 86.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 18,755.25 16,750.50 17,028.75 14,138.25 20,145.75 13,441.50
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.50 2.20 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 6,421.50 7,003.50 9,120.00 29,752.50 20,425.50 20,425.50
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,102.00 196.00 34.00
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Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (144,027.85)(126,985.94)(234,414.76)(229,868.04)(270,520.45)(235,673.82)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
36.33 41.71 31.51 29.37 22.02 22.12
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 19,290.00 15,247.00 26,990.00 21,684.00 14,169.00 18,168.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 6,072.70 7,931.90 9,098.60 6,589.60 3,066.00 2,032.60
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - 28.00 28.00 2,084.00
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% - - - 502.75 179.50 2,317.75
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 51,492.00 647.00 48,395.00 - - -
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 3,523.75 264.75 2,583.00 - - -
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.6: Bank of Scotland’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m ) (156,035.84)(140,241.82)(250,041.98)(246,034.10)(282,043.60)(245,849.40)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
31.02 35.63 26.94 24.40 18.70 18.76
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,384.00 1,641.00 2,571.00 2,502.00 2,905.00 2,375.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 603.00 733.00 945.00 445.00 534.00 319.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
35,501.10 41,768.15 46,478.85 18,103.60 23,162.85 20,677.45
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
- - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% /
85%
8,254.35 7,125.55 11,724.90 42,473.95 25,628.80 24,808.10
Treasury and other bills 83% - - - - 61.42 400.89
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 450.34 465.59 526.22 292.60 251.02 60.83
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 23,460.63 24,255.21 27,413.58 13,986.66 10,949.13 6,553.29
Equity securities 72% 523.44 1,626.48 2,535.12 1,625.04 1,392.48 1,560.24
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 38,450.00 39,713.00 23,563.00 49,711.00 82,967.00 68,614.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 13,360.50 61,362.50 8,391.00 22,795.00 43,843.00 25,916.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 68,292.00 68,065.00 194,728.00 176,183.00 159,232.00 147,597.00
Continued on next page
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Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m ) (156,035.84)(140,241.82)(250,041.98)(246,034.10)(282,043.60)(245,849.40)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
31.02 35.63 26.94 24.40 18.70 18.76
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 555.00 871.65 2,339.30 2,971.35 2,623.25 1,887.45
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 51.10 86.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 18,755.25 16,750.50 17,028.75 14,138.25 20,145.75 13,441.50
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 5.50 2.20 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 6,421.50 7,003.50 9,120.00 29,752.50 20,425.50 20,425.50
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 1,102.00 196.00 34.00
Continued on next page
240
Table F.6 –continued from previous page
Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m ) (156,035.84)(140,241.82)(250,041.98)(246,034.10)(282,043.60)(245,849.40)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
31.02 35.63 26.94 24.40 18.70 18.76
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 19,290.00 15,247.00 26,990.00 21,684.00 14,169.00 18,168.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 6,072.70 7,931.90 9,098.60 6,589.60 3,066.00 2,032.60
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - 28.00 28.00 2,084.00
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% - - - 502.75 179.50 2,317.75
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 51,492.00 647.00 48,395.00 - - -
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 3,523.75 264.75 2,583.00 - - -
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.7: Bank of Scotland’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (36,163.47) (61,561.74) (60,867.77) (85,513.89) (65,477.15) (38,596.62)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 78.49 70.35 80.18 73.05 75.11 82.90
Long-term Funding Weights 131,970.00 146,065.00 246,178.00 231,824.00 197,538.00 187,126.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 22,208.00 2,348.00 1,302.00 1,920.00 4,774.00 25,407.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 20,907.00 31,840.00 47,013.00 55,928.00 56,264.00 52,712.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 153.00 367.00 242.00 0.00 134.00 102.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 6,729.00 8,458.00 6,168.00 25,234.00 5,370.00 15,295.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 46,470.00 77,877.00 112,536.00 110,245.00 89,941.00 69,148.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 26,027.00 12,770.00 57,073.00 - - -
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% - - - 26,572.00 18,702.00 4,419.00
Equity 100% 9,476.00 12,405.00 21,844.00 11,925.00 22,353.00 20,043.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 153,824.00 193,245.40 290,646.60 308,003.80 256,256.00 221,390.00
Net loans 100% 179,650.00 217,339.00 460,267.00 488,213.00 439,538.00 405,525.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (34,156.00) (31,249.60) (188,686.40) (210,915.20) (202,196.00) (197,352.00)
Equity investments 100% 374.00 633.00 1,739.00 193.00 423.00 401.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 3,695.00 2,518.00 4,816.00 22,082.00 8,945.00 6,608.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment in property 100% 37.00 39.00 34.00 43.00 30.00 789.00
Intangible assets 100% 108.00 164.00 476.00 108.00 91.00 58.00
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Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (36,163.47) (61,561.74) (60,867.77) (85,513.89) (65,477.15) (38,596.62)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 78.49 70.35 80.18 73.05 75.11 82.90
Fixed assets 100% 487.00 455.00 1,291.00 1,187.00 4,903.00 3,433.00
Other assets 100% 3,629.00 3,347.00 10,710.00 7,093.00 4,522.00 1,928.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 14,309.47 14,381.34 16,399.17 9,334.09 6,759.15 4,332.62
Treasury and other bills 2% - - - - 1.48 9.66
Debt securities 10%-
100%
13,582.47 14,042.49 15,871.02 8,995.54 6,467.57 3,997.91
Equity securities 15% 727.00 338.85 528.15 338.55 290.10 325.05
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
243
Table F.8: Bank of Scotland’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (39,755.93) (66,110.71) (66,134.90) (88,310.50) (67,702.95) (40,110.75)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 76.85 68.84 78.82 72.41 74.47 82.35
Long-term Funding Weights 131,970.00 146,065.00 246,178.00 231,824.00 197,538.00 187,126.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 22,208.00 2,348.00 1,302.00 1,920.00 4,774.00 25,407.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 20,907.00 31,840.00 47,013.00 55,928.00 56,264.00 52,712.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 153.00 367.00 242.00 0.00 134.00 102.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 6,729.00 8,458.00 6,168.00 25,234.00 5,370.00 15,295.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 46,470.00 77,877.00 112,536.00 110,245.00 89,941.00 69,148.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 26,027.00 12,770.00 57,073.00 - - -
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% - - - 26,572.00 18,702.00 4,419.00
Equity 100% 9,476.00 12,405.00 21,844.00 11,925.00 22,353.00 20,043.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 153,824.00 193,245.40 290,646.60 308,003.80 256,256.00 221,390.00
Net loans 100% 179,650.00 217,339.00 460,267.00 488,213.00 439,538.00 405,525.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (34,156.00) (31,249.60) (188,686.40) (210,915.20) (202,196.00) (197,352.00)
Equity investments 100% 374.00 633.00 1,739.00 193.00 423.00 401.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 3,695.00 2,518.00 4,816.00 22,082.00 8,945.00 6,608.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment in property 100% 37.00 39.00 34.00 43.00 30.00 789.00
Intangible assets 100% 108.00 164.00 476.00 108.00 91.00 58.00
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Bank of Scotland 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (39,755.93) (66,110.71) (66,134.90) (88,310.50) (67,702.95) (40,110.75)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 76.85 68.84 78.82 72.41 74.47 82.35
Fixed assets 100% 487.00 455.00 1,291.00 1,187.00 4,903.00 3,433.00
Other assets 100% 3,629.00 3,347.00 10,710.00 7,093.00 4,522.00 1,928.00
Total Illiquid Security Weights 17,901.93 18,930.31 21,666.30 12,130.70 8,984.95 5,846.75
Treasury and other bills 17% - - - - 12.58 82.11
Debt securities 23%-
100%
17,698.37 18,297.79 20,680.42 11,498.74 8,430.85 5,157.88
Equity securities 28% 203.56 632.52 985.88 631.96 541.52 606.76
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.9: HSBC Bank Plc’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 36,590.52 45,665.12 40,751.37 (4,338.31) 55,953.44 10,048.64
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
161.43 147.96 122.79 98.50 129.57 103.82
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,711.00 3,618.00 7,146.00 9,470.00 14,274.00 24,495.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 3,595.00 2,937.00 2,434.00 1,917.00 2,082.00 1,932.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% 48,510.00 85,994.00 153,206.00 172,026.00 165,008.00 159,552.00
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% 316.00 794.00 2,267.00 1,634.00 774.00 556.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 16,049.00 18,631.00 16,467.00 37,199.00 15,428.00 27,312.00
Treasury and other bills 98% 3,871.00 3,135.02 1,844.36 10,350.76 2,302.02 9,166.92
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 13,646.93 11,247.16 16,393.05 11,127.60 13,498.20 9,060.30
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 6,620.69 12,922.59 17,217.31 52,187.64 41,661.27 51,561.86
Equity securities 85% 1,836.85 1,610.75 2,594.20 2,267.80 1,968.60 1,212.10
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 15,090.00 17,087.50 22,211.00 29,758.50 28,228.00 24,343.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% - - - - - -
Continued on next page
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HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 36,590.52 45,665.12 40,751.37 (4,338.31) 55,953.44 10,048.64
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
161.43 147.96 122.79 98.50 129.57 103.82
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 10,053.80 11,196.60 13,248.80 18,327.35 16,457.30 16,921.90
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% - - - 5,822.60 6,073.50 71,714.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 15,977.25 39,060.00 88,090.50 47,861.25 41,521.50 43,080.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% - - - 2,409.00 2,784.00 3,176.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 5,822.60 6,073.50 71,714.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 15,977.25 39,060.00 88,090.50 47,861.25 41,521.50 43,080.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,409.00 2,784.00 3,176.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.34 23.66 40.26
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 2,982.00 256.50 3,562.50 204.48 304.05 1,843.08
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Continued on next page
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HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 36,590.52 45,665.12 40,751.37 (4,338.31) 55,953.44 10,048.64
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
161.43 147.96 122.79 98.50 129.57 103.82
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 486.60 71.40 60.10
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 12,938.25 24,557.25 46,154.25 177,067.50 86,222.25 94,907.25
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,128.00 3,012.00 2,060.00
Senior debt (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 2,257.90 2,805.30 3,967.50 4,111.50 3,128.60 3,733.20
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 1.50 30.75 0.00 17.75 1.25 5.50
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 265.25 230.50 1,583.00 1,676.25 1,391.25 1,156.75
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.10: HSBC Bank Plc’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 23,026.45 25,572.74 9,343.68 (32,777.97) 37,126.50 (9,396.11)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
138.66 126.86 105.23 88.69 119.62 96.43
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,711.00 3,618.00 7,146.00 9,470.00 14,274.00 24,495.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 3,595.00 2,937.00 2,434.00 1,917.00 2,082.00 1,932.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
41,233.50 73,094.90 130,225.10 159,479.85 155,155.75 150,858.75
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
268.60 674.90 1,926.95 1,521.72 734.69 524.76
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% /
85%
13,641.65 15,836.35 13,996.95 205,542.50 13,503.80 25,349.04
Treasury and other bills 83% 3,278.50 2,655.17 1,562.06 8,766.46 1,949.67 7,763.82
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 11,675.70 9,622.57 14,025.17 9,520.28 11,548.46 7,751.59
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 5,632.53 10,993.85 14,647.56 44,398.44 35,443.17 43,866.06
Equity securities 72% 1,555.92 1,364.40 2,197.44 1,920.96 1,667.52 1,026.72
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 15,090.00 17,087.50 22,211.00 29,758.50 28,228.00 24,343.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% - - - - - -
Continued on next page
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HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 23,026.45 25,572.74 9,343.68 (32,777.97) 37,126.50 (9,396.11)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
138.66 126.86 105.23 88.69 119.62 96.43
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 10,053.80 11,196.60 13,248.80 18,327.35 16,457.30 16,921.90
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 5,822.60 6,073.50 71,714.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 15,977.25 39,060.00 88,090.50 47,861.25 41,521.50 43,080.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,409.00 2,784.00 3,176.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.34 23.66 40.26
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 2,982.00 256.50 3,562.50 204.48 304.05 1,843.08
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 486.60 71.40 60.10
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 12,938.25 24,557.25 46,154.25 177,067.50 86,222.25 94,907.25
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 2,128.00 3,012.00 2,060.00
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HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) 23,026.45 25,572.74 9,343.68 (32,777.97) 37,126.50 (9,396.11)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
138.66 126.86 105.23 88.69 119.62 96.43
Senior debt (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 2,257.90 2,805.30 3,967.50 4,111.50 3,128.60 3,733.20
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 1.50 30.75 0.00 17.75 1.25 5.50
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 265.25 230.50 1,583.00 1,676.25 1,391.25 1,156.75
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.11: HSBC Bank Plc’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£) (138,535.25)(138,143.82)(177,058.48)(227,051.82)(188,847.38)(178,629.26)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 23.11 28.09 25.43 21.08 26.28 31.48
Long-term Funding Weights 41,649.00 53,966.00 60,374.00 60,642.00 67,332.00 82,049.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,018.00 4,338.00 4,364.00 1,914.00 1,273.00 (399.00)
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,399.00 3,418.00 3,293.00 3,333.00 3,750.00 5,685.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 4,209.00 9,118.00 10,909.00 14,808.00 17,522.00 25,075.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than1 year
100% - - - - - -
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 4,222.00 10,037.00 11,246.00 11,193.00 8,054.00 10,787.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 381.00 860.00 358.00 1,545.00 1,511.00 1,159.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,786.00 5,257.00 5,205.00 7,188.00 6,794.00 7,385.00
Equity 100% 18,455.96 19,708.61 23,999.00 18,911.00 26,678.00 30,607.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% 1,178.04 1,229.39 1,000.00 1,750.00 1,750.00 1,750.00
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 162,814.72 178,721.34 205,991.40 272,347.00 243,184.60 246,069.40
Net loans 100% 182,629.00 200,416.00 227,687.00 298,304.00 274,659.00 285,218.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (33,445.28) (36,702.66) (38,381.60) (48,192.00) (54,422.40) (57,861.60)
Equity investments 100% 845.00 923.00 118.00 73.00 79.00 76.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 862.00 444.00 367.00 1,952.00 1,671.00 1,335.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 207.00 76.00 38.00 25.00 4,851.00 4,281.00
Investment in property 100% - - - - - -
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HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£) (138,535.25)(138,143.82)(177,058.48)(227,051.82)(188,847.38)(178,629.26)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 23.11 28.09 25.43 21.08 26.28 31.48
Intangible assets 100% 491.00 856.00 903.00 1,131.00 1,184.00 1,283.00
Fixed assets 100% 4,319.00 4,408.00 4,119.00 4,697.00 4,090.00 2,108.00
Other assets 100% 6,907.00 8,301.00 11,141.00 14,357.00 11,073.00 9,630.00
Total Illiquid Security Weights 17,369.53 13,388.48 31,441.08 15,346.82 12,994.78 14,608.86
Treasury and other bills 2% 79.00 63.98 37.64 211.24 46.98 187.08
Debt Securities1 10%-
100%
16,966.38 13,040.25 30,945.64 14,735.38 12,600.40 14,207.88
Equity securities 15% 324.15 284.25 457.80 400.20 347.40 213.90
Notes: 1. Debt Securities for 2008 to 2010 does not include MBS or ABS without government sponsorship. 2. ‘ - ’ denotes no
information provided by the bank.
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Table F.12: HSBC Bank Plc’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (142,368.06)(142,423.35)(182,675.17)(236,417.94)(195,858.56)(187,386.57)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 22.63 27.48 24.84 20.41 25.58 30.45
Long-term Funding Weights 41,649.00 53,966.00 60,374.00 60,642.00 67,332.00 82,049.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,018.00 4,338.00 4,364.00 1,914.00 1,273.00 (399.00)
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,399.00 3,418.00 3,293.00 3,333.00 3,750.00 5,685.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 4,209.00 9,118.00 10,909.00 14,808.00 17,522.00 25,075.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than1 year
100% - - - - - -
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 4,222.00 10,037.00 11,246.00 11,193.00 8,054.00 10,787.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 381.00 860.00 358.00 1,545.00 1,511.00 1,159.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,786.00 5,257.00 5,205.00 7,188.00 6,794.00 7,385.00
Equity 100% 18,455.96 19,708.61 23,999.00 18,911.00 26,678.00 30,607.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% 1,178.04 1,229.39 1,000.00 1,750.00 1,750.00 1,750.00
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 162,814.72 178,721.34 205,991.40 272,347.00 243,184.60 246,069.40
Net loans 100% 182,629.00 200,416.00 227,687.00 298,304.00 274,659.00 285,218.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (33,445.28) (36,702.66) (38,381.60) (48,192.00) (54,422.40) (57,861.60)
Equity investments 100% 845.00 923.00 118.00 73.00 79.00 76.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 862.00 444.00 367.00 1,952.00 1,671.00 1,335.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 207.00 76.00 38.00 25.00 4,851.00 4,281.00
Investment in property 100% - - - - - -
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HSBC Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (142,368.06)(142,423.35)(182,675.17)(236,417.94)(195,858.56)(187,386.57)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 22.63 27.48 24.84 20.41 5.58 30.45
Intangible assets 100% 491.00 856.00 903.00 1,131.00 1,184.00 1,283.00
Fixed assets 100% 4,319.00 4,408.00 4,119.00 4,697.00 4,090.00 2,108.00
Other assets 100% 6,907.00 8,301.00 11,141.00 14,357.00 11,073.00 9,630.00
Total Illiquid Security Weights 21,202.35 17,668.01 37,057.77 24,712.94 20,005.96 23,366.17
Treasury and other bills 17% 671.50 543.83 319.94 1,795.54 399.33 1,590.18
Debt Securities 1 23%-
100%
19,925.77 16,593.58 35,883.27 22,170.36 18,958.15 21,376.71
Equity securities 28% 605.08 530.60 854.56 747.04 648.48 399.28
Notes: 1. Debt Securities for 2008 to 2010 does not include MBS or ABS without government sponsorship. 2. ‘ - ’ denotes no
information provided by the bank.
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Table F.13: Lloyds TSB’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (94,695.32) (110,520.48)(151,082.14)(20,783.74) (208,150.03)(176,674.78)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
43.56 43.01 34.53 85.26 35.94 60.71
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,156.00 1,898.00 4,330.00 5,008.00 36,089.00 38,115.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 1,310.00 1,431.00 1,242.00 946.00 1,045.00 1,368.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% 60,567.00 67,928.00 58,096.00 45,115.00 48,894.00 156,276.00
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 5,878.00 5,565.00 8,688.00 28,884.00 18,797.00 49,600.00
Treasury and other bills 98% 85.26 1,730.68 1,594.46 28,624.82 2,481.36 5,946.64
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 1,017.00 523.80 291.60 792.00 7,535.70 11,322.90
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 3,019.02 4,309.44 5,423.65 10,848.64 1,861.26 8,401.13
Equity securities 85% 39.10 12.75 24.65 34.85 68.85 1,916.75
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 23,859.00 28,157.00 35,466.00 49,620.00 76,070.00 24,938.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 3,169.00 2,685.00 1,849.00 7,548.50 31,574.50 8,052.50
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 112,551.00 124,726.00 144,213.00 15,164.00 152,423.00 307,622.00
Continued on next page
256
Table F.13 –continued from previous page
Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (94,695.32) (110,520.48)(151,082.14)(20,783.74) (208,150.03)(176,674.78)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
43.56 43.01 34.53 85.26 35.94 60.71
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 442.10 412.30 618.90 896.65 919.90 2,413.40
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 86.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 4,938.00 888.00 2,404.50 5,061.00 4,771.50 19,423.50
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 214.70 1.00 4.20
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 0.00 4,407.75 5,813.25 19,950.75 12,542.25 31,800.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 136.00 0.00 203.00
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Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (94,695.32) (110,520.48)(151,082.14)(20,783.74) (208,150.03)(176,674.78)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
43.56 43.01 34.53 85.26 35.94 60.71
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 20,411.00 29,672.00 20,307.00 24,381.00 26,315.00 31,225.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 1,230.10 1,862.10 1,557.60 3,613.60 4,246.80 9,369.20
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% 746.00 737.00 27.00 34.00 151.00 178.00
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 348.50 327.75 319.25 173.25 173.25 1,273.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 50.00 37.00 18,197.00 14,243.00 15,734.00 12,944.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 22.00 7.25 - - - 89.00
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.14: Lloyds TSB’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (105,278.60)(122,530.14)(162,199.18)(33,508.27) (215,946.65)(197,608.76)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
37.25 36.81 29.71 76.24 33.54 56.05
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,156.00 1,898.00 4,330.00 5,008.00 36,089.00 38,115.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% 1,310.00 1,431.00 1,242.00 946.00 1,045.00 1,368.00
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
51,481.95 57,738.80 49,381.60 42,636.90 45,450.95 147,415.55
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
- - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% /
85%
4,996.30 4,730.25 7,384.80 24,757.85 16,200.05 41,619.25
Treasury and other bills 83% 72.21 1,465.78 1,350.41 24,243.47 2,101.56 5,036.44
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 870.10 448.14 249.48 677.60 6,447.21 9,687.37
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 2,568.42 3,666.24 4,614.15 9,229.44 1,583.46 7,147.23
Equity securities 72% 33.12 10.80 20.88 29.52 58.32 1,623.60
Repos (and security borrowing) - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 23,859.00 28,157.00 35,466.00 49,620.00 76,070.00 24,938.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 3,169.00 2,685.00 1,849.00 7,548.50 31,574.50 8,052.50
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 112,551.00 124,726.00 144,213.00 15,164.00 152,423.00 307,622.00
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Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (105,278.60)(122,530.14)(162,199.18)(33,508.27) (215,946.65)(197,608.76)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
37.25 36.81 29.71 76.24 33.54 56.05
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 442.10 412.30 618.90 896.65 919.90 2,413.40
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.60 0.00 86.40
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 4,938.00 888.00 2,404.50 5,061.00 4,771.50 19,423.50
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 214.70 1.00 4.20
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 0.00 4,407.75 5,813.25 19,950.75 12,542.25 31,800.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 136.00 0.00 203.00
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Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (105,278.60)(122,530.14)(162,199.18)(33,508.27) (215,946.65)(197,608.76)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
37.25 36.81 29.71 76.24 33.54 56.05
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 20,411.00 29,672.00 20,307.00 24,381.00 26,315.00 31,225.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 1,230.10 1,862.10 1,557.60 3,613.60 4,246.80 9,369.20
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% 746.00 737.00 27.00 34.00 151.00 178.00
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 348.50 327.75 319.25 173.25 173.25 1,273.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 50.00 37.00 18,197.00 14,243.00 15,734.00 12,944.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 22.00 7.25 - - - 89.00
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.15: Lloyds TSB’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (6,810.62) (3,127.53) (93,088.44) (109,860.29)(59,383.63) (33,431.78)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 94.80 97.61 38.96 38.44 66.97 91.38
Long-term Funding Weights 124,160.00 127,605.00 59,416.00 68,614.00 120,408.00 354,607.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 1,330.00 2,867.00 26.00 1,991.00 782.00 11,477.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 9,677.00 6,370.00 2,449.00 3,000.00 22,850.00 67,931.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - 4,497.00 9,177.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 6,393.00 6,892.00 3,440.00 11,021.00 566.00 19,732.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 6,634.00 5,825.00 19,399.00 17,132.00 55,329.00 126,368.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 78,245.00 83,151.00 - - - 38,063.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 10,261.00 10,024.00 20,663.00 25,898.00 22,671.00 34,127.00
Equity 100% 11,620.00 12,476.00 13,439.00 9,572.00 13,713.00 47,732.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 120,194.00 127,932.20 139,642.80 163,067.60 165,649.80 372,671.20
Net loans 100% 176,635.00 190,135.00 209,814.00 242,735.00 245,226.00 611,089.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (71,116.00) (76,480.80) (82,191.20) (91,714.40) (92,279.20) (285,008.80)
Equity investments 100% - - - - 56.00 429.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 490.00 487.00 264.00 435.00 995.00 7,406.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,905.00
Investment in property 100% 4,260.00 4,739.00 3,722.00 2,631.00 2,340.00 5,997.00
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Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (6,810.62) (3,127.53) (93,088.44) (109,860.29)(59,383.63) (33,431.78)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 94.80 97.61 38.96 38.44 66.97 91.38
Intangible assets 100% 50.00 138.00 149.00 197.00 205.00 3,496.00
Fixed assets 100% 4,291.00 4,252.00 2,839.00 2,965.00 4,125.00 8,190.00
Other assets 100% 5,584.00 4,662.00 5,046.00 5,819.00 4,982.00 13,168.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 10,779.62 2,800.33 12,861.64 15,406.69 14,141.83 15,367.58
Treasury and other bills 2% 1.74 35.32 32.54 584.18 50.64 121.36
Debt securities 10%-
100%
10,770.98 2,762.76 12,824.75 14,816.36 14,079.04 14,907.97
Equity securities 15% 6.90 2.25 4.35 6.15 12.15 338.25
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.16: Lloyds TSB’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (7,427.15) (13,914.24) (94,187.88) (115,980.57)(61,140.25) (37,524.56)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 94.36 90.17 38.68 37.17 66.32 90.43
Long-term Funding Weights 124,160.00 127,605.00 59,416.00 68,614.00 120,408.00 354,607.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 1,330.00 2,867.00 26.00 1,991.00 782.00 11,477.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 9,677.00 6,370.00 2,449.00 3,000.00 22,850.00 67,931.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - 4,497.00 9,177.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 6,393.00 6,892.00 3,440.00 11,021.00 566.00 19,732.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 6,634.00 5,825.00 19,399.00 17,132.00 55,329.00 126,368.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 78,245.00 83,151.00 - - - 38,063.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 10,261.00 10,024.00 20,663.00 25,898.00 22,671.00 34,127.00
Equity 100% 11,620.00 12,476.00 13,439.00 9,572.00 13,713.00 47,732.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 120,194.00 127,932.20 139,642.80 163,067.60 165,649.80 372,671.20
Net loans 100% 176,635.00 190,135.00 209,814.00 242,735.00 245,226.00 611,089.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (71,116.00) (76,480.80) (82,191.20) (91,714.40) (92,279.20) (285,008.80)
Equity investments 100% - - - - 56.00 429.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 490.00 487.00 264.00 435.00 995.00 7,406.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7,905.00
Investment in property 100% 4,260.00 4,739.00 3,722.00 2,631.00 2,340.00 5,997.00
Intangible assets 100% 50.00 138.00 149.00 197.00 205.00 3,496.00
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Lloyds TSB 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (7,427.15) (13,914.24) (94,187.88) (115,980.57)(61,140.25) (37,524.56)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 94.36 90.17 38.68 37.17 66.32 90.43
Fixed assets 100% 4,291.00 4,252.00 2,839.00 2,965.00 4,125.00 8,190.00
Other assets 100% 5,584.00 4,662.00 5,046.00 5,819.00 4,982.00 13,168.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 11,399.83 13,588.24 13,963.40 21,530.25 15,904.93 19,640.76
Treasury and other bills 17% 14.79 300.22 276.59 4,965.53 430.44 1,031.56
Debt securities 23%-
100%
11,368.48 13,282.62 13,676.37 16,549.96 15,445.33 17,797.40
Equity securities 28% 12.88 4.20 8.12 11.48 22.68 631.40
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.17: Natwest’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (181,808.27)(210,594.80)(227,507.48)(223,969.40)(248,395.63)(35,018.84)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
2.45 2.30 2.58 3.36 2.08 17.94
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,568.00 1,525.00 1,363.00 1,285.00 1,805.00 1,824.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 791.00 1,111.00 1,230.00 2,719.00 1,007.00 3,769.00
Treasury and other bills 98% 45.08 49.00 45.08 - - -
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 782.10 832.50 2,034.00 2,443.50 1,403.10 1,132.20
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 740.35 531.31 566.15 490.44 268.00 196.31
Equity securities 85% 644.30 918.00 787.10 848.30 795.60 733.55
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 29,351.00 29,353.76 28,472.65 33,650.04 33,412.86 32,224.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 6,531.00 7,477.12 7,252.68 8,571.48 8,511.07 665.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 141,464.00 156,274.73 176,620.72 171,434.05 192,915.26 1,528.00
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Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (181,808.27)(210,594.80)(227,507.48)(223,969.40)(248,395.63)(35,018.84)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
2.45 2.30 2.58 3.36 2.08 17.94
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 648.25 1,079.16 1,219.66 1,183.85 1,332.19 79.30
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.55 13.07 30.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 549.00 876.75 986.25 1,645.52 604.69 2,325.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.49 0.00 200.00
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Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (181,808.27)(210,594.80)(227,507.48)(223,969.40)(248,395.63)(35,018.84)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
2.45 2.30 2.58 3.36 2.08 17.94
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 3,040.00 2,423.53 3,063.64 2,457.02 1,168.58 1,528.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 722.60 582.65 736.54 590.70 280.94 158.60
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% 326.00 16.78 28.96 155.93 139.15 95.00
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 454.25 24.05 41.51 223.52 199.46 194.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 3,061.00 - - - - 3,647.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 232.00 994.50 861.00 672.75 860.25 -
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. On demand interbank deposits for 2006 to 2009 are calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand interbank
deposits to interbank deposits due in 1 year. 2. On demand stable retail deposits for 2006 to 2009 are calculated based on the
2005 ratio of on demand stable retail deposits to stable retail deposits due in 1 year. 3. On demand senior debt for 2006 to
2009 is calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand senior debt to senior debt due in 1 year. 4. On demand subordinated
debt for 2006 to 2009 is calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand subordinated debt to subordinated debt due in 1 year.
5. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.18: Natwest’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (182,282.87)(211,261.40)(228,245.48)(225,716.89)(248,977.45)(37,489.63)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
2.20 1.99 2.26 2.61 1.85 12.15
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 1,568.00 1,525.00 1,363.00 1,285.00 1,805.00 1,824.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
- - - - - -
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
- - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% /
85%
316.40 444.40 492.00 971.51 425.18 1,298.21
Treasury and other bills 83% 45.08 49.00 45.08 - - -
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 782.10 832.50 2,034.00 2,443.50 1,403.10 1,132.20
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 740.35 531.31 566.15 490.44 268.00 196.31
Equity securities 72% 644.30 918.00 787.10 848.30 795.60 733.55
Repos (and security borrowing) - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 29,351.00 29,353.76 28,472.65 33,650.04 33,412.86 32,224.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 6,531.00 7,477.12 7,252.68 8,571.48 8,511.07 665.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 141,464.00 156,274.73 176,620.72 171,434.05 192,915.26 1,528.00
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Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (182,282.87)(211,261.40)(228,245.48)(225,716.89)(248,977.45)(37,489.63)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
2.20 1.99 2.26 2.61 1.85 12.15
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 648.25 1,079.16 1,219.66 1,183.85 1,332.19 79.30
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 8.55 13.07 30.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 549.00 876.75 986.25 1,645.52 604.69 2,325.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 28.49 0.00 200.00
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Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (182,282.87)(211,261.40)(228,245.48)(225,716.89)(248,977.45)(37,489.63)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
2.20 1.99 2.26 2.61 1.85 12.15
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 3,040.00 2,423.53 3,063.64 2,457.02 1,168.58 1,528.00
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 722.60 582.65 736.54 590.70 280.94 158.60
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% 326.00 16.78 28.96 155.93 139.15 95.00
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 454.25 24.05 41.51 223.52 199.46 194.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 3,061.00 - - - - 3,647.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 232.00 994.50 861.00 672.75 860.25 -
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. On demand interbank deposits for 2006 to 2009 are calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand interbank
deposits to interbank deposits due in 1 year. 2. On demand stable retail deposits for 2006 to 2009 are calculated based on the
2005 ratio of on demand stable retail deposits to stable retail deposits due in 1 year. 3. On demand senior debt for 2006 to
2009 is calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand senior debt to senior debt due in 1 year. 4. On demand subordinated
debt for 2006 to 2009 is calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand subordinated debt to subordinated debt due in 1 year.
5. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.19: Natwest’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (116,294.17)(124,293.99)(133,367.67)(131,943.76)(88,656.90) (105,623.33)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 26.45 28.51 26.53 29.66 43.05 29.37
Long-term Funding Weights 41,817.00 49,579.00
48,168.00
55,626.00 67,018.00 43,912.41
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 3,588.00 1,950.00 1,883.00 2,840.00 10,998.00 1,451.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year 1
100% 3,495.00 3,361.00 4,505.00 5,273.00 7,904.00 6,467.68
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year2
100% 1,925.00 1,174.00 1,936.00 5,758.00 3,578.00 2,476.44
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 535.00 6,085.00 10,494.00 8,848.00 7,492.00 42.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 17,585.00 20,296.00 11,511.00 10,400.00 13,503.00 -
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,505.00 5,528.00 5,737.00 9,049.00 8,062.00 5,877.00
Equity 100% 10,184.00 11,185.00 12,102.00 13,458.00 15,481.00 16,369.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 156,651.00 172,430.80 180,214.00 186,739.00 155,118.60 147,490.80
Net loans 100% 159,943.00 182,411.00 188,976.00 198,267.00 164,403.00 155,133.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (13,384.00) (19,075.20) (16,744.00) (21,812.00) (21,114.40) (20,951.20)
Equity investments 100% - - - - - 904.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment in property 100% 1,531.00 1,719.00 1,514.00 1,970.00 3,300.00 3,191.00
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Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital(£m) (116,294.17)(124,293.99)(133,367.67)(131,943.76)(88,656.90) (105,623.33)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 26.45 28.51 26.53 29.66 43.05 29.37
Intangible assets 100% 438.00 490.00 471.00 421.00 385.00 683.00
Fixed assets 100% 1,462.00 1,517.00 1,404.00 1,758.00 1,696.00 3,191.00
Other assets 100% 6,661.00 5,369.00 4,593.00 6,135.00 6,449.00 5,340.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 1,460.17 1,442.19 1,321.67 830.76 556.30 2,044.94
Treasury and other bills 2% 0.92 1.00 0.92 - - -
Debt securities 10%-
100%
1,345.55 1,279.19 1,181.85 681.06 415.90 1,915.49
Equity securities 15% 113.70 162.00 138.90 149.70 140.40 129.45
Notes: 1. Customer deposits due in more than 1 year in 2010 are calculated based on the average historical ratio of customer
deposits due in more than 1 year to total customer deposits from 2005 to 2009. 2. Derivative cash flow due in more than 1 year
in 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of derivative cash flow due in more than 1 year to total derivative
cash flow from 2005 to 2009. 3.‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.273
Table F.20: Natwest’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (116,623.08)(124,086.44)(133,873.25)(132,499.65)(89,021.25) (105,928.36)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) % 26.39 28.55 26.46 29.57 42.95 29.31
Long-term Funding Weights 41,817.00 49,579.00 48,168.00 55,626.00 67,018.00 43,912.41
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 3,588.00 1,950.00 1,883.00 2,840.00 10,998.00 1,451.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year1
100% 3,495.00 3,361.00 4,505.00 5,273.00 7,904.00 6,467.68
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year2
100% 1,925.00 1,174.00 1,936.00 5,758.00 3,578.00 2,476.44
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 535.00 6,085.00 10,494.00 8,848.00 7,492.00 42.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 17,585.00 20,296.00 11,511.00 10,400.00 13,503.00 -
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 4,505.00 5,528.00 5,737.00 9,049.00 8,062.00 5,877.00
Equity 100% 10,184.00 11,185.00 12,102.00 13,458.00 15,481.00 16,369.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 156,651.00 172,430.80 180,214.00 186,739.00 155,118.60 147,490.80
Net loans 100% 159,943.00 182,411.00 188,976.00 198,267.00 164,403.00 155,133.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (13,384.00) (19,075.20) (16,744.00) (21,812.00) (21,114.40) (20,951.20)
Equity investments 100% - - - - - 904.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Investment in property 100% 1,531.00 1,719.00 1,514.00 1,970.00 3,300.00 3,191.00
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Natwest 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (116,623.08)(124,086.44)(133,873.25)(132,499.65)(89,021.25) (105,928.36)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) % 26.39 28.55 26.46 29.57 42.95 29.31
Intangible assets 100% 438.00 490.00 471.00 421.00 385.00 683.00
Fixed assets 100% 1,462.00 1,517.00 1,404.00 1,758.00 1,696.00 3,191.00
Other assets 100% 6,661.00 5,369.00 4,593.00 6,135.00 6,449.00 5,340.00
Total Illiquid Security Weights 1,789.08 1,234.64 1,827.25 1,386.65 920.65 2,349.97
Treasury and other bills 17% 7.82 8.50 7.82 - - -
Debt Securities 23%-
100%
1,569.02 923.74 1,560.15 1,107.21 658.57 2,108.33
Equity securities 28% 212.24 302.40 259.28 279.44 262.08 241.64
Notes: 1. Customer deposits due in more than 1 year in 2010 are calculated based on the average historical ratio of customer
deposits due in more than 1 year to total customer deposits from 2005 to 2009. 2. Derivative cash flow due in more than 1 year
in 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of derivative cash flow due in more than 1 year to total derivative
cash flow from 2005 to 2009. 3.‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.275
Table F.21: RBS Bank Plc’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (377,384.49)(446,726.82)(600,492.56)(592,871.78)(520,712.64)(398,333.61)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
13.14 11.39 9.75 25.60 20.40 27.30
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 4,759.00 6,121.00 5,559.00 6,806.00 27,060.00 49,838.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 23,881.00 28,367.00 41,432.00 175,147.00 70,023.00 62,662.00
Treasury and other bills 98% 5,427.24 5,388.04 - - - -
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 15,890.40 12,955.50 11,767.50 13,247.10 31,971.60 32,737.50
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 5,722.47 3,023.04 4,813.28 7,264.81 2,891.72 3,182.50
Equity securities 85% 1,393.15 1,542.75 1,331.95 1,563.15 1,538.50 1,157.70
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 69,383.00 86,874.00 92,282.16 113,057.34 71,190.23 51,841.75
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 15,479.50 18,962.50 25,818.42 31,630.83 19,917.38 14,504.12
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 286,738.00 324,718.00 430,297.00 438,114.00 436,337.00 385,404.36
Continued on next page
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RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (377,384.49)(446,726.82)(600,492.56)(592,871.78)(520,712.64)(398,333.61)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
13.14 11.39 9.75 25.60 20.40 27.30
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 2,212.25 2,471.95 21,514.85 21,905.70 21,816.85 3,585.08
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 29.04 12.80 4.77 24.83
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 18,333.75 22,560.75 33,418.46 122,446.44 52,282.56 46,163.47
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 513.70 1,882.22 803.68 709.61
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RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (377,384.49)(446,726.82)(600,492.56)(592,871.78)(520,712.64)(398,333.61)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
13.14 11.39 9.75 25.60 20.40 27.30
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 19,272.00 19,573.00 27,431.13 42,238.74 33,355.14 27,665.95
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 4,524.00 2,004.70 5,212.09 8,025.63 6,337.69 5,256.70
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% 530.00 746.00 130.71 299.62 220.16 173.42
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 886.00 774.25 170.07 389.85 286.46 225.64
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 16,533.00 25,102.00 27,905.88 16,498.92 11,371.39 12,065.46
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 566.25 337.00 672.78 397.77 274.15 290.88
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. On demand interbank deposits for 2007 to 2010 are calculated based on the average historical ratio of on demand
interbank deposits to interbank deposits due in 1 year from 2005 to 2006. 2. On demand stable retail deposits in 2010 are
calculated based on the average historical ratio of on demand stable retail deposits to stable retail deposits due in 1 year from
2005 to 2009. 3. On demand senior debt for 2007 to 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of on demand senior
debt to senior debt due in 1 year from 2005 to 2006. 4. On demand subordinated debt for 2007 to 2010 is calculated based on
the average historical ratio of on demand subordinated debt to subordinated debt due in 1 year from 2005 to 2006. 5. Other
on demand financial liabilities designated at fair value for 2007 to 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of on
demand other financial liabilities designated at fair value to other financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year from
2005 to 2006. 6.‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.22: RBS Bank Plc’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (385,159.79)(454,365.07)(609,829.02)(623,341.98)(537,227.54)(413,759.32)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
11.35 9.87 8.35 21.78 17.88 24.48
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 4,759.00 6,121.00 5,559.00 6,806.00 27,060.00 49,838.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100%
/85%
- - - - - -
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100%
/85%
- - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100%
/85%
20,298.85 24,111.95 34,717.40 147,913.64 58,793.12 52,617.09
Treasury and other bills 83% 4,596.54 4,563.34 - - - -
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 13,595.12 11,084.15 10,067.75 11,333.63 27,353.48 28,008.75
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 4,868.37 2,571.84 4,094.88 6,180.51 2,460.12 2,707.50
Equity securities 72% 1,180.08 1,306.80 1,128.24 1,324.08 1,303.20 980.64
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 69,383.00 86,874.00 92,282.16 113,057.34 71,190.23 51,841.75
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 15,479.50 18,962.50 25,818.42 31,630.83 19,917.38 14,504.12
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 286,738.00 324,718.00 430,297.00 438,114.00 436,337.00 385,404.36
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RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (385,159.79)(454,365.07)(609,829.02)(623,341.98)(537,227.54)(413,759.32)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
11.35 9.87 8.35 21.78 17.88 24.48
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 2,212.25 2,471.95 21,514.85 21,905.70 21,816.85 3,585.08
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 29.04 12.80 4.77 24.83
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 18,333.75 22,560.75 33,418.46 122,446.44 52,282.56 46,163.47
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 513.70 1,882.22 803.68 709.61
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RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (385,159.79)(454,365.07)(609,829.02)(623,341.98)(537,227.54)(413,759.32)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
11.35 9.87 8.35 21.78 17.88 24.48
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 19,272.00 19,573.00 27,431.13 42,238.74 33,355.14 27,665.95
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 4,524.00 2,004.70 5,212.09 8,025.63 6,337.69 5,256.70
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% 530.00 746.00 130.71 299.62 220.16 173.42
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 886.00 774.25 170.07 389.85 286.46 225.64
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 16,533.00 25,102.00 27,905.88 16,498.92 11,371.39 12,065.46
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 566.25 337.00 672.78 397.77 274.15 290.88
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. On demand interbank deposits for 2007 to 2010 are calculated based on the average historical ratio of on demand
interbank deposits to interbank deposits due in 1 year from 2005 to 2006. 2. On demand stable retail deposits in 2010 are
calculated based on the average historical ratio of on demand stable retail deposits to stable retail deposits due in 1 year from
2005 to 2009. 3. On demand senior debt for 2007 to 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of on demand senior
debt to senior debt due in 1 year from 2005 to 2006. 4. On demand subordinated debt for 2007 to 2010 is calculated based on
the average historical ratio of on demand subordinated debt to subordinated debt due in 1 year from 2005 to 2006. 5. Other
on demand financial liabilities designated at fair value for 2007 to 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of on
demand other financial liabilities designated at fair value to other financial liabilities designated at fair value due in 1 year from
2005 to 2006. 6.‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.23: RBS Bank Plc’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (172,965.34)(176,361.27)(171,042.47)325,967.66 49,214.02 103,754.30
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 53.54 57.05 65.63 153.59 109.40 121.64
Long-term Funding Weights 199,326.00 234,275.00 326,636.00 934,231.00 572,809.00 583,135.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 9,547.00 7,393.00 7,589.00 5,663.00 5,113.00 4,370.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 11,857.00 10,563.00 12,685.00 15,015.00 16,965.00 15,219.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 72,060.00 88,032.00 157,710.00 742,897.00 353,576.00 354,161.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 21,710.00 42,986.00 50,580.00 57,447.00 75,681.00 84,429.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 25,190.00 23,026.00 23,252.00 27,867.00 31,926.00 36,402.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 24,348.00 23,943.00 26,985.00 38,092.00 33,351.00 30,947.00
Equity 100% 34,614.00 38,332.00 47,835.00 47,250.00 56,197.00 57,607.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 361,245.60 404,241.60 489,933.20 566,861.40 486,684.80 447,659.40
Net loans 100% 418,920.00 468,506.00 551,449.00 619,503.00 536,169.00 518,321.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (87,306.40) (95,238.40) (93,888.80) (110,997.60) (112,159.20) (116,541.60)
Equity investments 100% - - 5,509.00 2,691.00 2,405.00 2,340.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 1,096.00 1,181.00 919.00 4,254.00 2,835.00 4,625.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 788.00 561.00 500.00 11,756.00 10,291.00 6,680.00
Investment in property 100% 4,346.00 4,884.00 3,431.00 - - 4,170.00
Intangible assets 100% 1,044.00 937.00 978.00 759.00 8,017.00 1,107.00
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RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (172,965.34)(176,361.27)(171,042.47)325,967.66 49,214.02 103,754.30
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 53.54 57.05 65.63 153.59 109.40 121.64
Fixed assets 100% 10,396.00 10,166.00 9,594.00 16,628.00 17,309.00 11,973.00
Other assets 100% 11,962.00 13,245.00 11,442.00 22,268.00 21,818.00 14,985.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 11,045.74 6,394.67 7,745.27 41,401.94 36,910.18 31,721.30
Treasury and other bills 2% 110.76 109.96 - - - -
Debt securities 10%-
100%
10,689.13 6,012.46 7,510.22 41,126.09 36,638.68 31,517.00
Equity securities 15% 245.85 272.25 235.05 275.85 271.50 204.30
Notes: 1.‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.24: RBS Bank Plc’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital ( £m) (177,158.49)(179,744.47)(173,664.33)322,730.82 43,929.00 98,373.49
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 52.94 56.59 65.29 152.78 108.31 120.29
Long-term Funding Weights 199,326.00 234,275.00 326,636.00 934,231.00 572,809.00 583,135.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 9,547.00 7,393.00 7,589.00 5,663.00 5,113.00 4,370.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 11,857.00 10,563.00 12,685.00 15,015.00 16,965.00 15,219.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 72,060.00 88,032.00 157,710.00 742,897.00 353,576.00 354,161.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 21,710.00 42,986.00 50,580.00 57,447.00 75,681.00 84,429.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 25,190.00 23,026.00 23,252.00 27,867.00 31,926.00 36,402.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 24,348.00 23,943.00 26,985.00 38,092.00 33,351.00 30,947.00
Equity 100% 34,614.00 38,332.00 47,835.00 47,250.00 56,197.00 57,607.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 361,245.60 404,241.60 489,933.20 566,861.40 486,684.80 447,659.40
Net loans 100% 418,920.00 468,506.00 551,449.00 619,503.00 536,169.00 518,321.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (87,306.40) (95,238.40) (93,888.80) (110,997.60) (112,159.20) (116,541.60)
Equity investments 100% - - 5,509.00 2,691.00 2,405.00 2,340.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 1,096.00 1,181.00 919.00 4,254.00 2,835.00 4,625.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 788.00 561.00 500.00 11,756.00 10,291.00 6,680.00
Investment in property 100% 4,346.00 4,884.00 3,431.00 - - 4,170.00
Intangible assets 100% 1,044.00 937.00 978.00 759.00 8,017.00 1,107.00
Continued on next page
284
Table F.24 –continued from previous page
RBS Bank Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital ( £m) (177,158.49)(179,744.47)(173,664.33)322,730.82 43,929.00 98,373.49
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 52.94 56.59 65.29 152.78 108.31 120.29
Fixed assets 100% 10,396.00 10,166.00 9,594.00 16,628.00 17,309.00 11,973.00
Other assets 100% 11,962.00 13,245.00 11,442.00 22,268.00 21,818.00 14,985.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 15,370.01 9,923.07 10,492.49 44,785.90 42,340.00 37,211.07
Treasury and other bills 17% 941.46 934.66 - - - -
Debt securities 23%-
100%
13,838.51 8,335.01 9,928.37 44,123.86 41,688.40 36,720.75
Equity securities 28% 458.92 508.20 438.76 514.92 506.80 381.36
Notes: 1.‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.25: Santander UK Plc’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (9,740.00) (172,253.54)(44,377.90) (69,962.56) (77,660.36) (53,489.55)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
91.27 31.79 64.10 53.07 48.55 63.56
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 991.00 888.00 1,038.00 4,017.00 4,163.00 26,502.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% 58,231.00 62,314.00 56,427.00 26,264.00 33,290.00 35,461.00
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% 30,597.00 8,713.00 11,783.00 11,377.00 12,358.00 6,777.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 11,855.00 8,336.00 9,951.00 35,125.00 22,827.00 24,377.00
Treasury and other bills 98% - - - - - -
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% - - - 2,144.70 364.50 112.50
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt1
67% - 5.36 5.36 157.45 229.14 17.33
Equity securities 85% 110.50 12.75 27.20 38.25 42.50 42.50
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 845.00 102.00 416.00 2,375.00 3,716.00 3,478.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 2,385.00 3,277.00 3,787.50 4,614.00 971.50 462.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 53,326.00 57,009.00 55,766.00 102,170.00 105,157.00 104,664.00
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Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (9,740.00) (172,253.54)(44,377.90) (69,962.56) (77,660.36) (53,489.55)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
91.27 31.79 64.10 53.07 48.55 63.56
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 583.45 392.40 610.45 1,236.20 1,269.85 1,670.30
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 107.10 111.80
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 39,498.00 43,267.50 41,922.75 31,021.50 33,810.75 31,281.75
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 5,961.00 6,246.75 6,867.00 4,675.50 3,237.75 2,662.50
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 109.00 137.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 8,448.00 141,363.00 12,736.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (9,740.00) (172,253.54)(44,377.90) (69,962.56) (77,660.36) (53,489.55)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
91.27 31.79 64.10 53.07 48.55 63.56
Senior debt (on demand)2 100% 74.00 147.75 251.71 520.01 444.05 387.43
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 327.30 653.50 1,113.30 2,300.00 1,964.00 1,713.60
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 26.25 - 104.25 135.50 116.00 210.50
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 50.50 63.75 34.00 38.25 31.50 -
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. Other debt securities(including foreign debt)in 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of other debt
securities (including foreign debt) to total debt securities from 2005 to 2009. 2. On demand senior debt for 2006 to 2010 is
calculated based on the 2005 ratio on demand senior debt to senior debt due in 1 year. 3. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided
by the bank.
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Table F.26: Santander UK Plc’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (24,859.35) (184,160.74)(56,107.01) (81,216.60) (87,028.46) (61,166.24)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
77.71 27.07 54.61 45.52 42.34 58.33
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 991.00 888.00 1,038.00 4,017.00 4,163.00 26,502.00
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
49,496.35 52,966.90 47,962.95 22,324.40 30,901.00 32,919.00
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% /
85%
26,007.45 7,406.05 10,015.55 9,670.45 9,021.90 5,445.10
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% /
85%
10,076.75 7,085.60 8,458.35 29,856.25 19,277.35 20,599.55
Treasury and other bills 83% - - - - - -
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% - - - 1,834.91 311.85 96.25
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt1
57% - 4.56 4.56 133.95 194.94 14.75
Equity securities 72% 93.60 10.80 23.04 32.40 36.00 36.00
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 845.00 102.00 416.00 2,375.00 3,716.00 3,478.00
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 2,385.00 3,277.00 3,787.50 4,614.00 971.50 462.00
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 53,326.00 57,009.00 55,766.00 102,170.00 105,157.00 104,664.00
Continued on next page
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Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (24,859.35) (184,160.74)(56,107.01) (81,216.60) (87,028.46) (61,166.24)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
77.71 27.07 54.61 45.52 42.34 58.33
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 583.45 392.40 610.45 1,236.20 1,269.85 1,670.30
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 107.10 111.80
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 39,498.00 43,267.50 41,922.75 31,021.50 33,810.75 31,281.75
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 5,961.00 6,246.75 6,867.00 4,675.50 3,237.75 2,662.50
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 109.00 137.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 8,448.00 141,363.00 12,736.50 0.00 0.00 0.00
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Continued on next page
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Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (24,859.35) (184,160.74)(56,107.01) (81,216.60) (87,028.46) (61,166.24)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
77.71 27.07 54.61 45.52 42.34 58.33
Senior debt (on demand)2 100% 74.00 147.75 251.71 520.01 444.05 387.43
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 327.30 653.50 1,113.30 2,300.00 1,964.00 1,713.60
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - - - -
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% 26.25 - 104.25 135.50 116.00 210.50
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 50.50 63.75 34.00 38.25 31.50 -
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. Other debt securities(including foreign debt) in 2010 is calculated based on the average historical ratio of other debt
securities (including foreign debt) to total debt securities from 2005 to 2009. 2. On demand senior debt for 2006 to 2010 is
calculated based on the 2005 ratio of on demand senior debt to senior debt due in 1 year. 3. ‘ - ’ denotes no information
provided by the bank.
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Table F.27: Santander UK Plc’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) 31,860.30 31,098.11 70,919.56 36,734.40 (1,130.06) 17,772.40
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 209.82 212.56 374.12 150.09 98.52 122.14
Long-term Funding Weights 60,872.00 58,725.00 96,791.00 110,076.00 75,095.00 98,044.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 2.00 - - 3,123.00 159.00 3,441.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 894.00 1,662.00 2,086.00 4,353.00 14,130.00 15,672.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 15,248.00 7,431.00 8,371.00 6,309.00 5,678.00 4,394.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 10,437.00 17,933.00 15,746.00 2,267.00 1,978.00 2,271.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 17,929.00 22,543.00 56,052.00 69,536.00 29,715.00 36,812.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 5,348.00 1,335.00 3,818.00 6,231.00 7,623.00 11,808.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 6,100.00 4,705.00 7,276.00 10,750.00 8,590.00 11,372.00
Equity 100% 3,110.00 2,813.84 3,108.23 6,902.00 6,334.00 11,380.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% 1,804.00 302.16 333.77 605.00 888.00 894.00
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 28,992.20 27,622.00 25,864.00 73,019.00 76,064.20 80,251.60
Net loans 100% 95,467.00 103,146.00 112,147.00 186,863.00 193,183.00 200,600.00
(Residential mortgages) -80% (75,484.80) (81,692.00) (88,696.00) (127,344.00) (128,372.80) (132,858.40)
Equity investments 100% 24.00 22.00 29.00 35.00 75.00 2.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 741.00 727.00 432.00 3,412.00 1,355.00 2,426.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 6,687.00 6,379.00 5,468.00
Investment in property 100% - 415.00 528.00 1,202.00 1,250.00 1,705.00
Continued on next page
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Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) 31,860.30 31,098.11 70,919.56 36,734.40 (1,130.06) 17,772.40
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 209.82 212.56 374.12 150.09 98.52 122.14
Intangible assets 100% 1,756.00 - 90.00 88.00 183.00 284.00
Fixed assets 100% 314.00 415.00 528.00 754.00 938.00 1,470.00
Other assets 100% 6,175.00 4,589.00 806.00 1,322.00 1,074.00 1,155.00
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 19.50 4.89 7.44 322.60 160.86 20.00
Treasury and other bills 2% - - - - - -
Debt securities 10%-
100%
- 2.64 2.64 315.85 153.36 12.50
Equity securities 15% 19.50 2.25 4.80 6.75 7.50 7.50
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.28: Santander UK Plc’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) 31,843.40 31,095.36 70,914.60 36,395.26 (1,223.41) 17,749.65
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 209.70 212.54 374.05 149.40 98.40 122.11
Long-term Funding Weights 60,872.00 58,725.00 96,791.00 110,076.00 75,095.00 98,044.00
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 2.00 - - 3,123.00 159.00 3,441.00
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 894.00 1,662.00 2,086.00 4,353.00 14,130.00 15,672.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% 15,248.00 7,431.00 8,371.00 6,309.00 5,678.00 4,394.00
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 10,437.00 17,933.00 15,746.00 2,267.00 1,978.00 2,271.00
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 17,929.00 22,543.00 56,052.00 69,536.00 29,715.00 36,812.00
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 5,348.00 1,335.00 3,818.00 6,231.00 7,623.00 11,808.00
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 6,100.00 4,705.00 7,276.00 10,750.00 8,590.00 11,372.00
Equity 100% 3,110.00 2,813.84 3,108.23 6,902.00 6,334.00 11,380.00
Hybrid capital securities 100% 1,804.00 302.16 333.77 605.00 888.00 894.00
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 28,992.20 27,622.00 25,864.00 73,019.00 76,064.20 80,251.60
Net loans 100% 95,467.00 103,146.00 112,147.00 186,863.00 193,183.00 200,600.00
(Residental mortgages) -80% (75,484.80) (81,692.00) (88,696.00) (127,344.00) (128,372.80) (132,858.40)
Equity investments 100% 24.00 22.00 29.00 35.00 75.00 2.00
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 741.00 727.00 432.00 3,412.00 1,355.00 2,426.00
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 6,687.00 6,379.00 5,468.00
Investment in property 100% - 415.00 528.00 1,202.00 1,250.00 1,705.00
Continued on next page
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Santander UK Plc 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Stress Long-term £m £m £m £m £m £m
Net Cash Capital (£m) 31,843.40 31,095.36 70,914.60 36,395.26 (1,223.41) 17,749.65
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 209.70 212.54 374.05 149.40 98.40 122.11
Intangible assets 100% 1,756.00 - 90.00 88.00 183.00 284.00
Fixed assets 100% 314.00 415.00 528.00 754.00 938.00 1,470.00
Other assets 100% 6,175.00 4,589.00 806.00 1,322.00 1,074.00 1,155.00
Total Illiquid Securities weights 46.80 8.84 14.96 172.06 174.38 20.88
Treasury and other bills 17% - - - - - -
Debt securities 23%-
100%
- 3.44 3.44 155.86 156.38 2.88
Equity securities 28% 36.40 4.20 8.96 12.60 14.00 14.00
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.29: Standard Chartered’s Normal Short-term Liquidity Position
Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (57,154.32) (65,845.80) (81,341.29) (158,420.90)(134,695.46)(149,127.35)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
30.09 30.32 32.71 45.62 33.94 37.73
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 4,524.38 3,988.33 5,107.85 21,090.14 11,226.72 20,959.72
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100% 5,835.05 8,141.94 11,524.92 13,464.48 13,898.56 17,306.95
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100% 5,291.24 6,815.09 13,154.41 60,803.60 23,649.11 30,653.69
Treasury and other bills 98% 3,187.27 3,294.03 2,881.33 12,479.85 7,123.29 7,194.42
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
90% 2,880.31 2,846.35 3,099.50 13,967.54 8,046.98 7,903.07
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
67% 2,628.58 3,226.09 3,233.68 10,063.67 4,715.10 5,443.62
Equity securities 85% 258.58 337.23 533.37 1,031.72 537.40 877.69
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 9,372.33 12,490.87 12,813.05 27,206.55 21,499.24 17,014.88
Interbank deposits due in 1 year 50% 773.64 870.41 592.61 1,476.07 918.58 723.12
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 58,327.30 65,171.80 80,784.35 183,700.93 142,621.57 172,430.93
Continued on next page
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Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (57,154.32) (65,845.80) (81,341.29) (158,420.90)(134,695.46)(149,127.35)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
30.09 30.32 32.71 45.62 33.94 37.73
Stable Retail deposits due in 1
year
5% 408.02 493.78 398.66 945.96 687.25 1,199.78
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 268.79 409.41
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 2,642.37 3,873.70 5,365.13 10,133.06 4,720.16 6,525.89
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 199.20
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.79 6.73
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 4,177.65 5,324.64 9,890.66 44,370.60 16,651.53 22,455.61
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.88 180.62
Continued on next page
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Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (57,154.32) (65,845.80) (81,341.29) (158,420.90)(134,695.46)(149,127.35)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
30.09 30.32 32.71 45.62 33.94 37.73
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 4,091.82 4,342.71 5,503.93 10,970.61 7,052.69 6,928.29
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 800.07 477.48 584.18 506.37 565.58 579.78
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - 737.60 447.68 3.20
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% - 64.89 63.00 284.57 - 46.44
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 1,083.66 1,312.35 4,785.57 10,617.08 8,162.29 10,346.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 82.87 67.74 90.86 372.51 168.58 416.65
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.30: Standard Chartered’s Stress Short-term Liquidity Position
Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (60,159.03) (69,537.76) (86,496.13) (175,148.66)(142,736.56)(158,429.65)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
26.42 26.41 28.44 39.88 29.99 33.84
Stock of high-quality liquid
assets
Weights
Cash and deposits with central
banks
100% 4,524.38 3,988.33 5,107.85 21,090.14 11,226.72 20,959.72
Items in course of collection
from other banks
100% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio assets at fair
value due in 1 year
100%
/85%
- - - - - -
Financial assets designated at
fair value due in 1 year
100%
/85%
4,959.79 6,920.65 9,796.18 11,444.81 12,458.18 15,881.01
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year
100%
/85%
4,497.55 5,792.82 11,181.25 51,683.06 20,086.97 25,966.80
Treasury and other bills 83% 2,699.42 2,789.84 2,440.31 10,569.67 6,032.99 6,093.24
Debt securities without govern-
ment sponsorship
0% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Debt securities with government
sponsorship
77% 2,464.26 2,435.21 2,651.79 11,950.01 6,884.64 6,761.52
Other Debt securities, including
foreign debt
57% 2,236.26 2,744.58 2,751.04 8,561.63 4,011.36 4,631.14
Equity securities 72% 219.04 285.65 451.79 873.93 455.21 743.45
Repos (and security borrowing) 100% - - - - - -
Cash outflow Weights
Interbank deposits (on demand) 100% 9,372.33 12,490.87 12,813.05 27,206.55 21,499.24 17,014.88
Interbank deposits due in less
than 1 year
50% 773.64 870.41 592.61 1,476.07 918.58 723.12
Continued on next page
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Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (60,159.03) (69,537.76) (86,496.13) (175,148.66)(142,736.56)(158,429.65)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
26.42 26.41 28.44 39.88 29.99 33.84
Stable Retail deposits (on de-
mand)
100% 58,327.30 65,171.80 80,784.35 183,700.93 142,621.57 172,430.93
Stable Retail deposits due in
less than 1 year
5% 408.02 493.78 398.66 945.96 687.25 1,199.78
Other less stable deposits (on
demand)
100% - - - - - -
Other less stable deposits due in
less than 1 year
10% - - - - - -
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 2 )
75% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Trading portfolio liabilities
(level 3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
1 )
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 268.79 409.41
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
2 )
75% 2,642.37 3,873.70 5,365.13 10,133.06 4,720.16 6,525.89
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due in 1 year (level
3 )
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 199.20
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 1)
10% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 35.79 6.73
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 2)
75% 4,177.65 5,324.64 9,890.66 44,370.60 16,651.53 22,455.61
Continued on next page
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Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Liquidity Coverage (£m) (60,159.03) (69,537.76) (86,496.13) (175,148.66)(142,736.56)(158,429.65)
Liquidity Coverage Ratio
(%)
26.42 26.41 28.44 39.88 29.99 33.84
Derivative cash flow due in 1
year (level 3)
100% 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 92.88 180.62
Senior debt (on demand) 100% 4,091.82 4,342.71 5,503.93 10,970.61 7,052.69 6,928.29
Senior debt due in 1 year 25% 800.07 477.48 584.18 506.37 565.58 579.78
Subordinated debt (on demand) 100% - - - 737.60 447.68 3.20
Subordinated debt due in 1 year 25% - 64.89 63.00 284.57 - 46.44
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value (on demand)
100% 1,083.66 1,312.35 4,785.57 10,617.08 8,162.29 10,346.00
Other financial liabilities desig-
nated at fair value due in 1 year
25% 82.87 67.74 90.86 372.51 168.58 416.65
Repos (and security lending) 10% - - - - - -
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.31: Standard Chartered’s Normal Long-term Liquidity Position
Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (28,120.29) (37,071.34) (34,856.37) (68,860.20) (62,809.21) (78,170.46)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 49.53 47.84 53.03 55.69 47.98 48.64
Long-term Funding Weights 27,595.76 33,999.28 39,356.30 86,555.89 57,938.54 74,023.87
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 528.56 338.32 351.40 1,253.48 777.10 416.97
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 1,806.48 2,298.81 2,905.58 5,645.92 2,610.55 6,292.91
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 1,812.12 2,931.93 6,242.87 30,170.92 12,364.80 16,708.72
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 3,388.20 4,767.04 4,795.10 7,594.23 7,885.51 9,493.49
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 6,447.74 7,792.22 6,100.30 10,558.60 7,554.24 9,724.71
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 5,844.08 6,319.78 7,649.48 12,951.22 9,911.53 10,019.98
Equity 100% 7,768.58 9,551.17 11,311.57 18,381.53 16,834.81 21,367.08
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 51,027.53 61,044.41 67,398.72 144,437.37 110,980.70 140,180.73
Net loans 100% 63,128.38 72,171.33 77,441.53 152,039.98 122,782.41 153,949.30
(Residential mortgages) -80% (19,909.51) (20,563.60) (20,375.98) (33,216.99) (28,551.06) (36,207.21)
Equity investments 100% 72.28 112.95 135.04 446.05 318.27 404.16
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 210.07 345.57 212.85 1,301.49 826.63 1,026.72
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 121.41 70.98 50.20 32.30 19.20 16.01
Investment in property 100% - - - - - -
Intangible assets 100% 1,037.35 1,000.45 451.80 774.26 441.49 532.26
Continued on next page
302
Table F.31 –continued from previous page
Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (28,120.29) (37,071.34) (34,856.37) (68,860.20) (62,809.21) (78,170.46)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) 49.53 47.84 53.03 55.69 47.98 48.64
Fixed assets 100% 928.37 1,123.24 1,451.78 3,130.22 2,540.58 2,886.73
Other assets 100% 5,439.19 6,783.48 8,031.50 19,930.05 12,603.20 17,572.76
Total Illiquid Securities Weights 4,688.52 10,026.21 6,813.95 10,978.73 9,767.05 12,013.60
Treasury and other bills 2% 115.19 129.75 117.14 291.78 234.78 229.23
Debt securities 10%-
100%
4,492.52 9,781.59 6,509.31 10,478.37 9,379.12 11,542.55
Equity securities 15% 80.81 114.86 187.50 208.58 153.16 241.82
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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Table F.32: Standard Chartered’s Stress Long-term Liquidity Position
Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (30,485.74) (35,312.34) (37,750.67) (75,261.33) (67,716.47) (83,150.10)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) % 47.51 49.05 51.04 53.49 46.11 47.10
Long-term Funding Weights 27,595.76 33,999.28 39,356.30 86,555.89 57,938.54 74,023.87
Deposits by banks due in more
than 1 year
100% 528.56 338.32 351.40 1,253.48 777.10 416.97
Customer deposits due in more
than 1 year
100% 1,806.48 2,298.81 2,905.58 5,645.92 2,610.55 6,292.91
Financial liabilities designated
at fair value due after 1 year
100% - - - - - -
Derivative cash flow due in more
than 1 year
100% 1,812.12 2,931.93 6,242.87 30,170.92 12,364.80 16,708.72
Senior debt due in more than 1
year
100% 3,388.20 4,767.04 4,795.10 7,594.23 7,885.51 9,493.49
Other funding due in more than
1 year
100% 6,447.74 7,792.22 6,100.30 10,558.60 7,554.24 9,724.71
Subordinated debt due in more
than 1 year
100% 5,844.08 6,319.78 7,649.48 12,951.22 9,911.53 10,019.98
Equity 100% 7,768.58 9,551.17 11,311.57 18,381.53 16,834.81 21,367.08
Hybrid capital securities 100% - - - - - -
Total Illiquid Assets Weights 51,027.53 61,044.41 67,398.72 144,437.37 110,980.70 140,180.73
Net loans 100% 63,128.38 72,171.33 77,441.53 152,039.98 122,782.41 153,949.30
(Residential mortgages) -80% (19,909.51) (20,563.60) (20,375.98) (33,216.99) (28,551.06) (36,207.21)
Equity investments 100% 72.28 112.95 135.04 446.05 318.27 404.16
Held-to-hedge financial instru-
ments
100% 210.07 345.57 212.85 1,301.49 826.63 1,026.72
Held-to-maturity financial in-
struments
100% 121.41 70.98 50.20 32.30 19.20 16.01
Investment in property 100% - - - - - -
Intangible assets 100% 1,037.35 1,000.45 451.80 774.26 441.49 532.26
Continued on next page
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Table F.32 –continued from previous page
Standard Chartered 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Net Cash Capital (£m) (30,485.74) (35,312.34) (37,750.67) (75,261.33) (67,716.47) (83,150.10)
Net Cash Capital Ratio (%) % 47.51 49.05 51.04 53.49 46.11 47.10
Fixed assets 100% 928.37 1,123.24 1,451.78 3,130.22 2,540.58 2,886.73
Other assets 100% 5,439.19 6,783.48 8,031.50 19,930.05 12,603.20 17,572.76
Total Illiquid Security Weights 7,053.96 8,267.21 9,708.24 17,379.86 14,674.32 16,993.24
Treasury and other bills 17% 979.09 1,102.90 995.66 2,480.09 1,995.59 1,948.50
Debt Securities 23%-
100%
5,924.02 6,949.90 8,362.59 14,510.42 12,392.82 14,593.34
Equity securities 28% 150.84 214.41 349.99 389.35 285.90 451.40
Notes: 1. ‘ - ’ denotes no information provided by the bank.
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